Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant overcame the procedural bars that applied to his postconviction habeas petition and that Appellant's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. Due to a single aggravating circumstance - a New York conviction for a felony invoking the use or threat of violence to another person - Appellant was sentenced to death. Later, a New York court vacated Appellant's New York conviction. Appellant subsequently filed his habeas petition, arguing that his death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the prior-violent-felony-conviction aggravating circumstance was invalid in light of the vacatur of his New York conviction. The district court denied the petition, concluding that it was procedurally barred and barred by statutory latches. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's petition and that Appellant's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada asking to decide whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.031(1) constitutes a waiver of Nevada's sovereign immunity from damages liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), holding that Nevada has waived the defense of sovereign immunity to liability under the FLSA.Appellant and several other employees of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) filed a putative class and collective action complaint alleging that the State and NDOC violated the FLSA and the state Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) and breached their contract under state law. The State removed the action to federal district court, where at issue was whether the State possessed sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and left open the question of whether the State retained its sovereign immunity from liability. The court then certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that, by enacting Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.031(1), Nevada consented to damages liability for a State agency's violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. View "Echeverria v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, to alter or amend the judgment to offset the settlement proceeds paid by other defendants, and to retax costs, holding that Appellant was entitled to an offset of the settlement proceeds.Dr. Kayvan Khiabani was fatally injured when he collided with a passing bus while riding his bicycle. Khiabani's estate and surviving family members (collectively, Respondents), sued several defendants, including Appellant. Each defendant except Appellant settled with Respondents. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Respondents on their failure-to-warn theory. The district court denied each of Appellant's post-judgment motions, after which Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied MCI's motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to relax costs; and (2) erred in denying MCI's motion to alter or amend the judgment because Appellants was entitled to an offset of the settlement proceeds where Appellant and the settling defendants were liable for the same injury. View "Motor Coach Industries, Inc. v. Khiabani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus in this medical malpractice action, holding that the relevant one-year statute of limitations expired and that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2), a medical malpractice action against a healthcare provider must be filed within one year of the discovery of the injury or three years of the date of injury, whichever occurs first. At issue in this case was whether the limitations period was tolled for concealment where Plaintiffs were in possession of the necessary medical records to procure an expert affidavit more than one year prior to filing the complaint and the alleged concealment did not hinder the acquisition of the affidavit. The district court denied summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that questions of fact existed with respect to Defendants' alleged concealment. The Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief, holding that tolling was inapplicable and the complaint was untimely. View "Kushnir v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition for judicial review challenging his dismissal from employment as a correctional officer and denying his amended petition for judicial review that correctly named all parties as respondents, holding that Prevost v. State, Department of Administration, 418 P.3d 675 (Nev. 2018) is overruled.In Prevost, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's failure to name one party of record in the caption of a petition for judicial review was not jurisdictionally fatal under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) because the petition named the missing respondent in the body of the petition and served the missing respondent with the petition. The Supreme Court overruled Prevost, holding (1) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) plainly requires petitioners to name all parties as respondents, Prevost is overruled; (2) Appellant failed to strictly comply with section 233B.130(2)(a), and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed his petition; and (3) Appellant failed to timely filed his amended petition pursuant to section 233B.130(2)(d), and therefore, the district court correctly denied the motion to amend. View "Whitfield v. Nevada State Personnel Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing this action brought by Somersett Owners Association (SOA) seeking to recover damages against those involved in the design and construction of stacked retaining walls supporting the Somersett residential development in northern Nevada, holding that the statute of repose barred this lawsuit.After the rockery walls began failing, SOA brought suit against Defendants alleging negligence and negligence per se, breach of express and implied warranties and other claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the six-year period of repose set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.202 applied. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. At issue was when the rockery walls achieved "substantial completion" for purposes of section 11.202. The Supreme Court held (1) the six-year period in section 11.202 begins when the improvement to the real property is "substantially complete," which means sufficiently complete so that the owner can occupy or utilize the improvement; and (2) SOA failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue as to whether it brought the underlying suit within the six-year period set by section 11.202. View "Somersett Owners Ass'n v. Somersett Development Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court holding that the Nevada Transportation Authority's (NTA) approval of Appellants' tax leases under Nev. Rev. Stat. 706.473 foreclosed further inquiry into their employee status, holding that the district court erred.Appellants, taxi drivers, sued Respondents, taxicab companies that leased taxicabs to Appellants under agreements approved by the NTA. Appellants alleged (1) their take-home pay was often less than the minimum hourly wage required by the Minimum Wage Amendment to the Nevada Constitution (MWA); and (2) notwithstanding the recital in the lease agreement that they were independent contractors, they were, in fact, employees under the "economic realities" test set forth in Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.3d 951 (Nev. 2014). The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) employee status for purposes of the MWA is determined only by the "economic realities" test, but employee status for purposes of statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages may be affected by the presumption set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155; (2) a contractual recitation that a worker is not an employee is not conclusive under either test; and (3) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the NTA's approval of Appellants' leases. View "Myers v. Reno Cab Co." on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court clarified that the existence of a bond pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.2415 precluded a contractor's ability to maintain a claim for unjust enrichment against the property owner because the subject of the dispute was governed by an express, written contract.University entered into an agreement with Lessee providing that University would purchase certain real property and lease it to Lessee, whereby Lessee would fund and construct student housing and other establishments. Lessee subsequently entered into a construction contract with Contractor. When a dispute arose between Contractor and Lessee, Contractor recorded a mechanics' lien against the property and filed a complaint against several defendants, including a claim against University for unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of University. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bond provided an adequate remedy at law and that the unjust enrichment claim was improper. View "Korte Construction Co. v. State, Board of Regents" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition requesting a genetic market analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying the petition requesting genetic marker analysis and that the decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated.Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes related to a fifteen-year-old girl's sexual assault and sentenced in 2011 to twenty-five years to life. In 2019, Defendant learned that a rape kit collected from the alleged victim and not tested prior to trial revealed a DNA match to a man other than Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion requesting a genetic marker analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court remanded both matters for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that a CODIS match would have been inadmissible and in denying Defendant's petition requesting a genetic marker analysis on this basis; and (2) because the court erred in denying the genetic marker analysis petition, the court's decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated. View "James v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 268.0035's limitations apply to a city's ability to litigate such that the city's power to maintain a lawsuit must be derived from an express grant of power or fall within a matter of local concern as defined by section 268.003(1).Section 268.0035(1), Nevada's modified version of Dillon's Rule, limits a city's powers to those expressly granted to it, those necessarily implied from an express grant of power, or those necessary to address matters of local concern. The City of Reno brought the underlying action against Petitioners, manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioid medications, to recover damages as a result of the opioid epidemic. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred under Dillon's Rule. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners then filed this writ petition arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that the modified Dillon's Rule applies to a city's ability to bring a lawsuit, and the district court misapplied the definition of a "matter of local concern." View "Endo Health Solutions, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law