Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Bourne was diagnosed with chronic anxiety, major depressive disorder, and chronic low back pain by Dr. Zidrieck Valdes in 2015. Valdes prescribed Klonopin and an opioid. In 2019, Valdes informed Bourne of new CDC guidelines against concurrent use of these medications and switched Bourne to Buspar. Bourne experienced withdrawal symptoms and refused a referral to an in-patient drug treatment facility. Despite reporting stress and receiving a half-dose emergency prescription of Klonopin, Bourne showed no signs of withdrawal or suicidal ideation in subsequent visits. In November 2019, Bourne died by suicide, leaving a note blaming the medication changes.Bourne's wife and child sued Valdes for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in not tapering off Klonopin. Their expert, Dr. Donald A. Misch, supported this claim. Valdes moved for summary judgment, arguing that suicide is a superseding cause that precludes liability. The district court agreed, citing the "suicide rule" and granted summary judgment, stating Valdes had no control over Bourne.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that a patient's suicide does not automatically preclude liability for medical malpractice. The court emphasized that established medical malpractice principles should apply, and whether a medical provider's negligence led to a patient's suicide is a factual question for the jury. The court found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on the "suicide rule" and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bourne v. Valdes" on Justia Law

Mable Hrynchuk named Bryan Kenton as the sole beneficiary of her estate, which included her residential property. After her death, the homeowner’s association foreclosed on the property and sold it to Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills. Kenton, through his attorney-in-fact, Foreclosure Recovery Services, sought to redeem the property as a successor in interest. Saticoy Bay refused, asserting that Kenton was not the successor in interest and had no rights of redemption under Nevada law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of Foreclosure Recovery Services, holding that Kenton was the successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. Saticoy Bay appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that a will beneficiary is immediately vested with a beneficial interest in devised property upon the testator’s death and is therefore the testator’s successor in interest for the purposes of NRS 116.31166. The court concluded that Kenton, as the sole beneficiary of Hrynchuk’s will, was her successor in interest and had the right to redeem the property. The court also determined that Foreclosure Recovery Services provided all necessary documentation to Saticoy Bay to establish its right to act on behalf of Kenton in redeeming the property. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3580 Lost Hills v. Foreclosure Recovery Services, LLC" on Justia Law

On January 18, 1997, C.V. was sexually assaulted by a man holding a knife who approached her at a bus stop, walked her to a vacant lot, and assaulted her. The perpetrator then dumped out her purse and left. A sexual assault examination was conducted, but no suspect was identified at the time. Over 20 years later, Clifton Dawson's DNA matched the DNA from the examination kit. Dawson was charged with one count of sexual assault and found guilty in 2022 after a six-day jury trial. At sentencing, the State sought an enhancement based on Dawson's habitual criminal status.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County applied the habitual criminal statute in effect at the time of the offense, which required three prior felony convictions for a large habitual criminal adjudication. The court found three qualifying convictions and sentenced Dawson to life in prison without the possibility of parole.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Dawson argued that the enhancement should be based on the statute in effect at the time of sentencing, not the time of the offense. The court disagreed, holding that the statute in effect at the time of the offense applies unless the legislature clearly states otherwise. The court found that the 1995 version of the habitual criminal statute was correctly applied.However, the court concluded that the district court erred in adjudicating Dawson as a habitual criminal because the State did not prove the requisite number of prior convictions. Only two of the prior convictions predated the charged offense. The court vacated Dawson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, emphasizing that the State must prove that prior convictions predate the charged offense for habitual criminal adjudication. View "DAWSON VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2020, state and federal law enforcement conducted a reverse sting operation in Reno, targeting individuals seeking commercial sex with minors. Jesus Alberto Martinez, Jr. was arrested after he responded to an online advertisement and engaged in text conversations with an undercover officer posing as a 17-year-old sex worker. Martinez was charged with attempted abuse or neglect of a child involving sexual exploitation and soliciting a child for prostitution. He was convicted on both charges following a jury trial.Martinez appealed, arguing that the government's conduct was outrageous and violated due process, and that the jury instructions on entrapment were improper. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges, and that his rights were violated by the district court's denial of his motion to compel the identity of the person depicted in the online advertisement.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court clarified the law on entrapment, emphasizing the importance of predisposition over initial contact. It adopted a six-factor test from United States v. Black to evaluate whether the government's conduct was outrageous. The court concluded that the government's conduct did not violate due process and that the jury instructions on entrapment, while containing an error regarding initial contact, did not warrant reversal. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the charges and determined that the district court did not err in denying Martinez's motion to compel the identity of the person in the advertisement. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "MARTINEZ VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

