Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

AZG Limited Partnership obtained a judgment against a client of Dickinson Wright PLLC, a law firm. To enforce the judgment, AZG served Dickinson Wright with garnishment interrogatories under Nevada law, specifically asking whether the firm had any “choses in action” (rights to bring legal claims) belonging to its client under its control. Dickinson Wright answered “no.” AZG challenged this response, arguing that the attorney-client relationship itself gave the law firm control over the client’s chose in action, and that the firm likely held unearned client funds that could be garnished. Dickinson Wright requested an in camera review of certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege, to support its response. The district court reviewed the documents and found that a third party, not the client, paid the legal bills, and that Dickinson Wright did not hold any retainer or unearned funds.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied AZG’s motion to traverse Dickinson Wright’s interrogatory responses, finding that the law firm did not possess or control the client’s chose in action as contemplated by the relevant statute. The court also ordered Dickinson Wright to disclose the identity of the third-party financer but did not require disclosure of the in camera documents, suggesting that discovery procedures would be the proper avenue for further requests.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that attorneys and law firms do not possess or control a client’s chose in action for purposes of NRS 31.290(1) merely by representing the client. The type of control attorneys exercise in litigation is distinct from the possessory or property-based control required by the statute for garnishment. Therefore, Dickinson Wright’s negative response to the interrogatory was proper, and the district court’s denial of AZG’s motion to traverse was correct. View "AZG Limited Partnership v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a complex series of shareholder derivative actions involving a mineral rights holding company. The litigation began in March 2014, alleging self-dealing by the company’s corporate counsel and majority shareholder. Over the years, multiple complaints and counterclaims were filed, and the cases were consolidated. The original defendant, Paul, was dismissed from the case in 2016 but was later named as a counterdefendant in an amended counterclaim filed in 2020, after control of the company shifted. During Paul’s absence from the litigation, the remaining parties agreed to waive the five-year rule for bringing a case to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B).The Second Judicial District Court, after considering Paul’s 2024 motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B), denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the 2020 amended counterclaim constituted a new action, thereby restarting the five-year period, and that the parties’ earlier waiver of the five-year rule applied to Paul as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the five-year period for bringing an action to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) begins with the filing of the initial complaint, regardless of subsequent procedural developments. The court further clarified that a waiver of the five-year rule by some parties does not bind parties who did not join in the waiver. The court also determined that the amended counterclaim did not constitute a new action for purposes of the rule. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss the action against Paul, with the district court to determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. View "Paul v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly pointing a firearm at another person and making threatening statements. The prosecution charged that the defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm by brandishing the firearm. During trial preparation, the defense requested, and the district court approved, a jury instruction requiring the State to prove that the defendant had the present ability to use the weapon, specifically that the firearm was both loaded and operable.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada granted the defense’s request for this instruction over the State’s objection. The State then filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the instruction misstated the law because the current statutory definition of assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof that the firearm was loaded and operable or that the defendant had a present ability to injure.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and determined that the relevant statute, NRS 200.471, had been amended since earlier case law to remove the requirement of a present ability to injure. The statute now defines assault as either an unlawful attempt to use physical force or intentionally placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. The court held that the jury instruction was legally inaccurate and misleading because it imposed requirements not found in the current statute. The court granted the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its order approving the challenged jury instruction. View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Angel Rodriguez outside his home. Surveillance footage showed a silver Cadillac SUV near the scene, and eyewitnesses described the shooter as matching the build of Xavier Acosta. Acosta was identified as a suspect after a domestic violence incident involving his spouse, Rebecca. During the investigation, Acosta’s mother-in-law reported that Acosta confessed to killing Rodriguez out of love for Rebecca, who was Rodriguez’s ex-boyfriend. Police seized two cell phones belonging to Acosta and, after obtaining a search warrant, extracted their contents, which included a photograph of Rodriguez’s house taken minutes before the shooting. DNA evidence also linked Acosta to a Cadillac similar to the one seen in the surveillance footage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over Acosta’s trial. Acosta moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing the warrant was overbroad and unsupported by probable cause, but the court denied the motion. The court also admitted certain letters between Acosta and his wife and evidence of a prior domestic violence incident. The jury found Acosta guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and he was sentenced accordingly.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the warrant authorizing the search of Acosta’s cell phones was constitutionally deficient because it lacked specific facts establishing probable cause that evidence of the murder would be found on the phones. The court found that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress this evidence and that the good-faith exception did not apply. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless due to overwhelming other evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Acosta v. State" on Justia Law

Baker Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporation, holds decreed water rights in Baker and Lehman Creeks, which flow through Great Basin National Park. In 2015, the National Park Service (NPS) received a permit for a nonconsumptive instream flow in Baker Creek, requiring that the water not be removed and the full natural flow exit the park undiverted. Baker Ranches alleged that, since 2016, the NPS denied it permission to remove obstructions and allowed rock dams to be constructed, diverting water into caves and interfering with its water rights. While related federal litigation was ongoing, Baker Ranches requested the State Engineer to investigate these alleged violations.The State Engineer, after site visits and correspondence, decided in 2021 to hold the investigation in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal litigation. Baker Ranches then petitioned the Seventh Judicial District Court in White Pine County for judicial review or a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the writ but granted judicial review, finding the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the State Engineer to complete the investigation and render a final decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State Engineer had the authority to hold the investigation in abeyance and whether such a decision was subject to judicial review. The court held that the State Engineer possesses discretionary powers, including the implied authority to pause investigations pending related litigation. The court further determined that the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation was interlocutory, not a final order, and therefore not subject to judicial review. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order granting Baker Ranches’ petition for judicial review. View "SULLIVAN, P.E. VS. BAKER RANCHES, INC." on Justia Law

