Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court addressed whether a claim for fraud in the inducement was available when the basis for the claim contradicts the very language of the contract at issue in the parties’ dispute. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded that when a fraudulent inducement claim contradicts the express terms of the parties’ integrated contract, it fails as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court addressed the propriety of the damages awarded by the jury under a separate claim for breach of contract. The Court affirmed the compensatory damages award in this case, but reversed the punitive damages award, as the Court reversed the finding of fraud on which the punitive damages were based. View "Road & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar" on Justia Law

Marie Liapis filed a complaint for divorce against petitioner Theodore Liapis, in which she also sought disposition of the couple's property, permanent spousal support, and her attorney fees and costs. Theodore answered Marie's complaint and later retained Mark Liapis, the couple's son, as his attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled, and each party filed a statement in preparation for that conference. In her statement, Marie objected to Mark's representation of Theodore. Because of the issues raised concerning Mark's representation of Theodore, the district court vacated the scheduled settlement conference and gave Mark time to determine whether he would continue as Theodore's counsel. Mark informed Marie's counsel that he did not intend to withdraw as counsel for Theodore. Marie subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Mark, asserting three bases for his disqualification: (1) Mark's representation of Theodore and his pecuniary interest in their estate created an appearance of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented her, there was an "inherent conflict of interest" because it was unclear "how [Mark] would be able to zealously represent [Theodore]" when he "professe[d] to still love both his parents;" and (3) Mark should be disqualified because he was a potential witness in the case. Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, the Court rejected that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney. The Court also concluded that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacked standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7. View "Liapis v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur E. Mallory was Churchill County's district attorney. Appellant John O'Connor is an elector and registered voter within Churchill County. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the narrow question of whether the office of district attorney is a state office for the purpose of determining whether district attorneys are subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution. Reviewing the Constitution as a whole, the Supreme Court's resolution of this inquiry was controlled by Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution, which plainly declares district attorneys to be "county officers." Because Article 4, Section 32 identifies district attorneys as county officers, it follows that the office of district attorney cannot be considered a "state office" for term-limits purposes, and thus, district attorneys are not subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order denying appellant's petition to set aside respondent's election to a consecutive term as the Churchill County District Attorney. View "In re Contested Election of Mallory" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the duty of care owed by a medical facility when performing nonmedical functions. The Court took the opportunity of this case to recognize that when a medical facility performs a nonmedical function, general negligence standards apply, such that the medical facility has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm as a result of its actions. Here, the complaint alleged that appellant, a cognitively impaired patient who required a guardian to make medical and financial decisions for her, was exploited by a third party after a social worker employed by the respondent medical facility provided the third party with a preprinted general power-of-attorney form, which the patient subsequently executed in furtherance of her discharge from the facility. The manner in which the medical facility allegedly discharged the patient could lead a reasonable jury to find that the patient's financial injuries were a foreseeable result of the facility's conduct. Thus, the Supreme Court found that district court erred when it found that the medical facility owed the patient no duty beyond the duty to provide competent medical care and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order dismissing this action and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "DeBoer v. Sr. Bridges of Sparks Fam. Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellants Consipio Holding, BV; Ilan Bunimovitz; Tisbury Services, Inc.; and Claudio Gianascio (collectively, Consipio) are shareholders of Private Media Group, Inc. (PRVT). In August 2010, Consipio filed a complaint in the Nevada district court, seeking injunctive relief and the appointment of a receiver for PRVT. Consipio also asserted derivative claims on behalf of PRVT against PRVT's former CEO and president, Berth H. Milton, Jr., and against officer and director respondents Johan Carlberg (PRVT director), Peter Dixinger (PRVT director), Bo Rodebrant (PRVT director), Johan Gillborg (former PRVT CFO), and Philip Christmas (PRVT subsidiary CFO). The claims focused on respondents' alleged conduct in assisting Milton, Jr., to financially harm PRVT for their personal gain. The complaint alleged that respondents assisted Milton, Jr., in obtaining significant loans for himself and entities he controls. It further stated that respondents failed to demand repayment on these loans and that they helped Milton, Jr. by removing funds from PRVT and concealing the wrongdoing. Given these allegations, Consipio contended that respondents collectively were guilty of misfeasance, malfeasance, and breach of their fiduciary duties. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Nevada courts could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident officers and directors who directly harm a Nevada corporation. The Court concluded that they can. In this case, the district court failed to conduct adequate factual analysis to determine whether it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondents before dismissing the complaint against them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal order and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court order granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting appellants State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, the Financial Institutions Division, and its Commissioner George Burns (collectively, the Department), from enforcing its declaratory order and advisory opinion regarding the appropriate amount of homeowners' association lien fees respondents Nevada Association Services, Inc.; RMI Management, LLC; and Angius & Terry Collections, Inc. (collectively, NAS) can collect. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department did not have jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion regarding NRS Chapter 116 and that NAS would suffer irreparable harm if the Department enforced its opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting NAS's request for injunctive relief. View "State, Bus. & Indus. v. Nev. Ass'n Servs." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the relationship between two statutory provisions, enacted in 2009, that govern the extent of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction: NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) and NRS 62B.335. Both provisions address a person who has been charged with committing an offense when the person was between 16 and 18 years of age that would be a category A or B felony if committed by an adult. In those circumstances, NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) provides that the act is not a "delinquent act" and divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction if the person is identified and charged between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Pursuant to NRS 62B.335, if a person charged with a delinquent act that would have been a category A or B felony if committed by an adult is identified before reaching 21 years of age but is not apprehended until after reaching 21 years of age, then the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing. The matter came before the Court in the case of "George J." who was seventeen years old when he allegedly committed: (1) home invasion, (2) burglary, (3) grand larceny, (4) grand larceny of an automobile, and (5) burglary of an automobile. Reading the statutes together, the Supreme Court concluded that NRS 62B.335 only applied to delinquent acts and therefore does not apply to acts that are "deemed not to be a delinquent act" under NRS 62B.330(3). "Thus, if the case is excluded from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3), then the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of NRS 62B.335." Here, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1). The Court nonetheless affirmed because the juvenile court reached the correct result by transferring the case to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. View "In re George J." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tri-County Equipment & Leasing v. Klinke" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on the applicability of NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2), a statutory provision that divests a juvenile court of jurisdiction over a person who commits a class A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age but is not identified until after reaching 21 years of age. Defendant Gregory Barren was seventeen years old when he allegedly kidnapped and secually assaulted a woman in 2005. Police identified Defendant from DNA evidence left from bodily fluids at the scene. Defendant was twenty-one when police made the DNA match. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this statutory provision governs jurisdiction over any proceedings initiated after the provision went into effect on October 1, 2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. Because NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) was in effect when the State initiated proceedings against Defendant, the Court concluded that the district court, not the juvenile court, had jurisdiction over his criminal case. View "Nevada v. Barren" on Justia Law