Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Judgment creditors obtained judgments in Florida against Jeffrey Kirsch and various entities he created (collectively, judgment debtors). Kirsch also created Rock Bay, a Nevada company. After the Florida litigation began, a series of monetary transfers occurred between Rock Bay and the judgment debtors. When the judgment creditors were unsuccessful in executing their judgments on the judgment debtors' assets, they domesticated the Florida judgments in Nevada. Kirsch voluntarily dissolved Rock Bay one week later. The judgment creditors then served a subpoena on a Las Vegas accounting firm that performed accounting services for the judgment debtors and Rock Bay, seeking records related to the judgment debtors and Rock Bay. Rock Bay unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it was not a party to the underlying litigation. The Supreme Court found the district court did not exceed its authority over Rock Bay, holding that discovery of a nonparty's assets under Nev. R. Civ. P. 69(a) is not permissible absent special circumstances, including those in which the relationship between the judgment debtor and the nonparty raises reasonable suspicion as to the good faith of asset transfers between the two, or in which the nonparty is the alter ego of the judgment debtor. View "Rock Bay, LLC v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and discharging a firearm at or into a vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was denied his counsel of choice at his preliminary hearing before the justice court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justice court's denial of Defendant's request to be represented by retained counsel at the preliminary hearing violated Defendant's qualified right to counsel of his choice; but (2) the denial of Defendant's counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing was harmless error. View " Patterson v. State" on Justia Law

More than a year after Wife's and Husband's divorce, Wife filed a motion to reopen discovery. Wife also filed a motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery, asserting that Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion would create an appearance of impropriety because Husband and others connected to the parties' divorce contributed to the judge's reelection complain. Judge Togliatti denied Wife's motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez, and the Judge Gonzalez went on to preside over Wife's motion to reopen discovery. Wife subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition vacating Judge Togliatti's order and disqualifying Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery. The Supreme Court denied Wife's petition, holding that the failure to disqualify Judge Gonzalez did not violate Wife's due process rights or Nevada law, as all of the campaign contributions at issue were within statutory limits and made after the divorce decree. View "Ivey v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for libel per se and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on Defendant's posting on the Internet accusing Plaintiff and his wife, a city councilwoman, of not following city municipal code requirements for the licensure of their law firm. Plaintiff, however, voluntarily dismissed the suit nine days after Defendant received the complaint and before Defendant filed an answer or any pleading in the case. Defendant then filed a separate complaint against Plaintiff, seeking damages and attorney fees pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action before the defendant files either an initial responsive pleading or a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.670, the defendant cannot file an anti-SLAPP suit against the plaintiff based on that action. View " Stubbs v. Strickland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Respondents hired a construction company (Company) to construct a shooting range. Respondents paid Company's bills as the construction continued through the summer and fall. By September, Company had billed $48,810. Respondents paid $46,000 by October but then refused to pay anything further. Soon thereafter, Company quit the project, which was largely finished. The range opened for business soon after. At the end of the year, Respondents installed soundproofing to the building. In March 2010, Company recorded its mechanics lien. In August, Company filed a complaint against Respondents seeking to recover $40,000 in damages and costs. The district court held the lien was not timely and was therefore frivolous and ordered the lien released, ruling that the "work of improvement" of constructing the shooting range concluded more than ninety days before Company filed the lien. At issue on appeal was whether the soundproofing constituted a "work of improvement." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the soundproofing was not within the scope of the "work of improvement" or finding that the lien was untimely and frivolous. View "I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Child was placed into the protective custody of the County Department of Social Services after Child was found with her extremely intoxicated mother. Child's father (Father) was not involved in the events leading to Child's removal. Social Services filed a petition for neglect against both parents, but the petition was dismissed as to Father. The juvenile court denied Child's placement with Father and placed Child in the legal custody of Social Services while Father was ordered to comply with a case plan for reunification with Child. Social Services then filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to comply with a case plan and accept services for purposes of reunification when Father was not found to have neglected the child; (2) keeping Child from the custody of Father when there were no substantiated findings he had neglected Child violated Father's fundamental constitutional rights to parent his child; and (3) the presumptions favoring termination of parental rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.109, which arose from Child being placed outside the home in the dependence proceeding, did not apply to Father. View "Washoe County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Kory L.G." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a civil complaint against Respondent. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint and filed a motion for an order declaring Appellant to be a vexatious litigant. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigant. Appellant's appeal was untimely as to the order of dismissal but timely as to the vexatious litigant order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the vexatious litigant order was substantively appealable. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that vexatious litigant orders are not independently appealable under any statutory provision. View "Peck v. Crouser" on Justia Law

Respondents sought to permanently enjoin their neighbor, Appellant, from constructing a wind turbine on his residential property, asserting that the proposed turbine would constitute a nuisance. The district court agreed and granted the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the wind turbine's construction, holding (1) the aesthetics of a wind turbine alone are not grounds for finding a nuisance, but a nuisance in fact may be found when the aesthetics are combined with other factors, such as noise, shadow flicker, and diminution in property value; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that the proposed residential wind turbine would be a nuisance in fact. View "Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision" on Justia Law

Kourtney Morrow filed a complaint for divorce from Craig Morrow and a motion for child custody. A hearing on the motion was set to be heard by Judge Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney served Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. On May 4, 2012, Craig made his first appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. The matter was reassigned to Judge Cynthia Steel, who rejected the peremptory challenge and transferred the matter back to Judge Teuton, ruling that the time to file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Kourtney served Craig with the complaint and motion. Craig filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has made a first appearance. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the requested writ, holding (1) the time to file a peremptory challenge begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing and may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the action; but (2) the ten-day window in which to file a challenge excludes intermediate nonjudicial days, and thus, the instant peremptory challenge was timely filed. View "Morrow v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner, and Richard Tannery was appointed to represent Petitioner. A notice of intent to seek an indictment was served by facsimile transmission to Tannery's office. The grand jury ultimately returned an indictment against Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of reasonable notice. The district court denied the motion. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the State's facsimile service of the grand jury notice was inadequate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that a facsimile service of a notice of intent to seek an indictment constitutes adequate service under Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241(2), as section 172.241(2) does not require personal service, and Nev. Rev. Sat. 178.589(1) permits facsimile transmission of motions, notices, and other legal documents where personal service is not required. View "Davis v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law