Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sierra International purchased a manufacturing facility's operations. Sierra later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants, the facility and its president, hired Respondent (MCW) to represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. Sierra's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2006, Appellants filed an action against MCW, alleging professional malpractice arising from its representation of Appellants in the bankruptcy action. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(e)(2). In 2010, Appellants filed a second complaint against MCW, reasserting the claims in their first complaint. MCW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations because the appropriate accrual date was 2006, the date of the filing of the first complaint. Appellants responded by asserting that Hewitt v. Allen, which provides that the statutory limitation period of a claim of legal malpractice involving the representation of a client during litigation does not commence until the underlying litigation is concluded, governed. The district court held that 2006 was the appropriate accrual date and that Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holing that Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding under Hewitt. View "Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, LLP" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon and related counts. The Supreme Court identified certain errors in Defendant's sentence on direct appeal and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. After Defendant was resentenced, he filed five successive post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Defendant's untimely and successive fifth petition, concluding that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing and ordering a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant established good cause sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to a consideration of his habeas petition on the merits. Remanded. View " State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Appellants agreed to purchase a restaurant and real property on which the restaurant was located from Respondent. After Appellants failed to make payments on the promissory note, Respondent filed an action against Appellants to recover the principal and unpaid interest. According to Respondent, a third buy-and-sell agreement between the parties was the operative agreement. But during trial, Appellants presented evidence that a fourth written agreement, which was allegedly later destroyed by Respondent or his brother, existed containing the agreed-upon purchase price and terms of the sale. The district court concluded that Appellants' evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because Appellants failed to produce the written agreement. The court then found that Appellants breached the third agreement and entered judgment for Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of the lost or destroyed writing. Remanded. View " Khan v. Bakhsh" on Justia Law

Logan D. was adjudicated delinquent for lewdness with a minor for an offense that occurred when Logan was seventeen years old. The law at the time of Logan's adjudication provided the juvenile court with discretion to require Logan to submit to adult registration and community notification if it determined that Logan was not rehabilitated. The Legislature subsequently passed a bill mandating that all juveniles ages fourteen an older adjudicated for certain sex offenses register as adult sex offenders and be subject to community notification. Logan and twenty other juveniles filed motions asking the juvenile court to find the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The juvenile court declared the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the retroactive application of mandatory sex offender registration and community notification requirements on juveniles adjudicated for certain sex offenses did not violate the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was in custody awaiting trial on a charge of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant successfully litigated a motion to suppress his incriminating statement to police based on his assertion that his statement was obtained through the use of extrinsic falsehoods. The State appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court subsequently set a trial date and denied the State's request to stay the trial pending resolution of its appeal. The State subsequently renewed its motion with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for a stay, holding (1) four factors govern the Court's exercise of discretion in ruling on a stay motion of a criminal proceeding pending resolution of an interlocutory suppression appeal; and (2) the factors weighed in favor of granting the state's motion in this case and staying the trial pending resolution of the State's appeal. View " State v. Robles-Nieves" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and related charges. Defendant timely appealed but died before his appeal was decided. Defendant's attorney filed a suggestion of death and a motion for abatement, arguing that the district court should abate the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss the charging document. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an attorney may file a substantive motion on a deceased client's behalf in a criminal case when, as in this case, a personal representative has not been substituted as a party to the appeal. The Court denied counsel's motion for abatement, holding (1) the attorney lacked authority to act on Defendant's behalf in these circumstances; (2) if a party dies pending a review of his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed unless the decedent's personal representative is substituted in as a party to the appeal within ninety days of the decedent's death; and (3) because the court's process caused the delay in filing the motion for substitution, in this instance only, the time for filing the substitution motion shall be extended. View " Brass v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted sexual assault of a child under fourteen and related charges. Defendant faced strong evidence, including his own admissions, that he had sexual contact with his daughter. During trial, defense counsel made a strategic decision to concede there had been some sexual contact between Defendant and his daughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of all the charges. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court's canvass concerning his counsel's concession strategy was inadequate, and therefore, his consent was involuntary and unknowing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court's inquiry did not fully comply with Hernandez v. State, which provides that a court, when faced with a concession of guilt by defense counsel during trial, must canvass the defendant to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the concession of guilt, the rationale underlying Hernandez is unsound and the opinion therefore must be overruled; (2) a concession-of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of a guilty plea and, therefore, the trial judge has no obligation to canvass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy; and (3) consequently, any deficiencies in the canvass conducted in this case did not warrant relief. View " Armenta-Carpio v. State" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of child abuse and neglect stemming from incidents in which Petitioner slapped and hit his pregnant sixteen-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment, contending (1) the State failed to prove that abuse or neglect occurred, and (2) the State failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of "physical injury" as used in the child-abuse-and-neglect statute. The district court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition as to one of the two counts of child abuse, concluding (1) when alleged "abuse or neglect" is based on a nonaccidental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury"; and (2) the State's failure to inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury" likely caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for one of the two counts of child abuse. View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized during a traffic stop. The police officer stopped Defendant for speeding, issued a warning, and then ordered Defendant to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. Defendant contended that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, unlawfully seizing him, and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court suppressed the evidence based on the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegitimate when the officer detains the driver beyond the time required to process the traffic offense unless the extended detention is de minimis, consensual, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the prolonged stop in this case met none of these exceptions and was therefore unconstitutional. View " State v. Beckman" on Justia Law

Appellant hired Law Firm to represent him in a divorce action. After a post-decree dispute, Appellant paid Law Firm for the firm's work through entry of the final decree but did not pay Law Firm the fees it charged to litigate the post-decree dispute. The district court granted Law Firm's post-decree motion to adjudicate and enforce a charging lien for unpaid attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015, entering personal judgment against Appellant. Under section 18.015(3), a charging lien only attaches to a decree and to money recovered on account of the action from the time of service of the notices. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Law Firm did not serve the statutory notices required to perfect its lien until the case was over and the decree had already become final, and because no prospect of post-perfection recovery appeared, the lien should not have been adjudicated under section 18.015. View " Leventhal v. Black & LoBello" on Justia Law