Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute between two parents, Molly and Bryan, over the termination of Bryan’s parental rights to their child, S.A.T. After their divorce, Molly had primary physical custody, and Bryan initially remained involved. In 2016, Bryan experienced a mental health crisis, resulting in an incident that led Molly to obtain a temporary protective order (TPO) against him, later extended to require Bryan to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling before resuming contact. Bryan, facing financial and legal barriers, did not see or communicate with the children for several years, though he made efforts to seek legal help and eventually complied with the TPO’s requirements once he had the means. In 2021, after Bryan completed the required treatment and paid child support arrears, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The petition proceeded only as to S.A.T. after the other child, K.W.T., emancipated and subsequently passed away.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, reviewed the petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Molly failed to prove any grounds of parental fault—abandonment, neglect, or only token efforts to communicate or support—by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that Bryan’s lack of contact was influenced by the TPO, financial hardship, and Molly’s actions to limit access, and that S.A.T. was well cared for in Molly’s custody.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that in private termination actions, severing parental rights based solely on token efforts to communicate or support is disfavored, especially when the child is safe and well cared for. The court also held that a parent does not admit a parental-fault ground merely by failing to oppose it in response to a termination petition. The order denying the petition to terminate Bryan’s parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2016 of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, receiving concurrent sentences including 8 to 20 years for robbery and 5 years to life for kidnapping. In November 2022, the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners assessed him as a high risk to reoffend, denied parole, and scheduled his next hearing for January 2025. The petitioner requested a reassessment, arguing the risk level was incorrect. The Board found an error, reassessed him as moderate risk, and held a new hearing in April 2023, but again denied parole and rescheduled the next hearing for November 2025, nine months later than originally set.The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that the Board unlawfully punished him for seeking reconsideration by delaying his next parole hearing. He claimed this delay was vindictive and violated his due process rights, relying on the presumption of vindictiveness established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and its progeny.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the presumption of vindictiveness may generally arise in parole proceedings if the Board, upon reconsideration, extends the time before a prisoner may be considered for parole again. However, the court concluded that the presumption does not apply when the Board corrects its own error without prompting from an outside tribunal. The court further found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual vindictiveness. The Board acted within its statutory discretion in scheduling the next hearing, and the petition for writ relief was denied. View "Stewart v. Board of Parole Commissioners" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted on 22 counts of theft after embezzling nearly $600,000 from his employer over several years. He sought treatment at an addiction center, where he was diagnosed as a pathological gambler and was provisionally approved as a candidate for gambler’s diversion court, a specialty court for defendants whose crimes are related to gambling addiction. He pleaded guilty to all counts and moved for admission into the diversion program, arguing that his crimes were committed to fund his gambling addiction. At an evidentiary hearing, he testified to this effect, but the State presented financial records showing that only a small fraction of the stolen funds was actually used for gambling.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion for admission into gambler’s diversion court. The court found that the majority of the embezzled money was used to support a lavish lifestyle rather than to further a gambling addiction. The court determined that the State had met its burden of proof under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, showing that the crimes were not committed in furtherance of or as a result of problem gambling. The appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and appealed the denial of admission to the specialty court.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified the standard for admission into gambler’s diversion court under NRS 458A.220. The court held that district courts have wide discretion in deciding whether to admit a defendant, and the defendant bears the burden of proving eligibility by showing a rational nexus between the crime and problem gambling. The court found that, although the district court had incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the State, this error did not prejudice the appellant. