Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court invalidating Order No. 1293A, which prohibited the driving of new domestic wells in the Pahrump Artesian Basin unless the applicant identified and relinquished 2.0 acre-feet annually from an alternate source (the 2.0 afa requirement), as unlawful, holding that Nevada law authorized the order's 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances.In invalidating the order, the district court concluded (1) the State Engineer violated due process by issuing the order without first providing notice and a public hearing; (2) the State Engineer lacked authority to issue the 2.0 afa requirement; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State Engineer was not required to hold a hearing or develop a more robust record; (2) the State Engineer was not required to provide notice and a hearing regarding the 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances; and (3) the State Engineer's decision was supported by substantial record evidence. View "Wilson, P.E. v. Pahrump Fair Water, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment against Plaintiffs, who argued that they were employees of Defendant within the context of the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA), Nev. Const. art. XV, section 16, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiff, dancers, demanded minimum wages from Defendant, a men's club. Defendant refused to pay because it considered Plaintiffs independent contractors. Plaintiffs brought this class action seeking a ruling that they were employees rather independent contractors and were therefore entitled to minimum wages. The district court concluded that Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155 applied to Plaintiffs, rendering them independent contractors ineligible for minimum wages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs were employees within the MWA's meaning; and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155 does not abrogate the constitutional protections to which Plaintiffs were entitled. View "Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - or, one or more firearms - at one time and place.Anthony Martinez shot two individuals. The police recovered five firearms at the scene - four from Martinez's car and the fifth from beside the car. The State charged Martinez with five counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) - possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony offense - one count per firearm. The district court granted Martinez's motion to consolidate the five felon-in-possession counts into a single count, concluding that Martinez committed, at most, a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b). The State filed a pretrial petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the court wrongly interpreted the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - i.e., one or more firearms - at one time and place. View "State v. Fourth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Employee's petition for review challenging the validity of Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment, holding that the offer was valid under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.475(8).Under section 616C.475(8), an employer may offer temporary, light-duty employment to an injured employee instead of paying temporary total disability benefits. In this case, Employee argued that the location, schedule, wages, and duties of the offered temporary employment as a secretary was not substantially similar to Employee's pre-injury position as a fire captain. The Supreme Court held (1) the offered employment here was substantially similar to the pre-injury position as to both schedule and number of hours, as well as wages, benefits, and location, and thus, Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment was reasonable and complied with section 616C.475(8); and (2) therefore, Employee's temporary total disability benefits were properly terminated. View "Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's special motion to dismiss under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, holding that each of Defendant's statements was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." See Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(4).The statements at issue were Defendant's criticisms of the homeowners' association and developers/managers of Southern Highlands in Clark County. Plaintiffs - Olympia Companies, LLC and its president - sued Defendant for defamation and defamation per se. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 41.660. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant met his prima facie burden to demonstrate that his statements were all made in public forums on a matter of public interest. The Court remanded the case with direction to consider whether Defendant made his communications in good faith. View "Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying St. Jude children's Research Hospital's petition to probate Theodore Scheide, Jr.'s lost will, holding that St. Jude met its burden to show the will was in legal existence and satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 136.240(3)'s requirement that two witnesses prove the will's provisions.Theodore's original will disinherited his biological son, Chip, and left his estate to St. Jude. After Theodore died, the original will could not be found, so St. Jude petitioned to probate the lost will. Chip argued that Theodore revoked the will by destruction and that St. Jude's witnesses did not satisfy section 136.240(3). The district court denied the petition, leaving Chip free to inherit the estate through intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence supported the conclusion that the will was in legal existence at Theodore's death; and (2) section 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement was satisfied in this case. View "In re Estate of Scheide" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment for Green Tree Servicing, LLC in this action to quiet title brought after a homeowners' association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale upon finding that the first deed of trust had not been extinguished because there had been a valid tender, holding that Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren took title subject to Green Tree's first deed of trust.Green Tree was assigned a deed of trust on certain property. The original homeowners because delinquent on their HOA assessments, and the HOA proceeded with a foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay. Saticoy Bay brought an action to quiet title, and Green Tree counterclaimed for the same. The district court granted summary judgment for Green Tree. On appeal, Saticoy Bay argued that the district court erred in granting equitable relief because the recitals in the foreclosure deed proved that the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien was in default at the time of the sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) conclusive recitals of default in a foreclosure deed do not prevent a valid pre-sale tender from preserving a deed of trust; and (2) the valid tender by Green Tree's predecessor preserved the original deed of trust. View "Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ordering the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) to disclose patrol officer unit assignments from 2014 through 2016, holding that the officers had a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments.Las Vegas Review-Journal submitted a Nevada Public Records Act request Metro's officers' unit assignments from 2014 through 2016. When Metro refused to disclose the unit assignments, the Review-Journal petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus. The district court granted the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts should apply the test adopted in Clark County School District v. Las Vegas Review-Journal (CCSD), 429 P.3d 313 (Nev. 2018) whenever the government asserts a nontrivial privacy interest; and (2) the district court erred in determining that Metro's officers lacked a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments. View "Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Las Vegas Review-Journal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a preliminary injunction based on a blue-penciled noncompetition agreement, holding that Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 159 (Nev. 2016), does not prohibit a district court from blue-penciling an unreasonable noncompetition agreement if the agreement allows for it.Defendants signed an employment contract containing a blue-penciling provision providing that, if any provision is found to be unreasonable by the court, the provision shall be enforceable to the extent the court deemed it unreasonable. When Defendants quit their employment and began work elsewhere, Plaintiff filed a complaint to enforce the agreement, alleging that Defendants violated the agreement's noncompetition clause. The district court found that the noncompetition agreement was overbroad and blue-penciled it. The court then granted Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the revised agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the noncompetition agreement had a blue-penciling provision, the district court did not abuse its discretion by blue-penciling the noncompetition agreement and enforcing the revised agreement. View "Duong v. Fielden Hanson Isaacs Miyada Robison Yeh, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when a tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, the tortfeasor may then assert a claim for contribution against a doctor who allegedly caused new injuries in treating the original injury.Marie Gonzales was injured in an accident involving a truck driven by an employee of Republic Silver State Disposal. Dr. Andrew Cash treated Gonzales's original injury and allegedly caused further injuries. Gonzales sued Republic and its employee, and the parties settled. The settlement agreement expressly discharged Gonzales's claim against her medical providers and reserved Republic's rights under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225-.305. Republic then sued Cash for contribution. The district court granted summary judgment for Cash, concluding that contribution was not available between successive tortfeasors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the right of contribution exists when the two parties are jointly or severally liable for the same injury, and whether the parties are joint or successive tortfeasors is immaterial; and (2) because Republic and Cash were jointly or severally liable for the injuries Cash allegedly caused and Republic settled those claims, Republic may pursue an action for contribution against Cash. View "Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash" on Justia Law