Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial based on new DNA test results, holding that, consistent with Sunburn v. State, 812 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1991), new DNA test results are "favorable" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.09187(1) where they would make a different result reasonably probable upon retrial.Under section 176.09187(1), a party may move for a new trial at any time where DNA test results are "favorable" to the moving party. In 2001, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of robbery. Although substantial circumstantial and physical evidence linked Defendant with the killings, no physical evidence connected Defendant to the locations where the bodies were found. In 2018 and 2019, DNA testing excluded Defendant from several pieces of evidence and discovered other DNA profiles on some of that evidence. Based on these DNA results, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the new results exculpated him and implicated an unknown person in the crimes. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the standard articulated today, the new DNA evidence did not make a different outcome reasonably probable and was not "favorable" to the defense as necessary to warrant a new trial. View "State v. Seka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writ relief in this case concerning whether the district court has authority to intervene in binding arbitration to sanction a party's misconduct, holding that the district court improperly intervened in this matter.The parties agreed to Plaintiff filing a complaint, staying the action, selecting an arbitrator, and allowing the case to proceed through arbitration. After an improper sweep of Plaintiff's technology, Defendant filed a motion for discovery sanctions. The arbitrator fined Plaintiff but declined to strike Plaintiff's claims at that time, as requested by Defendant. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court for provisional relief, requesting that the court take action to remedy the misconduct. The district court found that it had the authority to address the issues raised in the motion. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for writ relief, holding (1) where Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.222 provides limited authority to intervene in an arbitration only where the district court orders a provisional remedy and where the court did not order a provisional remedy in this case, the district court lacked authority under section 38.222 to intervene in the arbitration; and (2) the district court did not have inherent authority to intervene in the arbitration because the alleged litigation misconduct was squarely before the arbitrator. View "Direct Grading & Paving v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that an exclusion in a personal umbrella liability insurance policy expressly excluding coverage for damages that are "payable to any insured" was valid and precluded coverage, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff sought coverage for injuries he incurred as the passenger on a motorcycle that crashed. At the time of the crash, Plaintiff's wife was the named insured on a personal umbrella policy directly underwritten by Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers denied coverage under the umbrella policy under the exclusion at issue. Because Plaintiff was an insured under the umbrella policy, argued Farmers, he was not entitled to payment under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.147 does not apply to umbrella policies; (2) an insured who alleges that an exclusion was not disclosed must make that allegation in an affidavit rather than rely solely on the arguments of counsel; and (3) there was no other error on the part of the district court. View "Sciarratta v. Foremost Insurance Co. Grand Rapids Michigan" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals concerning whether shareholders had a right to dissent from a corporate merger and seek fair value for their shares the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that Appellants had the right to obtain an appraisal of the fair value of their shares.Appellants held shares of Respondent's stock and sought to exercise dissenters' rights when Respondent commenced a corporate merger offering per-share compensation that Appellants concluded were inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, finding that Respondent was a covered security and thus the market-out exception applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants had a right to dissent from the merger and obtain an appraisal of the fair value of their shares because the Board, in its resolution, approved a right to dissent for dissenting shareholders. View "Pope Investments, LLC v. China Yida Holding, Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a guardianship petition, holding that the petition did not demonstrate that the proposed protected person was incapacitated.Appellant filed a petition for appointment of temporary guardian and to establish a general permanent guardianship over his mother, Respondent, and her estate. The district court denied the petition without prejudice, finding that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.044(2)(i), a guardianship over an adult proposed protected person cannot be granted without a physician's certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a certificate from a physician or a qualified individual demonstrating need for a guardianship is required for the district court to consider a petition for adult guardianship, but the certificate need not be based on an in-person examination of the proposed protected person; (2) whether the petition and certificate warrant the need for a guardianship or further proceedings is within the district court's discretion; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing the guardianship petition because the petition did not demonstrate that Appellant's mother was incapacitated. View "In re Guardianship of Rubin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus sought by the City of Henderson seeking to strike a petition for judicial review of an administrative zoning decision, holding that the district court erred in denying the City's motion to strike the petition for judicial review.Solid State Properties, LLC sued petitioner city of Henderson seeking damages and other forms of civil relief related to the nonenforcement of a zoning decision. After later developments to the zoning decision, Solid State filed an "Amended Petition for Judicial Review" challenging the zoning decision. The City filed a motion to strike the document, arguing that it was an improper attempt to file a new action within an existing matter. Specifically, the City argued that the civil action could not properly be coupled with a new action for judicial review of an administrative decision. The district court denied the City's motion and allowed the amended petition to proceed as part of the existing civil action. The City subsequently filed its petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that Solid State could not initiate judicial review proceedings within the existing civil action against the City, and the district court erred in denying the City's motion to strike the amended petition. View "City of Henderson v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's action arguing that a new election was required pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.465, holding that Appellant's challenge to the November 3, 2020 general election for Clark County Commission District C failed.Appellant ran in the general election for the Clark County Commission District C. Appellant lost by a margin of fifteen votes. In this action, Appellant argued that a new election was required because the number of irregularities in the conduct of the election exceeded the narrow margin of victory. The district court denied relief, finding that the election was not prevented within the meaning of section 293.465. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's challenge did not warrant a new election under section 293.465 because nothing "prevented" the election from occurring or voters from casting their votes; and (2) once an election takes place and the voters have voted, any challenge to the donut of the election must proceed by way of an election contest brought under Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.407-.435. View "Anthony v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights in her child, holding that the juvenile court lacked authority to appoint a master to preside over the trial in the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding.At issue whether having a hearing master preside over trial in a TPR proceeding satisfies the due process requirements in the Nevada Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) due process requires the TPR trial to be heard before a district judge in the first instance; and (2) a hearing master cannot preside over a TPR trial pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B without infringing on a parent's constitutional right to procedural due process. The Court remanded the case for a new TPR proceeding. View "In re Parental Rights as to L.L.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Appellant's parental rights, holding that the district court's failure to apply Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.2(e)(4)'s mandate regarding disclosure of witnesses was harmless error.The State sought to terminate Appellant's parental rights, but the State did not disclose a nonexpert witness until after the trial had commenced. The district court, however, allowed the witness to testify at trial on the grounds that the nonexpert witness disclosure requirements in Rule 16.2(e)(4) do not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings. The district court ultimately terminated Appellant's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the nonexpert witness notice requirements in Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.2 apply to termination of parental rights proceedings; and (2) the district court erred by denying Appellant's motion in liming to exclude an unnoticed nonexpert witness during trial, but the error was harmless. View "In re Parental Rights as to T.M.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the provision in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.006(1)(b) that a custodial parent who intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of the State and desires to take the child but the noncustodial parent refuses to consent to relocation must first petition the district court applies not only to relocation from Nevada to a place outside of Nevada but also from a place outside of Nevada to another place outside of Nevada.Mother was granted primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children after the parties' divorce. Mother later filed a petition under section 125C.006 for permission to relocate with the children from Nevada to Arizona. Mother subsequently moved to Arizona with the children. Mother later petitioned for permission to again relocate with the children, this time from Arizona to Ohio. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Mother did not need permission for the current relocation because the court had already granted her permission to move from Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Mother sought to move with the children to Ohio and Father did not consent, section 125C.006(1)(b) applied; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to issue specific findings under the factors set out in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007. View "Pelkola v. Pelkola" on Justia Law