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s denial of admission to gambler’s diversion court. View "PIZARRO VS STATE" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Richard Goldstein, is the sole lifetime beneficiary of a discretionary trust created in Missouri and administered by Bank of America (BOA) from its St. Louis office. The trust was established by Goldstein’s father, and the contingent remainder beneficiaries are Goldstein’s sister and her children, none of whom reside in Nevada. Goldstein requested that BOA transfer the trust’s situs from Missouri to Nevada, but BOA denied the request after consulting its St. Louis team. Goldstein then filed a petition in the Ninth Judicial District Court in Douglas County, Nevada, seeking the court’s jurisdiction over the trust and a construction of the trust’s no-contest clause to allow him to challenge the situs without forfeiting his interest.The district court granted BOA’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee. The court determined that, although statutory in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 was satisfied, BOA was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceeding, and personal jurisdiction was required. The court found that Goldstein failed to allege facts supporting either general or specific personal jurisdiction over BOA, and that BOA’s compliance with Nevada’s registered agent statute did not constitute consent to jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the statutory grant of in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 does not override the constitutional due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. Because BOA, as trustee, was a necessary and indispensable party, personal jurisdiction was required. Goldstein failed to make a prima facie showing that BOA had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada related to the petition, and BOA’s business presence in Nevada was unrelated to the trust administration at issue. Thus, dismissal was proper. View "In re Goldstein Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

A newborn child, A.R., was removed from her parents’ custody by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) due to neglect and abuse. Two relatives, a paternal aunt (Aunt Mary) and a maternal grandmother (Grandma Ericka), each sought to care for A.R. Initially, A.R. was placed with Aunt Mary, with Grandma Ericka’s cooperation, and later spent alternating weeks with each relative. After parental rights were terminated, both relatives sought to adopt A.R. DFS recommended placement with Aunt Mary, citing the child’s strong bond with her cousin in that household and the benefits of a “nuclear family” environment, though it acknowledged both homes were loving and appropriate.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada held evidentiary hearings and found that both Aunt Mary and Grandma Ericka were equally capable of providing for A.R.’s needs. The court ultimately placed A.R. with Aunt Mary, giving “due weight” to DFS’s recommendation, and incorporated a post-adoption contact agreement to ensure ongoing contact between A.R. and Grandma Ericka. The court clarified that while it considered DFS’s preference, it retained authority to override that recommendation if it was not in the child’s best interest.Grandma Ericka petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court improperly relied on DFS’s recommendation, failed to make sufficient findings, and prioritized a nuclear family contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. The court reaffirmed that, under Nevada law, the district court must consider but is not bound by the agency’s placement preference, and the child’s best interest remains paramount. The court found the district court’s written findings and process sufficient and consistent with applicable law. View "Destin v. District Court" on Justia Law

AZG Limited Partnership obtained a judgment against a client of Dickinson Wright PLLC, a law firm. To enforce the judgment, AZG served Dickinson Wright with garnishment interrogatories under Nevada law, specifically asking whether the firm had any “choses in action” (rights to bring legal claims) belonging to its client under its control. Dickinson Wright answered “no.” AZG challenged this response, arguing that the attorney-client relationship itself gave the law firm control over the client’s chose in action, and that the firm likely held unearned client funds that could be garnished. Dickinson Wright requested an in camera review of certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege, to support its response. The district court reviewed the documents and found that a third party, not the client, paid the legal bills, and that Dickinson Wright did not hold any retainer or unearned funds.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied AZG’s motion to traverse Dickinson Wright’s interrogatory responses, finding that the law firm did not possess or control the client’s chose in action as contemplated by the relevant statute. The court also ordered Dickinson Wright to disclose the identity of the third-party financer but did not require disclosure of the in camera documents, suggesting that discovery procedures would be the proper avenue for further requests.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that attorneys and law firms do not possess or control a client’s chose in action for purposes of NRS 31.290(1) merely by representing the client. The type of control attorneys exercise in litigation is distinct from the possessory or property-based control required by the statute for garnishment. Therefore, Dickinson Wright’s negative response to the interrogatory was proper, and the district court’s denial of AZG’s motion to traverse was correct. View "AZG Limited Partnership v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a complex series of shareholder derivative actions involving a mineral rights holding company. The litigation began in March 2014, alleging self-dealing by the company’s corporate counsel and majority shareholder. Over the years, multiple complaints and counterclaims were filed, and the cases were consolidated. The original defendant, Paul, was dismissed from the case in 2016 but was later named as a counterdefendant in an amended counterclaim filed in 2020, after control of the company shifted. During Paul’s absence from the litigation, the remaining parties agreed to waive the five-year rule for bringing a case to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B).The Second Judicial District Court, after considering Paul’s 2024 motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B), denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the 2020 amended counterclaim constituted a new action, thereby restarting the five-year period, and that the parties’ earlier waiver of the five-year rule applied to Paul as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the five-year period for bringing an action to trial under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) begins with the filing of the initial complaint, regardless of subsequent procedural developments. The court further clarified that a waiver of the five-year rule by some parties does not bind parties who did not join in the waiver. The court also determined that the amended counterclaim did not constitute a new action for purposes of the rule. