Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for fourth-degree arson, holding that although the district court clearly erred in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective alternate juror based on gender, the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree arson. At issue on appeal was whether a discriminatory peremptory challenge used to remove a prospective alternate juror constituted structural error requiring reversal if no alternate deliberated with the jury. The Supreme Court held (1) there were compelling reasons to apply harmless-error review under these circumstances; and (2) the district court's error in rejecting Defendant's Batson objection to the prospective alternative juror based on gender, but the error was harmless because no alternate deliberated with the jury. View "Dixon v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to seal criminal records, holding that the district court misapplied the relevant statutes.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to a felony sexual offense that falls under a category for which criminal records are not subject to sealing. After successfully completing probation, Appellant withdrew his guilty plea and instead entered a guilty plea to unlawful contact with a child, a gross misdemeanor. Appellant subsequently filed this petition to seal his criminal records. The district court denied the petition, concluding that both the crime Appellant initially pleaded guilty to and the later pleaded crime were not subject to sealing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a withdrawn guilty plea cannot justify the denial of a petition to seal criminal records after a subsequent guilty plea; (2) gross misdemeanor unlawful contact with a child is not a crime for which record sealing is precluded under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.245(6); and (3) Appellant was entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.2445(1). View "Tiffee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, finding Defendant guilty but mentally ill on charges of first-degree murder and first-degree arson, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court misinstructed the jury on voluntary invocation and erred by denying his motion to vacate the jury's verdict and find him not guilty by reason of insanity. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for acquittal; and (2) Defendant could not demonstrate prejudice from the district court's inclusion of the challenged jury instruction. View "Kassa v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction and remanded the case, holding that the district court denied Defendant due process by failing to conduct a competency hearing when reasonable doubt arose about Defendant's competency.Pursuant to a jury verdict, Defendant was convicted of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied due process under the United States and Nevada Constitutions when the district court failed to order a competency hearing. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction, holding that a trial court must order a hearing sua sponte to determine whether a defendant is competent when their is a reasonable doubt about his competency, and to fulfill its duty to order a competency hearing a trial court must follow Nevada's statutory competency procedures. View "Goad v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the correct interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2), Nevada's "superpriority lien" statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Respondents, holding that the district court's construction of the statute was correct.Section 116.3116(2) gives a homeowners association's lien priority over a first deed of trust with respect to the HOA's assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the HOA "which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the [nine] months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien." Respondents' predecessor tendered a check equaling nine months' worth of assessments in an attempt to satisfy the HOA's superpriority lien, but the HOA had imposed a yearly assessment so that the entire assessment became due during the nine months immediately preceding when the HOA brought this action to enforce its liens. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly reasoned that the HOA's imposition of an annual assessment accelerated the assessments' due date such that Respondents were not required to tender more than nine months of assessments to satisfy the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. View "Anthony S. Noonan IRA, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n EE" on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, the Supreme Court concluded that EDCR 5.518 required the district court, on remand from an earlier appeal and upon the request of Lynita Nelson, to reinstate a joint preliminary injunction (JPI) over the parties' respective spendthrift trusts.During their marriage, Lynita and Eric Nelson created two irrevocable self-settled spendthrift trusts. When the parties divorced, the district court issued a JPI. On remand, the Supreme Court vacated portions of the divorce decree regarding awards against the trusts. On remand, Lynita filed a motion under ECCR 5.518 to reinstate the JPI. The district court granted the motion in part and imposed a JPI over two trust properties. Lynita petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to impose a JPI under EDCR 5.518 over all property subject to a clam of community property interest. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that trust may be parties to a divorce action and that EDCR is mandatory, does not require the requesting party to make a prima facie showing of community interest, and applies on remand. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering that his conviction for misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence charge be vacated and that he receive a jury trial, holding that the new rule in Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 448 P.3d 1120 (Neb. 2019), applied to Petitioner.In Andersen, the Supreme Court announced that persons charged with a misdemeanor domestic battery offense are entitled to a jury trial. Anderson was decided three weeks after the district court affirmed Petitioner conviction of appeal. Petitioner then brought this petition arguing that the municipal court and district court erred by denying him a jury trial. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Andersen announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure; and (2) because Andersen was decided before the time period to appeal had expired, Petitioner's conviction was not final and the rule in Andersen applied to his conviction. View "Hildt v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's shareholder complaint against Appellees, the individual directors of a corporation and its controlling stockholder, holding that Appellant failed to rebut the business judgment rule and allege particularized facts demonstrating the requisite breach of fiduciary duty.In her complaint, Appellant alleged breach of fiduciary duty and sought damages from a merger. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, determining that the business judgment rule applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.138 and Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 458 P.3d 336 (Nev. 2020), foreclose the inherent fairness standard that previously allowed a shareholder to automatically rebut the business judgment rule and shift the burden of proof to the director; and (2) the district court properly dismissed Appellant's complaint. View "Guzman v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question under Nev. R. App. P. 5 concerning an insurer's right to reimbursement, holding that when a party to a contract performs a challenged obligation under protest and a court subsequently determines that the contract did not require performance, the party may generally recover in restitution, thus giving effect to the terms of the parties' bargain.Insurer filed this declaratory judgment action seeking reimbursement of expenses it had occurred in defending Insured against a suit by a third party. The district court concluded that Insurer was not entitled to reimbursement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the suit did not trigger a duty to defend. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Ninth Circuit regarding the issue. The Supreme Court then held (1) no contract governed the right to reimbursement in this case; and (2) under the principle of unjust enrichment, a party that performs a disputed obligation under protest and does not in fact have a duty to perform is entitled to reimbursement. View "Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Access Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the two-year limitations period of Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e) for commencing actions to recover for personal injuries or wrongful death is subject to equitable tolling and that Appellant failed to demonstrate that her circumstances warranted equitable tolling of section 11.190(4)(e).Plaintiff filed a civil torts complaint two and a half years after an alleged sexual assault occurred, alleging that Defendant sexually assaulted her. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e), which imposes a two-year limitations period for wrongful death and personal injury claims. In response, Plaintiff argued that the limitations period should be tolled. The district court granted Defendant's motion, finding that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 11.190(4)(e) is subject to equitable tolling; but (2) Plaintiff failed to meet the relevant tolling factors in this case. View "Fausto v. Sanchez-Flores" on Justia Law