Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Randy Holcomb, who worked as a construction laborer and automotive mechanic, contracted and died from mesothelioma, typically caused by exposure to asbestos. Before Randy died, he and his wife, Tamara Holcomb (collectively, Appellants), filed a personal injury complaint against joint-compound manufacturers, manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, an asbestos supplier, and various automotive brake produce manufacturers, distributers, and sellers. The complaint asserted that Randy's mesothelioma was caused by exposure to products containing asbestos. As relevant to this appeal, the district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturers of asbestos-containing productions and the asbestos supplier. On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. for mesothelioma cases. The Court then affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the asbestos supplier's favor but reversed the grant of summary judgment for the manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, holding that Appellants raised inferences of probable exposure to the manufacturers of asbestos-containing products sufficient to defeat summary judgment as to those respondents. View "Holcomb v. Georgia Pac., LLC" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Nevada homeowner, elected mediation pursuant to the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) to produce a loan modification. When the mediation did not result in a loan modification, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review asking for sanctions against Respondent, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC), alleging that BAC failed to comply with the FMP's document production and good faith requirements. The district court rejected Appellant's petition, finding (1) there was no irregularity as to the submitted documents; (2) BAC met its burden of showing a lack of bad faith; and (3) absent a timely appeal, a letter of certification would issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although BAC's document production lacked a key assignment, Appellant filled the gap with a document he produced; and (2) the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions and allowing the FMP certificate to issue. View "Einhorn v. BAC Homes Loans Servicing" on Justia Law

Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) filed in district court a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition regarding a budget dispute with Clark County and its officials (County). SNHD petitioned the court to compel the County to fully fund SNHD in the amount it had requested and to prohibit the County from interfering with its funding. The district court granted the relief requested, holding (1) the controlling statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 439.865, was ambiguous as to whether the County could exercise control over the amount of funding SNHD received in its annual budget; and (2) the Legislature appeared to have intended the direct funding source to which SNHD asserted it was entitled. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 439.865 was ambiguous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a writ of mandamus; but (2) prohibition relief was improperly granted, as the County's participation in the budgeting process did not involve the exercise of judicial functions. View "Clark County v. S. Nev. Health Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioners, corporate entities and an individual that serviced and brokered loans for the acquisition and development of real property, faced a civil suit and a criminal investigation in connection with an alleged Ponzi scheme. Petitioners filed a motion with the district court in their civil case to stay any depositions and written discovery that would require their employees and officers to make testimonial statements, asserting that the evidence could be used by the FBI in their criminal investigation. The district court summarily denied the motion without prejudice. Petitioners subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to grant their motion to stay. The Supreme Court denied the requested relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, on balance, the interests of Petitioners in a stay did not outweigh the countervailing interests involved and in therefore denying the motion to stay. View "Aspen Fin. Servs. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a district court's discretion when resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such petitions, provides that a district court "shall grant a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision" if certain requirements are met. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether Appellant had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Goudge v. State" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a county's code of ordinance provisions establishing coroner's inquests into an officer-involved death. Appellants, five highway patrol officers, contended that the inquest procedures and provisions violated their due process rights and that the county board of county commissioners unconstitutionally impinged on the Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Appellants' due process arguments failed; but (2) determined that the code provision requiring that a justice of the peace serve as a presiding officer in coroner's inquest proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths intrudes on the Legislature's exclusive authority over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Because the code made no provision for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer in such proceedings, the Court concluded that the offending provision could not be severed, which required the entire inquest scheme regarding officer-involved deaths to be struck down. View "Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron" on Justia Law

This case arose when debtor Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLC filed for bankruptcy while seeking to construct and develop and $2.8 billion hotel-casino resort. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court certified questions to the Nevada Supreme Court relating to the viability of equitable subrogation and the enforceability of contractual subordination against mechanic's lien claimants under Nevada's mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes. The Supreme Court answered (1) the doctrine of equitable subrogation does not apply against mechanic's lien claimants, such that a mortgage incurred after the commencement of work on a project will not succeed to the senior priority position of a preexisting lien satisfied by the mortgagee if intervening mechanics' liens exist; and (2) contractual subordination agreements executed by mechanic's lien claimants purporting to subordinate mechanic's liens prospectively are not enforceable, but mechanic's lien claimants may waive their statutorily protected rights when the precise requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.2457 are met. View "In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law