Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that divorce jurisdiction requires mere residence - not domicile - and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.020.Appellant and Respondent married in Saudi Arabia. In 2018, Respondent obtained a student visa and moved to Las Vegas. In 2020, Appellant and the child obtained dependent visas and also moved to Las Vegas. Two months later, Appellant filed a complaint for divorce. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Appellant could not establish domicile - or intent to remain in Nevada - so that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 125.020. The district court granted the motion, finding that, because residence is synonymous with domicile under section 125.020 and neither party had established domicile as a matter of law, dismissal was necessary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 125.020, residence means mere residence - not domicile - and Nev. Rev. Stat. 10.155 defines residence as physical presence; and (2) because Appellant had been physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before she filed her divorce complaint, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 125.020. View "Senjab v. Alhulaibi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of two counts of driving under the influence resulting in death and one count of felony reckless driving but vacated his sentence, holding that the district court wrongly considered certain statements during sentencing.Under Nev. Const. art. I, 8A, also known as Marsy's Law, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.015 victims are afforded the right to be heard at sentencing. At issue was how to reconcile the provisions' different definitions of "victim." The Supreme Court held (1) neither definition includes anyone and everyone impacted by a crime, as the district court found in this case; (2) when presented with an objection to impact statements during sentences, a district court must first determine if an individual falls under either the constitutional definition or the statutory definition of "victim," and if the statement is from a nonvictim, the district court may consider it only upon a determination that the statement is relevant and reliable; and (3) the district court erroneously considered statements, over objection, from persons who do not fall under either definition of victim without making the required relevance and reliability findings. View "Aparicio v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that Assembly Bill (A.B.) 458, which did not met the supermajority voting requirement but was nevertheless passed during the eightieth session of the Nevada Legislature in 2019, was constitution, holding that the bill was not subject to the supermajority requirement.A.B. 458 eliminated future increases in the amount of tax credits available to businesses that donated to certain scholarship organizations. Appellants - parents of scholarship recipients, a scholarship organization, and businesses who benefitted from the tax credit - brought this action challenging the legislation as unconstitutional. The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the legislation did not violate the supermajority voting provision set forth in Nev. Const. art. IV, 18(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) A.B. 458 does not increase public revenue but instead redirects funds from a specific appropriation to the State General Fund; and (2) therefore, the bill was constitutionally enacted. View "Morency v. State, Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting a motion to modify a divorce decree under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), holding that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was inappropriate in this case.Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief from a judgment for any justifiable reason besides those otherwise listed specifically in that rule. Your years Appellee moved for relief from the divorce decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and to modify the decree, arguing that Appellant fraudulently induced her into signing the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA), which was merged into the divorce decree. The district court modified the decree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in modifying the divorce decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), as Appellee's assertions sounded in Rule 60(b)(1) or (3) and Rule 60(b)(6) applies in extraordinary circumstances not address in Rules 60(b)(1)-(5). View "Byrd v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the order of the district court denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss counts of an indictment, the Supreme Court held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss Douglas County charges for lack of venue.Petitioner was charged with committing three burglaries in two murders in Washoe County and two burglaries and two murders in Douglas County. A Washoe County grand jury indicted Petitioner for all of the above offenses. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Douglas County charges for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue was proper in Washoe County for each charge. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the State's theories supporting venue in Washoe County were too speculative and unsupported by the evidence to make venue proper for the Douglas County charges. View "Guzman v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and related charges, holding that there was no reversible error in jury selection or closing arguments.During his trial, Defendant stipulated to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if he was found guilty and to waive his right to appeal issues "stemming from the guilt phase of the trial." The jury found Defendant guilty, and the court sentenced Defendant to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant raised errors relating to the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, jury selection, closing arguments, jury deliberations, and sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not waive any error that occurred during closing arguments, sentencing or jury selection; and (2) Defendant waived his other alleged errors. View "Burns v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claims and state law tort claims, holding that the district court erred by requiring Appellant to administratively exhaust all potential remedies.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that Georgina Stuart, who was employed by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS), and two police officers forced him to sign a temporary guardianship over his two minor children to the children's maternal aunt. DFS subsequently made a findings of maltreatment against Appellant, which he administratively appealed. The district court dismissed Appellant's request for punitive damages as not available and dismissed Appellant's section 1983 and state law tort claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not required to administratively exhaust all potential remedies in his DFS case before bringing his section 1983 and tort claims; and (2) the district court erred by finding that Appellant's section 1983 claim was solely a procedural due process claim subject to the exhaustion doctrine. View "Eggleston v. Stuart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint under Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.310, holding that the district court erred.Appellant purchased property at a homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure sale following the previous owner's default on HOA assessments imposed by covenants, conditions, or restrictions (CC&Rs). Because the first deed of trust on the property survived the foreclosure sale, Appellant sued the HOA and its agent, alleging breach of the duty of good faith, misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violation of Nev. REv. Stat. Chapter 113. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Appellant had not engaged in alternative dispute resolution before bringing this suit in violation of section 38.310. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 38.310 did not apply to Appellant's claims; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Peccole Ranch Community Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for writ relief asserting that the district court properly dismissed the claims against them as precluded by the former six-year statute of repose, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.The City of North Las Vegas's (CNLV) hired one petitioner in this case to construct a fire station, and that contractor hired several subcontractors to assist in the construction (collectively, Petitioners). When CNLV noticed construction defects years later, CNLV filed this complaint alleging construction defect claims. The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.202's six-year period of repose. Thereafter, a legislative statutory amendment extending the repose period to ten years became effective. CNLV moved to alter the judgment, arguing that the ten-year statute of repose governed its claims. The district court granted the motion, determined that section 11.202 applied retroactively, and reinstated the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse or arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion by retroactively applying section 11.202's ten-year repose period to CNLV's claims. View "Dekker/Perich/Sabatini Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition filed by NuVeda, LLC for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus asking the Supreme Court to disqualify Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez from presiding over a contempt hearing and to order the Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court to randomly reassign that hearing to another judge, holding that NuVeda was not entitled to relief.In this business dispute, NuVeda moved for a change of judge thirty-seven days after the court set a date for a trial on NuVeda's alleged contempt. The district court denied the motion as untimely. NuVeda petitioned for extraordinary writ relief. The Supreme Court denied the relief, holding (1) motions for a change of judge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 22.030(3) must be made with reasonable promptness under the circumstances; and (2) the district court did not erroneously determine that the motion in this case was untimely. View "NuVeda, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law