Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that declaratory relief actions are not categorically exempt from statutes of limitations, that the four-year statute of limitations applies to an action like this one to determine the validity of a lien under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010, and that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the titleholder affirmatively repudiates the lien.In this declaratory relief and quiet title matter arising out of a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as the questions leading to this opinion. The Supreme Court held (1) City of Fernley does not hold that declaratory relief actions are categorically exempt from statutes of limitations; (2) this is a quiet title action under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.010; (3) the four-year catch-all statute of limitations applies; and (4) the four-year limitations period is not triggered until the titleholder repudiates the lien. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Father's motion to modify the parties' physical custody designation and Father's child support obligation, holding that the new child support guidelines alone did not constitute a change in circumstances necessary to support a motion to modify a child support obligation.When the parties divorced, they agreed upon joint physical custody of their children. Father later filed a motion requesting that the court modify the order to reflect the parties' actual arrangement and to modify the child support obligations. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was no change in circumstances that warranted modifying custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that there was no change in circumstances that warranted modifying the child custody arrangement. View "Romano v. Romano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's overt interjection of racial stereotypes into Appellant's criminal trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. In his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for introducing racial issues into the trial. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's statements impermissibly tainted the jury pool by introducing racial invective into the proceedings; and (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the defense. View "Dean v. Narvaiza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly robbery and other crimes. After a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a death sentence. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition at issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on the alleged ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel as good cause and prejudice to raise grounds for relief from the guilt phase of his trial; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance claims of second postconviction counsel lacked merit; and (3) Defendant failed to show that the failure to consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to the petition. View "Chappell v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's summary judgment as to damages for claims outside the two-year statute of limitations, holding that the court erred by tolling the statute of limitations far beyond two years based on an erroneous interpretation of the notice requirements of the Minimum Wage Act, Nev. Const. art. XV, 16.Respondents, the named representatives in this class action, were taxi drivers who brought suit against their former employer (Appellants) and its owner, alleging that Appellants failed to pay them minimum wage. The district court severed the claims against the owner and entered summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) this matter was properly in front of the district court because plaintiffs in a class action may aggregate damages for jurisdiction; (2) the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations; (3) damages were reasonably calculated; (4) claims against the owner were properly severed; (5) the attorney fees award and award of costs must be reconsidered; (6) the judgment was properly amended; and (7) the district court erred in denying a motion to quash a writ of execution without conducting an evidentiary hearing. View "A Cab, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting title in favor of Respondent, the first deed-of-trust beneficiary in this case, holding that the district court properly quieted title in Respondent's favor.A homeowners' association foreclosed its lien on the subject property. The property was eventually transferred to Appellant by deed expressly providing that Appellant's interest was subject to any claims, encumbrances, or liens. U.S. Bank Trust, the assignee of the first deed of trust, sought to quiet title. The district court concluded that Appellant took title to the property subject to U.S. Bank Trust's first deed of trust and that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that U.S. Bank Trust may enforce its deed-of-trust lien in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.210. View "Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application seeking a writ of mandamus precluding the district court from requiring adherence to an unconstitutional statute, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 52.380 violates the separation of powers doctrine.In 2019, the Supreme Court amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 35, which governs mental and physical examinations of a party that are ordered during discovery in civil litigation. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted section 52.380, which governs conditions for such examinations. Rule 35 disallows observers at certain mental examinations, prohibits the examinee's attorney from attending any examination, and allows audio recordings only upon a showing of good cause. Section 52.380, however, allows the examinee's attorney to attend and make audio recordings of all mental and physical examinations. The district court concluded that section 52.380 supersedes Rule 35 such that the real party in interest's examinations in this case must follow the statutory procedures. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) section 52.380 is unconstitutional because it attempts to abrogate an existing rule of procedure that this Court prescribed under its inherent authority to regulate the judicial process; and (2) the district court manifestly abused its discretion by allowing the examinations to proceed under section 52.380. View "Lyft, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court and appeals officer that Employee was incapacitated from earning "full wages" and therefore denying Employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Employee's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury amounted to being incapacitated from earning "full wages" such that he could seek to reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. The appeals officer concluded (1) Employee was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time specified under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.400(1); (2) that Employee had satisfied the statute's period of incapacitation; and (3) therefore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390(5) permitted Employee to submit an application to reopen his claim more than one year after it had closed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "full wages" as used in section 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's findings in this case. View "City of Henderson v. Wolfgram" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory relief challenging attorney fees imposed under a deed of trust, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant purchased certain real property at a homeowners association foreclosure sale, taking the property subject to Respondent's deed of trust, which allowed Respondent to add any reasonable expenses incurred protecting its interest in the property, including attorney fees, to the secured debt. The deed of trust entitled Respondent to add the attorney fees accrued in protecting its interest in the property to the secured debt without filing a motion seeking those fees in court. The district court concluded that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note secured by the deed of trust because Appellant's property was subject to the deed of trust and because Appellant sought to pay off the note secured by the deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) and its timing requirements were inapplicable in this case; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Respondent may add those attorney fees to the amount of indebtedness owed under the note. View "Oella Ridge Trust v. Silver State Schools Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a judgment debtor may claim the so-called "wildcard exemption" from execution under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(z) to protect up to $10,000 of the debtor's disposable earnings not already excepted by the earnings exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(g), holding that the district court did not err.The district court permitted Appellant to execute on the attachable portion of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings to the extent that those earnings exceeded $10,000 during the 180-day garnishment period. Appellant appealed, challenging Respondent's use of the wildcard exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because earnings qualify as personal property, the plain language of the wildcard exemption permits a debtor to shield from execution up to $10,000 of earnings not otherwise exempted; and (2) the use of the wildcard exemption on nonexempt earnings does not produce absurd results. View "Platte River Insurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law