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss the action against Paul, with the district court to determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. View "Paul v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly pointing a firearm at another person and making threatening statements. The prosecution charged that the defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm by brandishing the firearm. During trial preparation, the defense requested, and the district court approved, a jury instruction requiring the State to prove that the defendant had the present ability to use the weapon, specifically that the firearm was both loaded and operable.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada granted the defense’s request for this instruction over the State’s objection. The State then filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the instruction misstated the law because the current statutory definition of assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof that the firearm was loaded and operable or that the defendant had a present ability to injure.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and determined that the relevant statute, NRS 200.471, had been amended since earlier case law to remove the requirement of a present ability to injure. The statute now defines assault as either an unlawful attempt to use physical force or intentionally placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. The court held that the jury instruction was legally inaccurate and misleading because it imposed requirements not found in the current statute. The court granted the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its order approving the challenged jury instruction. View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Angel Rodriguez outside his home. Surveillance footage showed a silver Cadillac SUV near the scene, and eyewitnesses described the shooter as matching the build of Xavier Acosta. Acosta was identified as a suspect after a domestic violence incident involving his spouse, Rebecca. During the investigation, Acosta’s mother-in-law reported that Acosta confessed to killing Rodriguez out of love for Rebecca, who was Rodriguez’s ex-boyfriend. Police seized two cell phones belonging to Acosta and, after obtaining a search warrant, extracted their contents, which included a photograph of Rodriguez’s house taken minutes before the shooting. DNA evidence also linked Acosta to a Cadillac similar to the one seen in the surveillance footage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over Acosta’s trial. Acosta moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing the warrant was overbroad and unsupported by probable cause, but the court denied the motion. The court also admitted certain letters between Acosta and his wife and evidence of a prior domestic violence incident. The jury found Acosta guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and he was sentenced accordingly.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the warrant authorizing the search of Acosta’s cell phones was constitutionally deficient because it lacked specific facts establishing probable cause that evidence of the murder would be found on the phones. The court found that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress this evidence and that the good-faith exception did not apply. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless due to overwhelming other evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Acosta v. State" on Justia Law

Baker Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporation, holds decreed water rights in Baker and Lehman Creeks, which flow through Great Basin National Park. In 2015, the National Park Service (NPS) received a permit for a nonconsumptive instream flow in Baker Creek, requiring that the water not be removed and the full natural flow exit the park undiverted. Baker Ranches alleged that, since 2016, the NPS denied it permission to remove obstructions and allowed rock dams to be constructed, diverting water into caves and interfering with its water rights. While related federal litigation was ongoing, Baker Ranches requested the State Engineer to investigate these alleged violations.The State Engineer, after site visits and correspondence, decided in 2021 to hold the investigation in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal litigation. Baker Ranches then petitioned the Seventh Judicial District Court in White Pine County for judicial review or a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the writ but granted judicial review, finding the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the State Engineer to complete the investigation and render a final decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State Engineer had the authority to hold the investigation in abeyance and whether such a decision was subject to judicial review. The court held that the State Engineer possesses discretionary powers, including the implied authority to pause investigations pending related litigation. The court further determined that the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation was interlocutory, not a final order, and therefore not subject to judicial review. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order granting Baker Ranches’ petition for judicial review. View "SULLIVAN, P.E. VS. BAKER RANCHES, INC." on Justia Law