Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court awarding the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ) costs and attorney fees in proceedings under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing such a substantial discount from the amount requested without explaining its reasons for doing so.The award at issue in this case discounted the costs and fees requested by the LVRJ by almost forty percent. When the LVRJ asked the judge to explain the reduction, the judge did not elaborate on his reasons for the reduction. The Supreme Court vacated so much of the order as discounted the fees and costs requested by the LVRJ and otherwise affirmed, holding that, without specific reasons for the discount, this Court could not determine whether the district court's order was an abuse of discretion. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion to disqualify Justice Douglas Herndon after Justice Herndon filed a notice of voluntary disclosure informing the parties that he had inherited the underlying matter while serving as a district judge and that he had retained it until he left the bench, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.While Justice Herndon's disclosure stated that the underlying matter never appeared on his calendar and that he had no knowledge of the case before the instant appeal, Appellant sought disqualification, arguing that N.C.J.C. 2.11(A)(6)(d) is a mechanical rule that requires disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Judge Herndon did not "preside" over this matter in the district court within the meaning of the disqualification rule, his disqualification was not required. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part this petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) provides an employee with a private right of action where an employer does not attempt to provide reasonable accommodations for the use of medical cannabis off-site and outside of working hours.Roushkolb was terminated after he took a drug test and tested positive for cannabis. Roushkolb filed suit, asserting five claims against Petitioner. The district court dismissed the claim for deceptive trade practices but allowed the others to proceed. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking dismissal of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the district court properly declined to dismiss real party in interest James Roushkolb's claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. 678C.850(3) but erred by not dismissing his claims for tortious discharge, unlawful employment practices, and negligent hiring, training, or supervision. View "Freeman Expositions, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

In this opinion considering whether an indemnification provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree was enforceable where the divorcing veteran agreed to reimburse his or her spouse if the veteran elected to receive military disability pay rather than retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the spouse's motion to enforce the reimbursement provision of the divorce decree, holding that there was no error.After noting that federal law precludes state courts from dividing disability pay as community property in allocating each party's separate pay, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the parties agreed on a reimbursement provision that the state court would lack authority to otherwise mandate, state courts do not improperly divide disability pay when they enforce the terms of a negotiated property settlement as res judicata; and (2) a court does not abuse its discretion by awarding pendente lite attorney fees under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.040 without analyzing the factors set forth in Burnzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969). View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for extraordinary relief to address a matter of first impression before the Court regarding the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that extraordinary relief was warranted in the form of a petition for a writ of prohibition.At issue before the Supreme Court was the procedures and burden of proof required to establish the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner petitioned the Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus prohibiting the district court from compelling disclosure of documents from Petitioner's attorney-client privilege log under Nevada's crime-fraud exception and ordering the district court to find the documents undiscoverable. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the district court properly granted disclosure of the privileged documents after conducting an in camera review under Nevada's crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. View "Seibel v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the district court's judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted sexual assault, holding that when a child under the age of sixteen commits a delinquent act but is not charged until after turning twenty-one, no court has jurisdiction to hear the case.After he turned the age of twenty-one, Appellant was charged with committing delinquent acts as a fourteen-year-old. Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that while the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children under twenty-one years of age who are alleged to have committed a delinquent act when the person was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years of age, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction once a child turns twenty-one, and, absent certain exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction over any charges of delinquent acts. View "Zalyaul v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.Jennifer Goldstein obtained a judgment against NuVeda, LLC for over $2.5 million. In post-judgment collection proceedings, Goldstein had a writ of execution serviced on Clark NMSD, LLC, and cash was seized. Clark NMSD filed a third-party claimant petition, which NuVeda joined, seeking return of the seized cash and requesting that Goldstein be prohibited from further collection activity. The district court denied the petition. Goldstein then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Clark NMSD was not a party to the proceedings below it had not standing to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Clark NMSD had party standing to challenge the district court's order, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal. View "Clark NMSD, LLC v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Plaintiff because the statute of limitations had expired and because Defendant had not timely served him, holding that there was no error.At issue was recently-amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3), which requires that a district court extend the service period where a plaintiff timely moves for an extension and demonstrates that good cause for an extension exists. The Supreme Court held (1) in determining whether the plaintiff has made a good cause showing for extension of the service period exists, the district court must apply the factors set forth in Saavedra-Sandolva v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 P.3d 1198 (Nev. 2010), and Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 998 P.2d 1190 (Nev. 2000), to the extent those factors bear on tempted service/or whether circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control resulted in the failure timely to serve; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion to extend the service period. View "Moroney v. Young" on Justia Law