Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition requesting a genetic market analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying the petition requesting genetic marker analysis and that the decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated.Defendant was convicted of multiple crimes related to a fifteen-year-old girl's sexual assault and sentenced in 2011 to twenty-five years to life. In 2019, Defendant learned that a rape kit collected from the alleged victim and not tested prior to trial revealed a DNA match to a man other than Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion requesting a genetic marker analysis and a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court remanded both matters for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that a CODIS match would have been inadmissible and in denying Defendant's petition requesting a genetic marker analysis on this basis; and (2) because the court erred in denying the genetic marker analysis petition, the court's decision regarding the habeas petition must be vacated. View "James v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 268.0035's limitations apply to a city's ability to litigate such that the city's power to maintain a lawsuit must be derived from an express grant of power or fall within a matter of local concern as defined by section 268.003(1).Section 268.0035(1), Nevada's modified version of Dillon's Rule, limits a city's powers to those expressly granted to it, those necessarily implied from an express grant of power, or those necessary to address matters of local concern. The City of Reno brought the underlying action against Petitioners, manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioid medications, to recover damages as a result of the opioid epidemic. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred under Dillon's Rule. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners then filed this writ petition arguing that Dillon's Rule barred the underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that the modified Dillon's Rule applies to a city's ability to bring a lawsuit, and the district court misapplied the definition of a "matter of local concern." View "Endo Health Solutions, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)(a) does not bar a claim that a petition received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated stalking. The district court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of sixty-two to 156 months. Defendant filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because the State breached the plea agreement and counsel did not object. The district court denied the petition, concluding that any issues regarding Defendant's sentence were outside the scope of section 34.810(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 34.810 does not bar claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing; and (2) the State materially breached its promise to recommend concurrent sentences, and counsel's failure to object prejudiced Defendant. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion for leave to proceed by information and this case and the judgment of the conviction, holding that a preliminary hearing transcript can satisfy Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.035(2)'s affidavit requirement.Section 173.035(2) allows the State to seek and obtain leave to proceed against an accused by information filed in district court upon a showing that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges. To obtain that leave, the district attorney must file a motion upon affidavit. The State in this case filed a criminal complaint against Defendant. The justice of the peace sua sponte dismissed all charges against him. Thereafter, the State sought leave to proceed against Defendant by information in district court and supported its motion by attaching a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript from justice court. The district court granted the motion unopposed. Defendant was subsequently convicted of several offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's motion for leave to proceed by information in district court was substantially compliant with section 173.035(2) and demonstrated that the justice court committed egregious error in dismissing the charges against Defendant; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts each of sexual assault of a minor under fourteen years of age and lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, holding that the cumulative effect of serious errors violated Defendant's due process right to a fair trial.During trial, the State presented no physical evidence to prove that Defendant committed the offenses. Still, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts, and he was sentenced to serve an aggregate prison term totaling thirty-five years to life. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) a comment made by the district court undermining the presumption of innocence constituted judicial misconduct; (2) a juror committed misconduct by goggling the term "common sense," and prejudice resulted; (3) certain statements made by the prosecutor during the State's closing argument constituted misconduct; and (4) cumulative error warranted reversal. View "Gunera-Pastrana v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial based on new DNA test results, holding that, consistent with Sunburn v. State, 812 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1991), new DNA test results are "favorable" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.09187(1) where they would make a different result reasonably probable upon retrial.Under section 176.09187(1), a party may move for a new trial at any time where DNA test results are "favorable" to the moving party. In 2001, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of robbery. Although substantial circumstantial and physical evidence linked Defendant with the killings, no physical evidence connected Defendant to the locations where the bodies were found. In 2018 and 2019, DNA testing excluded Defendant from several pieces of evidence and discovered other DNA profiles on some of that evidence. Based on these DNA results, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the new results exculpated him and implicated an unknown person in the crimes. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the standard articulated today, the new DNA evidence did not make a different outcome reasonably probable and was not "favorable" to the defense as necessary to warrant a new trial. View "State v. Seka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writ relief in this case concerning whether the district court has authority to intervene in binding arbitration to sanction a party's misconduct, holding that the district court improperly intervened in this matter.The parties agreed to Plaintiff filing a complaint, staying the action, selecting an arbitrator, and allowing the case to proceed through arbitration. After an improper sweep of Plaintiff's technology, Defendant filed a motion for discovery sanctions. The arbitrator fined Plaintiff but declined to strike Plaintiff's claims at that time, as requested by Defendant. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court for provisional relief, requesting that the court take action to remedy the misconduct. The district court found that it had the authority to address the issues raised in the motion. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for writ relief, holding (1) where Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.222 provides limited authority to intervene in an arbitration only where the district court orders a provisional remedy and where the court did not order a provisional remedy in this case, the district court lacked authority under section 38.222 to intervene in the arbitration; and (2) the district court did not have inherent authority to intervene in the arbitration because the alleged litigation misconduct was squarely before the arbitrator. View "Direct Grading & Paving v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that an exclusion in a personal umbrella liability insurance policy expressly excluding coverage for damages that are "payable to any insured" was valid and precluded coverage, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff sought coverage for injuries he incurred as the passenger on a motorcycle that crashed. At the time of the crash, Plaintiff's wife was the named insured on a personal umbrella policy directly underwritten by Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers denied coverage under the umbrella policy under the exclusion at issue. Because Plaintiff was an insured under the umbrella policy, argued Farmers, he was not entitled to payment under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.147 does not apply to umbrella policies; (2) an insured who alleges that an exclusion was not disclosed must make that allegation in an affidavit rather than rely solely on the arguments of counsel; and (3) there was no other error on the part of the district court. View "Sciarratta v. Foremost Insurance Co. Grand Rapids Michigan" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals concerning whether shareholders had a right to dissent from a corporate merger and seek fair value for their shares the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that Appellants had the right to obtain an appraisal of the fair value of their shares.Appellants held shares of Respondent's stock and sought to exercise dissenters' rights when Respondent commenced a corporate merger offering per-share compensation that Appellants concluded were inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, finding that Respondent was a covered security and thus the market-out exception applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants had a right to dissent from the merger and obtain an appraisal of the fair value of their shares because the Board, in its resolution, approved a right to dissent for dissenting shareholders. View "Pope Investments, LLC v. China Yida Holding, Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a guardianship petition, holding that the petition did not demonstrate that the proposed protected person was incapacitated.Appellant filed a petition for appointment of temporary guardian and to establish a general permanent guardianship over his mother, Respondent, and her estate. The district court denied the petition without prejudice, finding that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.044(2)(i), a guardianship over an adult proposed protected person cannot be granted without a physician's certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a certificate from a physician or a qualified individual demonstrating need for a guardianship is required for the district court to consider a petition for adult guardianship, but the certificate need not be based on an in-person examination of the proposed protected person; (2) whether the petition and certificate warrant the need for a guardianship or further proceedings is within the district court's discretion; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing the guardianship petition because the petition did not demonstrate that Appellant's mother was incapacitated. View "In re Guardianship of Rubin" on Justia Law