Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the order of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for judicial review of an order of the Nevada Division of Insurance, holding that remand was required with the instruction that the district court grant judicial review in part.Choice Home Warranty (CHW) marketed and sold Home Warranty Administrator of Nevada, Inc. (HWAN)'s home warranty service contracts, in which HWAN was the obligor. The Department of Business and Industry, Division of Insurance filed a complaint alleging that HWAN, dba CHW, made false entries by answering no to a question in certificate-of-registration renewal applications, conducted business in an unsuitable manner, and failed to make records available to the Division. A hearing officer found that HWAN committed all of the alleged violations. The district court denied HWAN's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 690C.150, a provider of home warranty services is not simply an entity that issues, sells, or offers for sale service contracts but the obligor in those contracts; (2) CHW was not an obligor so it was not a provider and need not have held a certificate of registration; and (3) HWAN did not act improperly by selling its contracts through an unregistered entity. View "Home Warranty Administrator of Nevada, Inc. v. State, Department of Business & Industry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus stemming from lawsuits brought against generic drug manufacturers for selling vials of propofol to ambulatory surgical centers despite an allegedly foreseeable risk that they would be used on multiple patients, holding that some of the claims were preempted.Plaintiffs alleged that Petitioners knew or should have known that selling 50 mL vials of propofol, as opposed to 20 mL vials, to ambulatory surgical centers with high patient turnover was unsafe due to the risk of contamination from multi-dosing. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff's claims conflicted with federal law. The district courts summarily denied the motions to dismiss. Petitioners then filed the instant writ petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence cause of action and request for punitive damages survived; but (2) the remainder of Plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted. View "Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court properly determined that the allegedly defamatory statements made by Respondents Kay Zilverberg and Victoria Eagan fell within the protections of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes and that Appellant Jason Smith did not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims.Appellant was a professional thrifter, and Respondents were thrifters. When Respondents criticized Appellant for bullying behavior Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Respondents' statements were false and defamatory. Respondents filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and awarded Respondents attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss; and (2) Appellant failed to show with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claims. View "Smith v. Zilverberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to a local teachers' union in this union contract dispute, holding that the local union validly terminated the contract and so was not contractually obligated to continue transmitting its members' dues to the state union.The Clark County Education Association (CCEA) was a local union representing teachers and other school district employees. The Nevada State Education Association (NSEA) and the National Education Association (NSA) were its statewide and national affiliates. NSEA and CCEA entered into a contract requiring CCEA to transmit NSEA and NEA dues after receiving them from the school district. In 2017, CCEA notified NSEA that it wanted to terminate the contract and negotiate new terms. No new agreement was forthcoming, but CCEA continued to collect union dues but placed the portion of the NSEA dues in an escrow account pending litigation. CCEA filed an action seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to transmit the money to NSEA. NSEA and NEA filed a separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted judgment to CCEA on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CCEA lacked a contractual obligation to transmit the dues and properly placed them in escrow pending resolution of this dispute. View "Nevada State Education Ass'n v. Clark County Education Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus sought by Petitioner arguing that the district court was required to grant his release on bail under Nev. Const. art. I, 7, holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to defeat Petitioner's right to reasonable bail.Petitioner was charged by indictment with first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner filed motion to suppress his confession to the murder, which the district court granted. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to set reasonable bail on the basis that the State's proof was not evident, nor was the presumption great, that he committed the crime. The district court denied bail. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State failed to rebut the presumption in favor of bail under Article 1, Section 7 and, therefore, the district court's denial of Petitioner's request for release on reasonable bail was contrary to law. View "Sewall v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court invalidating Order No. 1293A, which prohibited the driving of new domestic wells in the Pahrump Artesian Basin unless the applicant identified and relinquished 2.0 acre-feet annually from an alternate source (the 2.0 afa requirement), as unlawful, holding that Nevada law authorized the order's 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances.In invalidating the order, the district court concluded (1) the State Engineer violated due process by issuing the order without first providing notice and a public hearing; (2) the State Engineer lacked authority to issue the 2.0 afa requirement; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State Engineer was not required to hold a hearing or develop a more robust record; (2) the State Engineer was not required to provide notice and a hearing regarding the 2.0 afa requirement under the circumstances; and (3) the State Engineer's decision was supported by substantial record evidence. View "Wilson, P.E. v. Pahrump Fair Water, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment against Plaintiffs, who argued that they were employees of Defendant within the context of the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA), Nev. Const. art. XV, section 16, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiff, dancers, demanded minimum wages from Defendant, a men's club. Defendant refused to pay because it considered Plaintiffs independent contractors. Plaintiffs brought this class action seeking a ruling that they were employees rather independent contractors and were therefore entitled to minimum wages. The district court concluded that Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155 applied to Plaintiffs, rendering them independent contractors ineligible for minimum wages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs were employees within the MWA's meaning; and (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.0155 does not abrogate the constitutional protections to which Plaintiffs were entitled. View "Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - or, one or more firearms - at one time and place.Anthony Martinez shot two individuals. The police recovered five firearms at the scene - four from Martinez's car and the fifth from beside the car. The State charged Martinez with five counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360(1)(b) - possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony offense - one count per firearm. The district court granted Martinez's motion to consolidate the five felon-in-possession counts into a single count, concluding that Martinez committed, at most, a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b). The State filed a pretrial petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the court wrongly interpreted the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State properly charges a defendant with only a single violation of section 202.360(1)(b) when it alleges, without more, that the defendant is a felon who possessed "any firearms" - i.e., one or more firearms - at one time and place. View "State v. Fourth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Employee's petition for review challenging the validity of Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment, holding that the offer was valid under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.475(8).Under section 616C.475(8), an employer may offer temporary, light-duty employment to an injured employee instead of paying temporary total disability benefits. In this case, Employee argued that the location, schedule, wages, and duties of the offered temporary employment as a secretary was not substantially similar to Employee's pre-injury position as a fire captain. The Supreme Court held (1) the offered employment here was substantially similar to the pre-injury position as to both schedule and number of hours, as well as wages, benefits, and location, and thus, Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment was reasonable and complied with section 616C.475(8); and (2) therefore, Employee's temporary total disability benefits were properly terminated. View "Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's special motion to dismiss under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, holding that each of Defendant's statements was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." See Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(4).The statements at issue were Defendant's criticisms of the homeowners' association and developers/managers of Southern Highlands in Clark County. Plaintiffs - Olympia Companies, LLC and its president - sued Defendant for defamation and defamation per se. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 41.660. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant met his prima facie burden to demonstrate that his statements were all made in public forums on a matter of public interest. The Court remanded the case with direction to consider whether Defendant made his communications in good faith. View "Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC" on Justia Law