Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2021, Hal de Becker contracted COVID-19 and was treated with ivermectin by his personal physician. Hal was later admitted to Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center, where his ivermectin treatment was stopped without consent, and he was administered remdesivir. Hal's condition deteriorated, and he died shortly after being discharged. Hal's family sued the attending doctors and the hospital, alleging negligence, professional negligence, and wrongful death, claiming the doctors and hospital failed to obtain informed consent and made treatment decisions based on media narratives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against the doctors and the hospital. The court found that the claims against the doctors were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and that the expert affidavit provided by the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071. The court also dismissed the claims against the hospital, finding them similarly barred by the PREP Act and that the claims were for professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were for professional negligence and required an expert affidavit under NRS 41A.071. The court found the expert affidavit insufficient as to the doctors because it did not specify acts of negligence separately for each doctor. However, the affidavit was sufficient as to the hospital. Despite this, the court concluded that the PREP Act barred the claim against the hospital because it related to the administration of remdesivir, a covered countermeasure. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law

Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law

In August 2021, a vehicle driven by Storm Griffith and owned by Isaias Luna-Cortez collided with a vehicle carrying Zoe Rivera and her daughter L.R. Rivera and L.R. filed a complaint against Griffith and Luna-Cortez, leading to court-annexed arbitration where Rivera and L.R. prevailed. Griffith and Luna-Cortez requested a trial de novo on October 25, 2022. The next day, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order amending the Nevada Short Trial Rules, increasing the maximum attorney fees a short trial judge could award from $3,000 to $15,000, effective January 1, 2023.The short trial was held on March 3, 2023, and Rivera and L.R. again prevailed. They filed for fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and the short trial judge awarded $15,000 in attorney fees to each respondent, totaling $30,000. The district court entered a final judgment consistent with this award. Griffith and Luna-Cortez appealed, arguing that the pre-amendment $3,000 cap should apply since they requested the trial de novo before the rule change.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the amendment to NSTR 27(b)(4) was procedural, not substantive, as it did not create or remove any conditions under which fees could be awarded but merely increased the maximum amount. The court noted that procedural changes apply to pending cases unless they alter substantive rights. The court found that the parties had fair notice of the rule change, which was published 67 days before it took effect, and had ample opportunity to adjust their actions accordingly. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, applying the amended rule to the case. View "Griffith v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Ramon Vasquez, Jr., sustained injuries while working in a restaurant and subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim, which was accepted by AmTrust North America, Inc. AmTrust paid $177,335.59 in benefits. Vasquez then initiated third-party litigation against several defendants, resulting in a $400,000 settlement. AmTrust, having intervened as subrogee, sought to recover its lien from the settlement proceeds. Vasquez argued that AmTrust was not entitled to any of the settlement proceeds based on prior case law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County held that AmTrust did not meaningfully participate in the third-party litigation and thus had to bear a portion of the litigation costs and fees under the Breen formula. The court also ruled that AmTrust could not recover from the portion of the settlement allocated to noneconomic damages, as per Poremba. Consequently, the district court adjudicated AmTrust’s lien at $0 and dismissed its complaint.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the Breen formula, which required insurers to bear a portion of litigation costs, conflicted with NRS 616C.215(5). The court held that there is no requirement for an insurer to intervene or participate in the third-party claim to recover on its lien. The court also overruled the Breen formula and Poremba to the extent they conflicted with the statute, stating that an insurer's lien applies to the total proceeds of any recovery, including noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Amtrust North America, Inc. v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Ryan S. and Marie S. married in 2011 and have three minor children. They separated in 2019, and Marie was awarded temporary primary physical and legal custody. Ryan participated in supervised visits, which were terminated due to policy violations. In early 2020, the district court found Ryan unfit for custody, partly due to self-diagnosed PTSD, and allowed Marie to relocate with the children to California. Ryan's virtual visits were also terminated due to financial constraints. Despite his efforts to comply with custody evaluations and provide support, Ryan had not interacted with his children since June 2020.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County, terminated Ryan's parental rights, finding him unfit and concluding that he had abandoned and neglected his children, making only token efforts to support or communicate with them. The court applied NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109, which outline factors for terminating parental rights and create a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest when the child has been placed outside the home.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 were inapplicable because the children were in the custody of a parent, not placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying these statutes and that the findings of abandonment, neglect, and token efforts were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Ryan's parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to order the destruction of any amended birth certificates and restore the children's names. View "In re Parental Rights to L.R.S., J.M.S. and J.L.S." on Justia Law

Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation lawsuit against The Associated Press (AP) and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by AP that reported on allegations of sexual assault against Wynn from the 1970s. The article was based on complaints obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Wynn claimed the allegations were false and that AP published the article with actual malice.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted AP's special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which are designed to protect free speech and petitioning activities from meritless lawsuits. The district court found that the article was a good faith communication related to an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to show a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. Wynn appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that AP met its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by showing the article was a good faith communication on a matter of public interest. The court also clarified that under the second prong, a public figure plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer, by clear and convincing evidence, that the publication was made with actual malice. Wynn failed to meet this burden, as his evidence did not demonstrate that AP published the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order granting the special motion to dismiss. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

