Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of conspiring with a hitman to have his sixth wife murdered during a staged burglary and then murdering the hitman, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain prior bad act evidence.At issue was the admission of events surrounding the death of Defendant's second wife. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value of the disputed evidence, and the district court abused its discretion by allowing its admission; and (2) the error in admitting the prior bad act evidence was not harmless. The Court remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Randolph v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to recognize and enforce in Nevada the disgorgement portion of a securities-fraud judgment from British Columbia, holding that the district court properly recognized the disgorgement judgment.On appeal, Appellant argued that the disgorgement judgment was in the nature of a fine or penalty, and therefore, it should not be enforced outside Canada. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the British Columbia judgment did not constitute an unenforceable penalty because the primary purpose of the disgorgement award was remedial in nature, not penal; and (2) even crediting the argument that Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.740(2)(b) takes the disgorgement judgment outside Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.750(1)'s mandatory recognition provisions, the district court properly recognized it as a matter of comity. View "Lathigee v. British Columbia Securities Commission" on Justia Law

In these two personal injury disputes the Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for a writ of mandamus demanding that the Supreme Court reverse the district court's order denying their two motions to strike requests for trials de novo in their cases, holding that Petitioners did not offer any cogent, compelling reason for the Supreme Court to issue mandamus.In separate incidents, John Walker sustained injuries when Sheila Michaels collided with him, and Ralph Ortega received injuries after Katheryn Fritter rear-ended his vehicle. Walker sued Michaels, and Ortega sued Fritter. Both cases proceeded to arbitration. Michaels and Fritter each served offers of judgment, which Walker and Ortega, respectively, rejected. Ultimately, the arbitrators in Walker's and Ortega's cases found in their favor. Because Farmers Insurance insured both Michaels and Fritter, the same attorney, McMillen, represented the interests of both defendants. McMillen sought trials de novo in both cases. Walker and Ortega filed motions to strike the requests. After the district court rejected the motions to strike, Walker and Ortega filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied their petition, holding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a basis for the Supreme Court to grant either a traditional or advisory writ of mandamus. View "Walker v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of driving and/or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or alcohol resulting in substantial bodily harm entered upon an Alford plea, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.When he entered his Alford plea, Defendant was informed that he faced a mandatory fine of up to $5,000 but was not informed that the fine would be at least $2,000. Defendant filed a presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he did not understand the consequences of his plea because he did not know the mandatory minimum fine for the offense was $2,000. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because a fine is a form of punishment, a defendant must be informed of any mandatory minimum fine in order to be fully informed of the direct consequences of a plea; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Banka v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a creditor of a settlor may bring a claim against a settlor of a trust so long as the settlor's interest in the trust is not solely discretionary and there is not a spendthrift provision precluding payment of the claim and that where a trust provides broad discretion to its trustees, the trustees may approve a creditor's claim against the trust.At issue was whether a creditor may satisfy its claim against the settlor's trust where the trust does not specifically provide for payment of the claim but the trustees approve the payment. The district court ordered frozen trust funds be released to pay the creditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both parties had standing to maintain this action, and the appeal is not moot; (2) the trust allowed for payment of the creditor's fees; (3) the creditor satisfied the procedural requirements to file a creditor's claim; and (4) the trustees had broad discretion to approve the creditor's claim. View "In re Christian Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition for judicial review filed by Silverwing Development challenging the fine imposed upon it by the Nevada State Contractors Board for improperly entering into contracts with contractors that exceeded the contractors' license limits in conjunction with Silverwing's condominium development projects, holding that the term "subdivision site" in Nev. Rev. Stat. 624.220(2) is not unconstitutionally vague.Section 624.220(2) requires the Board to impose a monetary license limit on the amount a contractor can bid on a project and calculates the limit with respect to "one or more construction contracts on a single construction site or subdivision site for a single client." In fining Silverwing, the hearing officer determined that the term "subdivision site" refers to the general location of a subdivision rather than a particular location within a subdivision. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Silverwing's petition for judicial review, holding that "subdivision site" in section 624.220(2) plainly refers to the general physical location of a subdivision and that the statute provides an adequate standard to preclude the Board from enforcing it discriminatorily. View "Silverwing Development v. Nevada State Contractors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to seal his criminal records stemming from a guilty plea to open or gross lewdness, a gross misdemeanor, holding that Appellant was entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.2445 and that no interested person provided evidence to rebut the presumption.In denying Appellant's petition to seal his criminal records, the district court concluded that the records could not be sealed under section 179.2445 because the underlying offense related to a crime against a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) misdemeanor open or gross lewdness is not an offense for which Defendant's records cannot be sealed; and (2) the presumption in favor of sealing Appellant's criminal records applied and was not rebutted. View "In re Petition of Aragon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that NAC 281.305(1)(a) is a jurisdictional rule that exceeds the rulemaking authority of the Nevada Department of Administration's Personnel Commission.NAC 281.305(1)(a) provides that a state officer or employee claiming whistleblower protection must file a whistleblower appeal within ten workdays of the alleged retaliation or reprisal. The Personnel Commission promulgated the rule under Nev. Rev. Stat. 281.641(5), which provides that the Personnel Commission may adopt procedural rules for whistleblower appeal hearings. Approximately eight months after the Nevada Department of Transportation's (NDOT) fired him, John Bronder filed a whistleblower appeal alleging that his termination was retaliation for whistleblower activity. NDOT filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Bronder's appeal was untimely by several months. The hearing officer concluded that the ten-day rule is invalid and ordered NDOT to reinstate Bronder's probationary employment. The district court denied NDOT's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that NAC 281.305(1)(a) is a jurisdictional, rather than a procedural, rule and is thus invalid. View "State, Department of Transportation v. Bronder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court imposing case-termination sanctions on MDB Trucking, LLC for spoliation of evidence, holding that the record did not support the imposition of case-terminating sanctions in this case.Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against MDB, a commercial trucking company, and Versa Products Company, which manufactured the dump gate valves, after an MDB driver experienced an uncommanded activation of the dump gate in his rig's trailer, causing it to open and unexpectedly dump its loads. The incident caused several collisions. MBD cross-claimed against Versa for contribution, alleging an unreasonably dangerous and defective design of the Versa valve. MDB reached a settlement with Plaintiffs, who assigned their claims against Versa to MDB. Versa then filed the motion for sanctions underlying this appeal, asking the district court to dismiss MDB's claim with prejudice for having spoliated evidence, namely by discarding plug, sockets, and cords in the tractor/trailer rig. The district court dismissed MDB's claims with prejudice, holding that MDB's failure to preserve the replaced parts caused Versa prejudice that lesser sanctions could not cure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MDB acted negligently, not willfully, when it discarded the replaced parts and that, on remand, the district court should consider whether Versa can meet its burden of proving prejudice. View "MDB Trucking, LLC v. Versa Products Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this foreclosure action, holding that the loan servicer timely commenced the action after the foreclosure sale and sufficiently demonstrated that a regulated entity under the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) conservatorship owned the loan.Defendant purchased property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the first deed of trust survived the sale and for quiet title. Plaintiff offered evidence that it was servicing the loan on behalf of Freddie Mac, which had previously been placed into an FHFA conservatorship and that the first deed of trust therefore survived under the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Applying a three-year limitations period, the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the claims underlying the action are best described as sounding in contract for purposes of the House and Economic Recovery Act statute of limitations, which provides for a six-year statute of limitations; and (2) the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented the foreclosure sale from extinguishing gate first deed of trust, and therefore, Defendant took the property subject to that deed of trust. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law