Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court establishing child custody, visitation, and child support holding that the district court erred by exceeding the cap set forth in NAC 425.150(1)(f).Father in this case had a monthly income of approximately $38,000, and Mother's monthly income was approximately $5,000. Mother sought an upward adjustment to Father's child support obligation. The district court ordered Father to pay $3,500 per month in child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 425.150(1)(f) plainly caps the limit of any upward adjustment to Mother's monthly obligation amount; and (2) the district court did not err by basing an upward adjustment on NAC 425.150(1)(f), but the court did err by ordering an upward adjustment in excess of the other party's total obligation. View "Matkulak v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of a drug offense in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.336(2)(a), holding that the statutes governing Defendant's first-offense drug crime mandated judgment deferral under the circumstances of this case.Defendant pleaded guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a) pursuant to a guilty-plea agreement with the State that did not address judgment deferral. Before sentencing, Defendant filed an election to enter a substance-use treatment program without addressing whether he qualified for judgment deferral. The district court entered a judgment of conviction with a corresponding prison sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.211(3)(a)(1) requires the district court to defer judgment where the defendant consents to deferral and pleads guilty to violating section 453.336(2)(a); and (2) the district court lacked discretion to decline to defer judgment. View "Locker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying and dismissing this class action complaint brought against Plaintiffs' former employer to obtain unpaid minimum and overtime wages, holding that the district court adhered to the law in its orders and that Plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue of material fact.Plaintiffs filed a putative class action asserting four claims. In the aggregate, the district court issued three orders in favor of Defendant that Plaintiffs challenged on appeal, including an order granting in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and a clarification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) dismissing the majority of Plaintiffs' statutory claims as time-barred; (2) granting summary judgment; and (3) concluding that an employer that is a party to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is exempt from the overtime scheme under Nev. Rev. Sat. 608.018 so long as the CBA provides overtime in a different manner than the statute. View "Martel v. HG Staffing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that there was no default of the loan in this case and issuing a wide-ranging preliminary injunction reaching matters that were not argued or briefed, holding that the district court erred in disregarding the loan agreements' provisions setting forth what constituted a default.At issue before the Supreme Court was the conditions under which a lender or its assignee is entitled to the appointment of a receiver after a borrower defaults on a real property loan agreement. Once Borrower in this case assumed ownership of properties housing multi-family apartment complexes the lender observed a significant decrease in occupancy. Observing that significant repairs were needed and relying on specific provisions in the loan agreements Lender demanded deposits into repair and replacement escrow accounts. Lender deemed a default when Borrower did not make the deposits. Lender sued and sought a receiver. Borrower countersued alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. The district court granted judgment for Borrower. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in refusing to appoint a receiver on Borrower's default; and (2) abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. View "Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Westland Liberty Village, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint in this case for failure to state a claim, holding that an employee discharged after testing positive at work based on recreational marijuana use does not have a common-law tortious discharge claim.Plaintiff was terminated from his employment based on a positive test result for marijuana. Plaintiff brought this complaint arguing that he did not use marijuana in the twenty-four hours before that shift and that his use complied with Nevada's recreational marijuana laws. The district court dismissed the complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether adult recreational marijuana use qualifies for protection under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.333. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that because federal law criminalizes the possession of marijuana in Nevada, marijuana use is not lawful in the state and does not support a private right of action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 613.333. View "Ceballos v. NP Palace, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this challenge to a district court order reinstating a claim against a cigarette manufacturer under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA), holding that mandamus relief was not warranted.Plaintiffs brought filed suit against Petitioner, a cigarette manufacturer, alleging civil conspiracy and a violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The district court granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600(1) because they never used Petitioner's products. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under the statute. The district court then granted reconsideration, concluding that the earlier dismissal order was erroneous. Petitioner then brought this petition, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the deceptive trade practices claim against Petitioner because they never used Petitioner's products. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court confirming a foreign custody order, holding that the language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 125A.465 is plain and unambiguous and that the challenges to the registration of the foreign custody order were untimely.At issue was the proper interpretation of the portion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act that precludes a party from challenging the registration of foreign child custody orders under section 125A.465 if the party fails to do so within twenty days of receiving notice of the request to register. Appellant, the father to the two minor children whose custody was at issue, filed a challenge to Respondent's attempt to register. The district court gave full faith and credit to the order and registered it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under section 125A.465's plain and unambiguous language this Court must apply the statute's twenty-day deadline to preclude untimely challenges to the registration of a foreign custody order. View "Blount v. Blount" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610 was not satisfied by the timely filing of Appellant's other claims.Appellant purchased seventeen lots that it owned as tenants in common with Nye County and two other owners. After the owners failed to pay property taxes the County sold the lots at public action, resulting in excess process. Two of the owners filed timely claims for the excess proceeds, which Nye County granted. The County, however, denied Appellant's petition for the excess proceeds on the grounds that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a former property owner wants its share of the excess proceeds from a tax sale, the former property owner must file a claim for those excess proceeds within the one-year deadline set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 361.610; and (2) because Appellant filed timely to file a claim, the money was no longer accessible to Appellant under section 361.610. View "Artmor Investments, LLC v. Nye County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus in this tort action, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the scheduling order, reopening discovery, and granting a motion to substitute.At issue in this case was the standard for substituting an expert witness after the close of discovery. Lamont Compton brought this complaint against Petitioners seeking damages for injuries received from a motor vehicle accident. Compton designated Dr. Jeffrey Gross as his expert, after which Dr. Gross pleaded guilty to conspiracy in a federal case. The district court subsequently granted Compton's motion to substitute Dr. Raimundo Leon for Dr. Gross. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court concluded that hte district court properly granted the motion, holding that Nev. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)'s good cause test, in combination with relevant local rules, provides the standard governing when a district court may modify a scheduling order. View "Torremoro v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a district court seeks to determine if the movant has demonstrated a prima facie case for modification of child custody under Rooney v. Rooney, 853 P.2d 123 (Nev. 1993), the court must generally consider only the properly-alleged facts in the movant's verified pleadings, declarations, or affidavits and may not consider alleged facts or offers of proof provided by the nonmoving party.Despite announcing the above general rule, the Supreme Court also announced an exception that a district court may look to the nonmovant's evidentiary support when it "conclusively establishes" the falsity of the movant's allegations. The Court's opinion further reiterated that a movant must first show the district court with specific, properly-alleged facts that his or her motion to modify child custody is potentially meritorious on its face before courts will decide a case fully upon its merits. The Court then held that because the movant's declarations in this case established a prima facie case for modification, the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "Myers v. Haskins" on Justia Law