Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for professional negligence, holding that Plaintiff's failure to include an affidavit from a medical expert in her complaint rendered her medical malpractice claim void ab initio.At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1)(a), which allows an exemption from the requirement that an action for professional negligence be filed with an affidavit from a medical expert, when "[a] foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery." The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was not exempt from the affidavit requirement and that Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 41A.100(1)(a) is unambiguous and does not include bacteria in the definition of foreign substance; and (2) Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. View "Montanez v. Sparks Family Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

In this original writ petition the Supreme Court held that once a party files a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC), that judge can take no further action in the case until the motion to disqualify is resolved.The real party in interest in this case asserted medical malpractice claims against Petitioners. After a mistrial was declared, Petitioners filed a motion to disqualify District Judge Rob Bare under NCJC Canon 2, Rule 2.11 based on Judge Bare's laudatory comments about the opposing party's counsel during trial. While the motion was pending, Judge Bare entered a written order reflecting his oral ruling granting the mistrial. Thereafter, the motion to disqualify Judge Bare was granted. The case was assigned to Judge Kerry Early, who denied Petitioners' motion for relief from the findings set forth in Judge Bare's mistrial order. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' writ petition and directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate Judge Bare's mistrial order as void, holding that if a motion to disqualify is granted and the judge is disqualified, any order entered by the judge after the motion to disqualify was filed is void. View "Debiparshad v. District Court" on Justia Law

In this case brought by the parents of a victim of the Route 91 Harvest Festival massacre against the manufacturers and distributors of the AR-15 rifles the gunman used the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.131 provided the gun manufacturers and distributors immunity from the claims asserted against them under Nevada law.Plaintiffs brought this suit in Nevada's federal district court alleging wrongful death, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment. The federal district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the negligent entrustment and negligence per se claims but denied it as to the wrongful death claim. The federal court then reconsidered its dismissal of the negligence per se claim and certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court. In response, the Supreme Court held that section 41.131 provided the gun companies immunity from the wrongful death and negligence per se claims asserted against them under Nevada law. View "Parsons v. Colt's Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint alleging slander and conspiracy, holding that Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged communication leading to the civil complaint was made in good faith.At issue was how the district court at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation should proceed when Defendant denied making the alleged statement. The district court used Plaintiff's version of the alleged defamatory statement during its step-one analysis and then denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's denial that he made the alleged statement was irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis; (2) Defendant's alleged statement did not constitute a nonactionable opinion; and (3) the district court correctly denied Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. View "Spirtos v. Yemenidjian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court determining that a proceeding before a citizen review board does not warrant tolling the statute of limitation under this Court's holding in State, Department of Human Resources v. Shively, 871 P.2d 355 (Nev. 1994), or under equitable tolling principles, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant filed a citizen complaint with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) Citizen Review Board (CRB) after an adverse encounter with LVMPD police officers. The CRB recommended additional officer training. Appellant later filed a civil complaint against LVMPD and the two officers (LVMPD respondents), claiming battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the complaint was time-barred and that equitable considerations did not favor tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Shively did not provide grounds for tolling the statute of limitations, and Appellant failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling. View "Wilson v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order granting summary judgment in this construction defect action brought by Appellant against Respondents, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment.Appellant, a homeowners' association, brought this construction defect claim against the builders of the Panorama Towers. Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that the construction defect claim was time-barred under the statute of repose in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.202(1). The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. Appellant subsequently filed two motions to alter or amend the summary judgment, but before the district court considered the second motion (1) the legislature amended the statute of repose to extend the filing deadline, specifying that the amendment was retroactive, and (2) the amended statute became effective. The district court denied the second motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the amended statute of repose, Appellant's construction defect claim was timely. View "Panorama Towers Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Hallier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual assault, battery with the intent to commit sexual assault upon a victim age sixteen or older, and open or gross lewdness, holding that Defendant was not denied a fair and just sentencing hearing.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's right to be present was violated when the sentencing hearing was conducted by simultaneous audiovisual transmission over the Zoom videoconferencing platform because of the district court's administrative orders forbidding in-person hearings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's sentencing hearing was fair and just considering the surrounding circumstances; (2) the district court properly admitted evidence of Defendant's previous conviction for battery with intent to commit sexual assault; and (3) the district court did not err in limiting inquiry into Defendant's prior conviction that the court had determined would be admitted as evidence. View "Chaparro v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court returning a $5.9 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his negligence action, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.An employee of Defendant collided the forklift he was driving with Plaintiff's vehicle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action, alleging negligence. The case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, and the district court awarded Plaintiff $2.3 million in attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) imposed sanctions within its discretion; (2) did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to recover the entirety of his contingency fee from the verdict under Nev. R. Civ. P. 68. View "Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to Respondent against Appellant pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 after Appellant rejected an offer of judgment and was unsuccessful at trial, holding that the district court erred.At issue was whether the district court improperly offset Appellant's settlement funds from a third party in favor of first satisfying Appellant's judgment for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court held that it did and reversed the district court's order as to the offset, holding (1) a party cannot make a claim for attorney fees and costs - and thus the district court cannot offset - against settlement funds from a third party that have not been reduced to a judgment; and (2) for an equitable offset to apply, there must be competing judgments between the parties that are mutually owed and mutually demandable. View "Harrison v. Ramparts, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered certified questions brought to it by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as to whether, in Nevada, the insured or the insurer has the burden of proving that an exception to an exclusion of coverage provision applies.The Ninth Circuit asked whether, under Nevada law, the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to an exclusion of coverage in an insurance policy falls on the insurer or the insured and whether the party that bears that burden may rely on extrinsic evidence to carry its burden. The Supreme Court answered (1) the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to an exclusion for coverage in an insurance policy falls on the insured; and (2) the insured may rely on any extrinsic evidence that was available to the insurer at the time the insured tendered the defense to the insurer. View "Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Ironshore Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law