Fahd Dayani was on house arrest pending an unrelated trial when officers conducted a warrantless compliance check and found methamphetamine and heroin in his residence. Dayani was arrested and charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. On the same day, his cousin, Alina Jagshi, made statements to the police indicating that the drugs belonged to her. Dayani's counsel informed the district attorney's office about Jagshi's confession, which was recorded on an officer's body-worn camera. However, the State did not present this video to the grand jury, which subsequently indicted Dayani.Dayani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State violated NRS 172.145(2) by not presenting exculpatory evidence, including the video of Jagshi's confession and evidence of a second bathroom in his residence. The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada construed the motion as a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it as untimely under NRS 34.700(1)(a)'s 21-day deadline. Dayani then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that his motion was improperly construed and should have been considered on its merits.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that challenges alleging violations of NRS 172.145(2) may be properly brought via a motion to dismiss and are not confined by the 21-day time limit for pretrial habeas petitions. The court concluded that the district court had a duty to consider Dayani's motion on its merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to consider the motion on its merits. View "DAYANI v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

Thomas Labs, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, sued Amber Marie Dukes and her veterinary supply company for money owed on products delivered. During the litigation, Dukes died, and her counsel filed a notice of death but did not serve any nonparty successors or representatives. Thomas Labs moved to substitute Dukes' trust and trustee, Jason Hilliard, as parties, which the district court granted. Later, Dukes' will was filed in probate court, appointing her brother, Lynn Hill, as personal representative. Dukes' counsel then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither Hilliard nor the trust were proper representatives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against Dukes, concluding that the 180-day deadline for substitution under NRCP 25(a) had passed. The court found that service of the notice of death on the parties alone triggered the deadline, even though no court-appointed executor or administrator existed when the notice was filed. The district court also denied Thomas Labs' motion to substitute a special administrator, Shara Berry, as untimely.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that under NRCP 25(a), when a decedent's attorney files a notice of death, they must serve the notice on nonparty successors or representatives to start the 180-day deadline for substitution. The court also noted that NRS 7.075 requires the decedent's attorney to file a motion to substitute a proper party within 90 days of the client's death. The Supreme Court found that the 180-day deadline never started because Dukes' counsel failed to serve the nonparty successors or representatives. Consequently, the district court's dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the substitution of a special administrator for Dukes. View "THOMAS LABS, LLC VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

A six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from the custody of Yumila Cardenas-Garcia due to unlivable conditions in her home. Cardenas-Garcia was charged with felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. She pleaded no contest at the custody hearing, and Z.K. remained in protective custody. In a separate criminal case, she pleaded guilty to the felony as part of a plea agreement, which allowed her to withdraw the felony plea after completing probation and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor.The Eighth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if Cardenas-Garcia had rebutted the statutory presumption against reunification under NRS 432B.555, which applies to parents convicted of felony child abuse. The court found she had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Z.K. would not be harmed by reunification. After completing probation and withdrawing her felony plea, Cardenas-Garcia again sought a determination on the presumption's applicability. The district court maintained that the presumption still applied because she had not rebutted it at the prior hearing.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who has ever been convicted of felony child abuse, regardless of the legal status of that conviction. The court emphasized that the statute's use of the word "ever" means it applies even if the conviction was later voided. The court concluded that the presumption against reunification remains unless the parent can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no harm will come to the child. The petition was denied, affirming the district court's application of the statutory presumption. View "CARDENAS-GARCIA VS. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

Retailers House of CB USA, LLC, and Chinese Laundry Lifestyle, LLC, leased commercial space at the Miracle Mile Shops, operated by PHWLV, LLC, which also runs the Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino. On July 8, 2017, a fire-suppression pipe burst, causing significant water damage to the retailers' stores and inventory. The retailers sued PHWLV for negligence in maintaining the fire-suppression system.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the retailers on the elements of duty and breach, concluding that PHWLV had a duty to prevent items on its property from damaging others' property and had breached this duty. The case proceeded to a jury trial on causation and damages, resulting in a verdict awarding House of CB $3,133,755.56 and Chinese Laundry $411,581.41. The district court denied PHWLV's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the jury verdict, also awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest to House of CB.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its formulation of PHWLV's duty. The appropriate standard of care was the duty to use reasonable care in servicing and inspecting the fire-suppression system and responding to issues arising from failures within the system. The court reversed the district court's judgment on the jury verdict, vacated the post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also denied PHWLV's request to reassign the case to a different judicial department. View "PHWLV, LLC VS. HOUSE OF CB USA, LLC" on Justia Law