Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied Tahican LLC's petition seeking a writ of mandamus affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Tahican LLC's second motion seeking to expunge a lis pendens, holding that the district court did not err in denying Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens.Max Joly and Bydoo, LLC formed a partnership. Joly later transferred his shares in the partnership to Bydoo but Bydoo did not make the payments required under the parties' agreement. Joly sued Bydoo and Jean Francois Rigollet, alleging breach of contract. Bydoo later transferred real property to Tahican by quitclaim deed. When Joly recorded a notice of lis pendens against the property Rigollet sought to expunge the lis pendens. Joly amended his complaint to add Tahican as a defendant and allege fraudulent transfer. The district court denied the motion to expunge and granted summary judgment in favor of Joly on the majority of his claims. Tahican brought this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no error in the denial of Tahican's motion to expunge the lis pendens because a fraudulent transfer claim seeking avoidance of the transfer of real property is an "action...affecting the title or possession of real property" within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 14.010(1). View "Tahican, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.After a decree of divorce issued divorcing Husband and Wife Husband appealed. The Supreme Court partly reversed the divorce decree, determining that assets in the parties' spendthrift trusts created in a separate property agreement could not be levied against through court order, that the separate property agreement was valid, and that the parties' property was avidly separated into their respective separate property trusts when it was executed. Wife subsequently filed a legal malpractice complaint against Attorney, who previously assisted the parties in creating their estate plan, seeking $5 million in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the legal malpractice claim was transactional and that that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no need to toll commencement of the limitations period for transactional malpractice claims; and (2) Wife's legal malpractice claim was transactional, and therefore, the litigation-malpractice tolling rule did not apply. View "Nelson v. Burr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a private right of action for money damages exists to vindicate questions of search-and-seizure rights under the Nevada Constitution but that a qualified immunity defense does not apply to such an action.Appellant filed a civil rights action in federal district court against Respondents, the warden and then-director of the Nevada Department of Corrections, asserting that her federal and state constitutional rights were violated when she went to High Desert State Prison to visit an inmate and was strip searched and interrogated and refused visitation. The district court denied summary judgment on the state law claims. Upon reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its order and certified four questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court elected to reframe and answer some of the certified questions, holding (1) Nev. Const. art. I, 18 contains an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief; and (2) qualified immunity is not a defense to an implied private right of action for retrospective monetary relief under Nev. Const. art. I, 18. View "Mack v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) violates due process, holding that the statute does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.Section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves a child welfare services agency from its duty to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent if a court finds that the parents' parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to the child's sibling. A court master recommended that the district court find section 432B.393(3)(c) unconstitutional because, for purposes of terminating the parent-child relationship, it could lead to a presumption that the parent is unfit without any consideration of present circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) insofar as section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves an agency of making reunification efforts it does not infringe on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and therefore does not violate due process; and (2) although the district court erred, the petition must be denied as moot. View "Washoe County Human Services v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying a request for mandamus or injunctive relief related to the political composition of the persons verifying signatures used for mail ballots in Clark County, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief.The Republican National Committee (RNC) brought a petition asserting that the composition of the temporary workers hired from employment agencies to verify signatures on returned mail ballots disproportionately excluded Republicans, and therefore, the Clark County Registrar violated his duty under Nev. Rev. Stat. 293B.360(2) to ensure that the members of each special election board represent all political parties "as equally as possible." The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RNC failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief. View "Republican Nat'l Committee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b). View "Arce v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In these appeals relating several statutes and issues regarding the administration of a discretionary trust the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.At issue on appeal was what disclosures must be made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in the administration of the trust. The district court concluded that the beneficiaries were not entitled to an accounting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's trust statutes did not require the trustees to provide the beneficiaries with an accounting because the beneficiaries' sole distribution interests were discretionary; and (2) because the beneficiaries constituted "present" and "vested" beneficiaries, they were entitled to request and receive copies of certain trust instruments, may inspect the books of account and records of financial transactions and may receive an annual tax return, inventory, and accounting under the terms of the trust. View "In re Trust Agreement, 23 Partners Trust I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law