A Nevada limited liability company, Mass Land Acquisition, LLC, challenged the use of eminent domain by Sierra Pacific Power Company, d/b/a NV Energy, to take an easement across its property for a natural gas pipeline. NV Energy sought immediate occupancy of the property, while Mass Land argued that such a taking by a private entity violated the Nevada Constitution and requested a jury determination on whether the taking was for a public use.The First Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Mass Land's motion to dismiss and granted NV Energy's motion for immediate occupancy. The court concluded that NV Energy, as a regulated public utility, was exercising delegated eminent domain powers and acting as the government, not as a private party. The court also found that the taking was for a natural gas pipeline, a statutorily recognized public use, and thus did not require a jury determination on public use before granting occupancy.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied Mass Land's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The court held that the Nevada Constitution's prohibition on transferring property taken by eminent domain to another private party did not apply to NV Energy's taking for a natural gas pipeline, as it was a public use. The court also determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury determination on whether the taking was actually for a public use. The court concluded that NV Energy's actions were lawful and consistent with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing eminent domain in Nevada. View "MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Aletha Porcaro was admitted to The Heights of Summerlin, a skilled nursing facility, for rehabilitation after surgery. Upon her discharge, she contracted COVID-19 and died eight days later. Her daughter, Rachelle Crupi, filed a lawsuit against The Heights and its parent companies, alleging that they failed to implement effective COVID-19 safety protocols. The claims included negligence, wrongful death, and other related causes of action.The Heights removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court. In state court, The Heights moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and Nevada’s Emergency Directive 011 granted them immunity from Crupi’s claims. The district court dismissed the professional negligence claim but allowed the other claims to proceed.The Heights then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, seeking to dismiss the remaining claims based on the same immunity arguments. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and concluded that the PREP Act does not apply to a lack of action or failure to implement COVID-19 policies. The court also determined that Directive 011 does not grant immunity to health care facilities, as it applies to individual medical professionals, not facilities.The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that neither the PREP Act nor Directive 011 provided immunity to The Heights for the claims brought by Crupi. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the remaining claims to proceed. View "The Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Nathan Chasing Horse, who was indicted on multiple felony charges, including sexual assault, by a grand jury. The charges stem from allegations by two victims, C.C.H. and S.B., who claimed that Chasing Horse used his position within the Lakota Tribe to manipulate them into sexual relationships under the guise of spiritual and healing practices. C.C.H. alleged that Chasing Horse coerced her into sexual acts to heal her mother’s cancer, while S.B. claimed she was similarly manipulated due to her fear of spiritual consequences.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Chasing Horse's pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the indictment on the grounds that the State improperly instructed the grand jury on the concept of "grooming" and failed to present exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed one count but upheld the remaining charges, leading Chasing Horse to seek relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the State had provided an improper instruction on "grooming" to the grand jury, which was unsupported by evidence and not necessary for the elements of the charged offenses. Additionally, the court determined that the State failed to present exculpatory evidence, specifically statements made by C.C.H. that could indicate consent, which is a critical element in sexual assault charges. The court concluded that these errors prejudiced Chasing Horse and undermined the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ petition, directing the district court to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. The State may seek a new indictment, but it must correct the errors identified by the court in its presentation to the grand jury. View "CHASING HORSE VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

In 2021, Hal de Becker contracted COVID-19 and was treated with ivermectin by his personal physician. Hal was later admitted to Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center, where his ivermectin treatment was stopped without consent, and he was administered remdesivir. Hal's condition deteriorated, and he died shortly after being discharged. Hal's family sued the attending doctors and the hospital, alleging negligence, professional negligence, and wrongful death, claiming the doctors and hospital failed to obtain informed consent and made treatment decisions based on media narratives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against the doctors and the hospital. The court found that the claims against the doctors were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and that the expert affidavit provided by the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071. The court also dismissed the claims against the hospital, finding them similarly barred by the PREP Act and that the claims were for professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were for professional negligence and required an expert affidavit under NRS 41A.071. The court found the expert affidavit insufficient as to the doctors because it did not specify acts of negligence separately for each doctor. However, the affidavit was sufficient as to the hospital. Despite this, the court concluded that the PREP Act barred the claim against the hospital because it related to the administration of remdesivir, a covered countermeasure. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law

Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law