Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court awarding retroactive child support in a paternity action initiated after the child reached the age of majority, holding that the three-year statute of limitations to bring a paternity action after the child reaches the age of majority applies to a parent's request for retroactive child support.Mother and Father had one child together. More than one year after the child turned eighteen, Mother filed a paternity action against Father in order to seek back child support. Mother asked the district court to recognize the parties' previous agreement for $400 per month under Nev. Rev. Stat. 126.900(1) and alternatively argued that, even absent an agreement, she was entitled to retroactive child support. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Mother's request for retroactive child support was timely; (2) because Mother was permitted to seek retroactive child support the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it did not have the authority to grant relief; and (3) because Father did not make a promise in writing to make monthly support payments, the district court correctly denied Mother's section 126.900(1) claim. View "Hargrove v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) prohibits disclosure, under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), of documents from pharmaceutical companies and pharmacy benefit managers collected under S.B. 539.The Nevada Independent (TNI) filed a petition with the district court seeking an order directing the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to release the documents at issue. The district court concluded that the documents were not subject to disclosure under the NPRA because the information contained in them comprised trade secrets protected under the DTSA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the DTSA classifies the requested documents, obtained pursuant to S.B. 539, as confidential trade secrets, the documents were exempt from disclosure under the NPRA; and (2) TNI's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Nevada Independent v. Whitley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 231.1517 and ordered the Parole Board to credit Respondent for the time he spent incarcerated pending adjudication on his new criminal charges.The Division of Parole and Probation issued parole violation reports against Respondent based on new criminal charges. Respondent was remanded into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and physically incarcerated in the prison. However, Respondent's parole revocation hearing was continued for more than one year until the day after he entered an Alford plea to the new charge of attempted burglary. Respondent received a consecutive sentence on the new charge and did not begin serving it until after he was parole on the previous charges. Respondent filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he lost over a year of credit for time served due to him. The district court agreed and granted relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board exceeded its authority by deferring the revocation hearing beyond sixty days after Respondent's return to the custody of NDOC. View "In re Application of Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied relief in this original petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion and dismissing her complaint as to the party whom she failed timely to serve.Petitioner filed a complaint against Mark Thomas Anderson and his employer, Thor Development, LLC, alleging various tort claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. After the expiration date of the Nev. R. Civ. P. 4 service period, Petitioner filed two motions to enlarge time for service. The district court granted the first motion but denied the second, finding that the motion was untimely. The court then dismissed Petitioners' complaint. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent request for relief, holding that Emergency Directive 009 did not toll the 120-day service period established by Rule 4(e), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's second motion to enlarge time. View "Cervantes-Guevara v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting attorney fees in this guardianship case where the guardian requested the protected person's estate to pay attorney fees, holding that the award was proper and that the court acted within its discretion in setting the amount of the award.The fees at issue stemmed from a period in 2019 when Donna Simmons and Robyn Friedman served as temporary co-guardians for their mother, Kathleen June Jones. The district court formally discharged Donna and Robyn upon the appointment of Kimberly Jones as general guardian. Donna and Robyn sought attorney fees payable from Jones's estate. The district court granted the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award was proper because the district court applied the relevant Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.344 factors and reasonably found that Donna and Robyn's complex temporary guardianship warranted compensation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of fees to award. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Mother's motion to relocate the parties' minor child, M.M., to Virginia, holding that the district court followed the correct procedures.Mother moved to relocate with M.M. to Virginia Beach, Virginia because her husband was required to relocate for work there and Father would not consent to the relocation. The district court granted Mother's motion. At issue on appeal was the correct interpretation of the best interests provision of Nevada's child relocation statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007(1)(b), including the application of the custody best interests factors as well as the applicable burden of proof necessary to satisfy section 125C.007(1). The Supreme Court held (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007(1)(b) requires the district court to make specific findings that relocation would be in the best interests of the child, which should include the custody best interest factors, and tie those findings to its conclusion; and (2) the applicable burden of proof for the threshold test is preponderance of the evidence. View "Monahan v. Hogan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part an interlocutory writ petition arising from a personal injury action in which Petitioner asserted that the district court improperly ordered that certain videos and reports were protected from disclosure as "work product" under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), holding that remand was required.Specifically, Petitioner argued that the district court erred in concluding that three surveillance videos and two related reports created by Petitioner's insurance company's investigators were subject to discovery and not protected from disclosure. The Supreme Court held (1) the first two videos and related report were not protected work product because their production was not directed by Petitioner's counsel; and (2) because the district court did not analyze whether the third video and accompanying report, which constituted work product, may nonetheless be discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship further proceedings were required. View "Keolis Transit Services, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that an arbitration provision was void under Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 for failure to include a specific authorization, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted section 597.955, and therefore, the district court's decision was erroneous.Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995 requires any agreement that includes an arbitration provision to include a specific authorization for that provision. The district court concluded that the arbitration provision at issue in this case was void for failure to include a specific authorization, as required by section 597.995. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because section 597.995 singles out and disfavors arbitration provisions by imposing stricter requirements on them than on other contract provisions, the FAA preempts the statute in cases involving interstate commerce; and (2) the district court erred by concluding that section 597.995 voided the parties' arbitration agreement. View "Maide, LLC v. Dileo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that EMTs wrongfully denied him medical treatment after concluding that Appellant's claims were barred by the public duty doctrine, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0336, and the Good Samaritan statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.500(5).In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants negligently misdiagnosed him and negligently denied him medical treatment because he was homeless and uninsured. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that, as a matter of law, Defendants could not be held liable for damages based on the public duty doctrine or the Good Samaritan statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff's claims based on misdiagnosis but reversed it to the extent it dismissed claims based on socioeconomic discrimination, holding that a failure to render medical assistance or to transport a patient to the hospital based solely on their socioeconomic status may qualify as an affirmative act exempted from the public duty doctrine and as gross negligence, which would render the Good Samaritan statute inapplicable. View "Porchia v. City of Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying judicial review from the determination of the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUC) denying Southwest Gas Corporation's (SWG) request for reimbursement and setting a return on equity lower than what the utility had requested, holding that the PUC's decision was neither clearly erroneous nor constitutionally infirm.SWG attempted to recover its expenses and sought an increased rate of return on equity (ROE). The PUC ultimately determined that the utility did not justify the expenses it was seeker to recover, thus denying SWG's requests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) utilities to not enjoy a presumption of prudence with respect to their incurred expenses but must show that the expenses were prudently incurred; (2) this Court declines to adopt the constitutional fact doctrine; (3) the PUC's rate-setting procedures met due process requirements and the ROE the PUC selected was not a confiscatory taking; and (4) the PUC's decision to disallow the SWG to recover certain project expenses and additional pension expenses was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Southwest Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission of Nevada" on Justia Law