Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court and appeals officer that Employee was incapacitated from earning "full wages" and therefore denying Employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Employee's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury amounted to being incapacitated from earning "full wages" such that he could seek to reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. The appeals officer concluded (1) Employee was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time specified under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.400(1); (2) that Employee had satisfied the statute's period of incapacitation; and (3) therefore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390(5) permitted Employee to submit an application to reopen his claim more than one year after it had closed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "full wages" as used in section 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's findings in this case. View "City of Henderson v. Wolfgram" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory relief challenging attorney fees imposed under a deed of trust, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant purchased certain real property at a homeowners association foreclosure sale, taking the property subject to Respondent's deed of trust, which allowed Respondent to add any reasonable expenses incurred protecting its interest in the property, including attorney fees, to the secured debt. The deed of trust entitled Respondent to add the attorney fees accrued in protecting its interest in the property to the secured debt without filing a motion seeking those fees in court. The district court concluded that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note secured by the deed of trust because Appellant's property was subject to the deed of trust and because Appellant sought to pay off the note secured by the deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and its timing requirements were inapplicable in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note. View "Oella Ridge Trust v. Silver State Schools Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a judgment debtor may claim the so-called "wildcard exemption" from execution under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(z) to protect up to $10,000 of the debtor's disposable earnings not already excepted by the earnings exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(g), holding that the district court did not err.The district court permitted Appellant to execute on the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings to the extent that those earnings exceeded $10,000 during the 180-day garnishment period. Appellant appealed, challenging Respondent's use of the wildcard exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because earnings qualify as personal property, the plain language of the wildcard exemption permits a debtor to shield from execution up to $10,000 of earnings not otherwise exempted; and (2) the use of the wildcard exemption on nonexempt earnings does not produce absurd results. View "Platte River Insurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment, holding that the trial court's Faretta canvass was in appropriate in this case.Defendant, who represented himself at trial, was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child under eighteen years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis that the waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Defendant validly waived his right to counsel was unreasonable in light of the inadequate inquiry into Defendant's understanding of the sentences he faced if convicted; and (2) the trial court should refrain from disparaging Defendant's choice to waive counsel. View "Miles v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court applying the catalyst theory in denying Plaintiff's request for attorney fees in this public records dispute, holding that the district court misconstrued one of the factors in the catalyst-theory analysis and neglected to conduct more than a summary analysis of several other factors.Plaintiff submitted a public records request to the City of Henderson under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) for certain documents. When the City requested a payment from Plaintiff to cover the cost of a review of the documents for privilege Plaintiff sought mandamus relief. Thereafter, the City reviewed the documents for privilege and provided to Plaintiff copies of non-privileged records while the privilege-review fee issue was being litigated. The district court concluded that the City satisfied its requirements under the NPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the case, but before the issue was addressed on remand, the City voluntarily disclosed eleven documents it had withheld pursuant to the deliberative-process privilege. At issue was whether Plaintiff was entitled to recovery of attorneys fees as the prevailing party under the catalyst theory. The district court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying the catalyst theory. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for the sexual assault of a woman who was killed twelve years before Defendant was charged, holding that there was no statutory time limit in which the State was required to file the sexual assault charge, and the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.In 1998, two elderly victims were murdered in a retirement facility. In 2010, the State charged Defendant with murdering both victims and sexually assaulting the female victim. Defendant moved to dismiss the sexual assault charge, arguing that the State's prosecution was time-barred. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was no limitations period for the offense under Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.083. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the murder of both victims and the sexual assault of the female victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the requirements of section 171.083 were satisfied, and therefore, there was no statutory time limit in which the State was required to file the sexual assault charge; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Ramos v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a pet store may not be held liable under tort law where a dog adopted at the store through an adoption event conducted by an independent charitable organization later attacks and injures an individual if the pet store did not assume a duty of care or have an agency relationship with the charitable organization that conducted the adoption event.James Todd was attacked by a dog adopted by his wife two days before from an independent pet-rescue organization holding an adoption event at a PetSmart store. The Todds sued PetSmart, among other defendants, for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and respondent superior. The district court denied PetSmart's motion for summary judgment, holding that PetSmart owed a duty to the Todds as a matter of law. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by PetSmart, holding that PetSmart did not owe a duty of care to the Todds as a matter of law and that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding any alleged agency relationship between PetSmart and the charitable organization. View "PetSmart, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order waiving the obligation of the real party in interest stockholders (RPIs) to provide consents from their stockholders of record until step four of the four-step process outlined in Nev. Rev. Stat. 92A.410-.440 and after petitioner corporation's merger vote was held, holding that the district court erred.At issue was the statutory process by which a stockholder who objects to a proposed merger may seek the fair value of the stockholder's shares from the corporation if the stockholder believes the proposed price for those shares is inadequate. In the event stockholders own their shares indirectly, the beneficial stockholders must obtain the stockholder of record's consent before dissenting from the merger. The Supreme Court held (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 92A.400(2)(a), when read in conjunction with the four-step process outlined in sections 92A.410-.440, unambiguously requires a beneficial holder to obtain the record holder's consent at step two before the vote on the merger is held; and (2) therefore, the district court here erred in construing the statutes as permitting RPIs to submit their consents after the merger vote was taken and in waiving RPIs statutory obligation to obtain those consents. View "Aerogrow International, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for professional negligence, holding that Plaintiff's failure to include an affidavit from a medical expert in her complaint rendered her medical malpractice claim void ab initio.At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1)(a), which allows an exemption from the requirement that an action for professional negligence be filed with an affidavit from a medical expert, when "[a] foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery." The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was not exempt from the affidavit requirement and that Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 41A.100(1)(a) is unambiguous and does not include bacteria in the definition of foreign substance; and (2) Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. View "Montanez v. Sparks Family Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

In this original writ petition the Supreme Court held that once a party files a motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC), that judge can take no further action in the case until the motion to disqualify is resolved.The real party in interest in this case asserted medical malpractice claims against Petitioners. After a mistrial was declared, Petitioners filed a motion to disqualify District Judge Rob Bare under NCJC Canon 2, Rule 2.11 based on Judge Bare's laudatory comments about the opposing party's counsel during trial. While the motion was pending, Judge Bare entered a written order reflecting his oral ruling granting the mistrial. Thereafter, the motion to disqualify Judge Bare was granted. The case was assigned to Judge Kerry Early, who denied Petitioners' motion for relief from the findings set forth in Judge Bare's mistrial order. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' writ petition and directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate Judge Bare's mistrial order as void, holding that if a motion to disqualify is granted and the judge is disqualified, any order entered by the judge after the motion to disqualify was filed is void. View "Debiparshad v. District Court" on Justia Law