Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan. View "LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Buyer in this dispute arising from an ordinary course covenant in an asset purchase agreement, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Buyer.In April 2019, Seller entered into an agreement to sell a casino and hotel to Buyer. The agreement contained an ordinary course covenant requiring Seller to operate its business in the usual manner between the time the agreement was signed and closing. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Seller complied with the Governor's emergency directive mandating closure of all nonessential businesses. The pandemic also affected Buyer's duties under the agreement. Buyer subsequently terminated the agreement and sued Seller for return of the deposit, alleging various contract claims. Seller counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Buyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Seller did not violate the agreement's ordinary course covenant by closing the casino and hotel as mandated by the Governor's emergency directive and was entitled to retain the earnest money deposit. View "Lucky Lucy D LLC v. LGS Casino LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, under the Nevada Constitution, both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court, thus rejecting Appellant's argument that only the governor has authority to temporarily replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court.At issue was Nev. Const. art. VI, 19(1)(c), under which the Chief Justice "may assigned [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary duty within the court system." In the forty-five years since the effective date of the amendment, article 6 section 19(1)(c), successive chief justices had assigned senior justices to temporary duty when a Supreme Court sitting justice is disqualified. In this action, Appellant objected to the chief justice's orders assigning senior justices to participate in disqualified justices' places, arguing that replacement justices must be designated in accordance with Nev. Const. art. VI, 4(2), thus authorizing the governor to designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of the disqualified Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court overruled Appellant's objection, holding that the senior justice assignments in this case were constitutionally permissible. View "Valley Health System, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction as to all counts except count two and reversed and remanded for the district court to strike count two from the judgment and enter an amended judgment, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges, and therefore, Defendant's conviction under count two must be reversed.Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously admit evidence of uncharged bad acts; (2) erred in admitting a certain detective's statement, but the error was not reversible; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial and by not excusing a seated juror for his expression of sympathy to victims who testified during trial; and (4) misstated the law in instruction number ten, and therefore, the conviction for count two should be reversed. View "Young v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits. View "Providence Corp. Development v. Buma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question by concluding that a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, so long as the series LLC has observed the corporate formalities provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether, under Nevada law, a series LLC created pursuant to section 86.296 must be sued in its own name for the court to obtain jurisdiction over it, or whether the master LLC under which the series is created may be sued instead. The Supreme Court answered the question as set forth above, holding that the master LLC may not be legally responsible for the acts of the series LLC and that if a series LLC has observed corporate formalities, it should be the named entity in a lawsuit against the series LLC. View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Saticoy Bay LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case. View "In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.Also at issue in this case was the process for removing June's guardian and appointing a successor guardian and June's standing to challenge certain issues on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) June had standing to challenge on appeal both the removal or her guardian and the appointment of the successor guardian; (2) the district court has authority to remove a guardian and appoint a successor guardian with the filing of a formal, written petition for removal, and a protected person is entitled to prior notice of and opportunity to be heard on such actions; (3) the district court did not improperly remove June's guardian and appoint a successor guardian, and June was afforded adequate due process; and (4) although the district court erred by improperly shifting the burden to June to file a communication and visitation petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.332-.338, the court properly denied June's proposed schedule. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court, certified as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), partially dismissing a medical malpractice action for failure to meet the affidavit-of-merit requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to three of the named defendants, holding that there was no error.Appellant, as special administrator of the estate of Sharon Monk, sued University Medical Center and Sharon's other healthcare providers, including the three physicians who were the respondents to this appeal, alleging negligence. Monk supported the complaint with a declaration from Nurse Jamescia Hambrick. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss on the grounds that Nurse Hambrick lacked the qualifications necessary to establish Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071 as to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims against Respondents was not exempted from section 41A.071's affidavit-of-merit requirement. View "Monk v. Ching" on Justia Law