Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. Based on evidence of domestic violence, Mother obtained a fictitious address from the Secretary of State, who could not disclose Mother's true address without a court order. Father subsequently filed in the Supreme Court an original petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the Secretary to remove Mother from the fictitious address program. At issue before the Court was whether Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's home address. The Supreme Court denied the petition, concluding that the Court was not the proper court to consider Father's petition for extraordinary relief. The court then held (1) as a co-parent, Father may seek the disclosure of Mother's address in the district court by extraordinary writ; and (2) in determining whether to grant the writ, the district court must consider whether Mother can establish that Father was a perpetrator of domestic violence, and if established, the burden shifts to Father to show that despite the domestic violence, disclosure is in the child's best interest. View "Falconi v. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

The State charged Respondent with misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence incident. A justice of the peace, who was sitting as a district court hearing master pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing masters, presided over Defendant's preliminary hearing. Respondent pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery, and the judge sentenced him on that charge. The judge then accepted Respondent's plea to the felony charge. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of the peace, who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. The district court granted Respondent's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a justice of the peace who has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace. View " State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for professional negligence against a doctor of podiatric medicine and his employer. Appellant filed the complaint without a supporting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 affidavit of merit because podiatrists are not considered "physicians" under chapter 41A for medical malpractice claims purposes. While Appellant's case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fierle v. Perez concluding that an affidavit of merit is required under section 41A.071 for both medical malpractice and professional negligence complaints. Relying on Fierle, the district court dismissed Appellant's complaint without prejudice. Appellant was subsequently unable to file a new complaint because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Fierle, the Court expanded the reach of section 41A.071 beyond its precise words, and therefore, Fierle was overruled; (2) professional negligence actions are not subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language of section 41A.071; and (3) therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed Appellant's professional negligence complaint for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit. View " Egan v. Chambers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and battery by strangulation, a felony. Appellant's defense was parental discipline privilege as to the child abuse charge and self-defense as to the battery charge. Appellant challenged (1) the district court's admission of evidence that Appellant had struck one of his sons in public and that Defendant got into an argument with nursing staff about his son, and (2) the court's admission of testimony from a witness reporting that she also had a heated exchange with Appellant over his disciplining a young boy. Appellant alleged the admission of this evidence violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045's prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one of the episodes involving one of Defendant's sons was properly admitted to refute Appellant's claim of parental privilege; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony about the incident involving Appellant's discipline of the young boy, but the error was harmless. View " Newman v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal was taken from a district court order in a quiet title action. While the appeal was pending, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) declared twenty-seven unpatented mining claims asserted by Appellant forfeit and void by operation of law because Appellant failed to comply with the statutory mining claim maintenance requirement. Consequently, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was rendered moot when the BLM declared Appellant's asserted claims forfeit and void. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the appeal was moot because the controversy that existed at the beginning of this litigation concerning superior title was no longer at issue, and Appellant's claims did not exist as a matter of law. View "Majuba Mining, Ltd. v. Pumpkin Copper, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with sexual assault of a minor and lewdness with a child. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault count and set a date for a new trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited a second trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness, and both offenses were based upon the same event. The district court denied the motion based on the jury's inability to reach of verdict on the sexual assault count. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) in determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, the district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact; (2) in conducting this analysis, the court may not consider the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the other counts; and (3) in this case, the district court improperly analyzed Petitioner's double jeopardy claim. View "Gonzalez v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of invasion of a home in violation of a temporary protective order (TPO). Defendant did not file a motion with the district court regarding the TPO's validity and did not address the issue during his sentencing. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the procurement of the TPO violated the procedure set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.020(5) and violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant may not collaterally attack the TPO's validity in a subsequent prosecution for violating the TPO; and (2) the other issues Defendant raised on appeal also lacked merit. View " Truesdell v. State" on Justia Law