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Michael Kosor, Jr., a homeowner in Southern Highlands, a Las Vegas residential common-interest community, sued the Southern Highlands Community Association (HOA) and its developer, Southern Highlands Development Corporation (SHDC), for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the homeowners' right to elect the HOA's board of directors. Kosor claimed that the community had surpassed the 75% home-sale threshold, ending the declarant control period, yet SHDC continued to appoint three of the five board members, violating homeowners' voting rights. The HOA and SHDC disputed Kosor's interpretation and calculations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied Kosor's motion for a temporary restraining order, largely denied the HOA's and SHDC's motion to dismiss, and denied Kosor's motion for summary judgment. Kosor then sought to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice, but the court dismissed it with prejudice and awarded fees and costs to the HOA and SHDC. Kosor appealed but later withdrew his appeal, acknowledging that he could not reinstate it or raise the same issues again. Subsequently, the HOA and SHDC sought additional fees and costs incurred on appeal, prompting Kosor to file a motion under NRCP 60(b)(4), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to noncompliance with NRS 38.310's pre-suit ADR requirement.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 38.310, which mandates pre-suit mediation or arbitration for certain HOA-related claims, is a procedural claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction despite the parties' noncompliance with NRS 38.310 and properly denied Kosor's motion to vacate its judgment and fee-award orders as jurisdictionally void. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. View "KOSOR VS. S. HIGHLANDS CMTY. ASS'N" on Justia Law

UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company and its affiliates (collectively, United) were sued by Fremont Emergency Services and other emergency medical providers (collectively, TeamHealth) for underpaying claims for emergency medical services provided to United’s members. TeamHealth alleged that United failed to adequately reimburse them for services rendered under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) after their contract with United expired, leaving them as out-of-network providers. TeamHealth claimed United was unjustly enriched and breached an implied-in-fact contract, also asserting statutory claims under the Prompt Pay and Unfair Claims Practices Acts.The case was initially removed to federal court, which found no ERISA preemption and remanded it to state court. The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled in favor of TeamHealth, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. United appealed the judgment and petitioned to seal certain court documents.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on unjust enrichment but not on the implied-in-fact contract or statutory claims. The court held that ERISA did not preempt TeamHealth’s claims and that United was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Unfair Claims Practices Act claim, as the statute did not provide a private right of action for medical providers. The court affirmed the compensatory damages for unjust enrichment but vacated the punitive damages award, remanding for recalculation to a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. The court also reversed the prejudgment interest and attorney fees awards under the Prompt Pay Act and remanded for a new determination of prejudgment interest.Additionally, the court denied United’s petition to seal certain documents, finding that United failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the necessity of sealing. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to seal parts of the record. View "UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company v. Fremont Emergency Services" on Justia Law

Steve Eggleston sued Clark County and Georgina Stuart, a social worker, alleging violations of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Eggleston claimed that Stuart coerced him into signing temporary guardianship papers for his children during an ongoing child abuse/neglect investigation by threatening that his children would be permanently removed from his care if he did not comply. Stuart and Clark County moved for summary judgment, arguing that their actions were protected by qualified immunity and discretionary-act immunity. The district court denied their motion.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada denied the motion for summary judgment, leading Stuart and Clark County to file a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the order. The district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Stuart's conduct violated clearly established law and whether her actions were protected by discretionary-act immunity.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and granted the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that Stuart was entitled to qualified immunity on Eggleston's substantive and procedural due process claims because her conduct did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights. The court also held that Stuart was entitled to discretionary-act immunity on Eggleston's IIED claim, as her actions involved individual judgment and were based on considerations of social policy. The court directed the district court to vacate the order denying summary judgment and to enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of Stuart and Clark County. View "Clark County v. District Court" on Justia Law

A child protection agency filed a petition alleging that a child, A.T., was in need of protection after A.T.'s sibling, K.T., died from head trauma and a leg fracture. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, witnessed the abuse by her boyfriend but did not protect K.T. Consequently, the Clark County Department of Family Services took protective custody of A.T. and filed a petition alleging abuse or neglect. Bellamy entered a no-contest plea to the petition, which the district court accepted over the objection of the deputy district attorney.The district court treated the no-contest plea as an admission, allowing the case to proceed without an evidentiary hearing. The Clark County Department of Family Services and the District Attorney's Office filed a petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus, arguing that a no-contest plea is not permissible without the prosecutor's agreement. They contended that the statute only allows for admission or denial of allegations.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a district court may accept a no-contest plea in NRS Chapter 432B dependency proceedings. The court found that the statute's language does not explicitly prohibit no-contest pleas and that such pleas align with the legislative intent of providing swift resolution in child protection cases. The court emphasized that accepting a no-contest plea does not infringe on the prosecutor's functions and helps avoid delays that could harm the child's welfare. The petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus was denied. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law