Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court imposing case-termination sanctions on MDB Trucking, LLC for spoliation of evidence, holding that the record did not support the imposition of case-terminating sanctions in this case.Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against MDB, a commercial trucking company, and Versa Products Company, which manufactured the dump gate valves, after an MDB driver experienced an uncommanded activation of the dump gate in his rig's trailer, causing it to open and unexpectedly dump its loads. The incident caused several collisions. MBD cross-claimed against Versa for contribution, alleging an unreasonably dangerous and defective design of the Versa valve. MDB reached a settlement with Plaintiffs, who assigned their claims against Versa to MDB. Versa then filed the motion for sanctions underlying this appeal, asking the district court to dismiss MDB's claim with prejudice for having spoliated evidence, namely by discarding plug, sockets, and cords in the tractor/trailer rig. The district court dismissed MDB's claims with prejudice, holding that MDB's failure to preserve the replaced parts caused Versa prejudice that lesser sanctions could not cure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MDB acted negligently, not willfully, when it discarded the replaced parts and that, on remand, the district court should consider whether Versa can meet its burden of proving prejudice. View "MDB Trucking, LLC v. Versa Products Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this foreclosure action, holding that the loan servicer timely commenced the action after the foreclosure sale and sufficiently demonstrated that a regulated entity under the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) conservatorship owned the loan.Defendant purchased property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the first deed of trust survived the sale and for quiet title. Plaintiff offered evidence that it was servicing the loan on behalf of Freddie Mac, which had previously been placed into an FHFA conservatorship and that the first deed of trust therefore survived under the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Applying a three-year limitations period, the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the claims underlying the action are best described as sounding in contract for purposes of the House and Economic Recovery Act statute of limitations, which provides for a six-year statute of limitations; and (2) the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented the foreclosure sale from extinguishing gate first deed of trust, and therefore, Defendant took the property subject to that deed of trust. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

In this construction defect lawsuit, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents and reversed the grant of attorney fees to respondent Land West Builders, Inc., holding that Appellant's action was time-barred but that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Lands West.Approximately seven years and three months after her home was built, Appellant filed a construction defect lawsuit against Sunridge Builders, Inc., Lands West as Sunridge's alter ego or successor, and other subcontractors (collectively, Respondents). The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents, concluding that because Appellant had failed to file her lawsuit during the grace period and the statute of repose had run, her claim was time barred. The district court then granted Lands West's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents because Appellant's action was time barred; and (2) abused its discretion awarding attorney fees to Lands West. View "Byrne v. Sunridge Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's defamation claim against The Associated Press and one of its reporters (collectively, Respondents), holding that a news article reporting on the contents of a citizen's complaint to the police that was neither investigated nor evaluated by the police is not a report of an official action or proceeding for which the fair report privilege provides an absolute defense.Respondents published a news article reporting on a 2018 citizen's complaint to the police, in which the complainant alleged that Appellant sexually assaulted her in the early 1970s. Police did not investigate the allegations for statute of limitations reasons. In his complaint, Appellant asserted that the complainant's accusations against him were false and that Respondents published the article with malice. The district court concluded that the fair report privilege protected Respondents from defamation liability because their article reported on a public record, namely documentation of a citizen's complaint to the police alleged that a crime occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint did not constitute an official action or proceeding as contemplated by the fair report privilege. View "Wynn v. Associated Press" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen, holding that a mistaken belief as to the victim's age is not a defense to the crime of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen.Defendant was convicted of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen. On appeal, Defendant argued that he had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the victim was eighteen years old and that the district court erred in preventing him from asserting a mistake-of-fact defense as to the victim's age. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding this crime, holding that a mistaken belief as to a child's age is not a defense to the crime of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment and awarding attorney fees and costs in favor of Zitting Brothers Construction, a subcontractor on a development project, on its breach of contract action against APCO Construction, Inc., the general contractor, holding that the pay-if-paid provision in construction contract here was void under Nev. Rev. Stat. 624.628(3).Provisions in the subcontract in this case conditioned payment on the general contractor receiving payment first and required the subcontractor to forgo its right to prompt payment under Nev. Rev. Stat. 624.624 when payment would otherwise be due. When the project failed, Zitting sued APCO seeking payment for work completed. APCO defended its nonpayment with the pay-if-paid provisions in the contract. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Zitting on its breach of contract and mechanics' liens claims, concluding that the pay-if-paid provisions were void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the pay-if-paid provisions in the parties' subcontract were void and unenforceable under section 624.628(3) because they limited Zitting's right to prompt payment under section 624.624(1). View "APCO Construction, Inc. v. Zitting Brothers Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Clark County's petition for judicial review of the decision of an appeals officer reversing Clark County's denial of a retiree's claim for ongoing partial disability benefits, holding that the appeals officer correctly found that the retiree was entitled to benefits based on the wages he was earning at the time he retired.Brent Bean worked as a Clark County firefighter and retired in 2011. In 2014, Bean was diagnosed with prostate cancer and had part of his prostate removed. Clark County rejected Bean's claim for occupational disease benefits insofar as it sought ongoing permanent partial disability benefits, concluding that because Bean was retired at the time he became permanently partially disabled, he was not earning wages upon which to base a permanent partial disability benefits award. The appeals officer reversed, and the district court rejected Clark County's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer correctly found that compensation for Bean's permanent partial disability rating must be based on the wages he was earning at the time of his retirement. View "Clark County v. Bean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the order of the Nevada Gaming Control Board affirming the decision of a Board agent that a casino's refusal to redeem Appellant's six $5,000 chips because it could not verify that Appellant had won them, holding that because Appellant was in fact a "patron" of the casino, the Board should have instructed the casino to redeem Appellant's chips.Nevada Gaming Commission Regulation (NGCR) 12.060(2)(c) provides that a licensee must promptly redeem its chips and tokens from its patrons. When a casino refused to redeem Appellant's chips, Appellant filed a complaint. A Board agent found that Appellant was a patron but concluded that because the casino could not verify that Appellant had won the chips, it need not have redeemed them. The Board affirmed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant was a patron of the casino, the casino should have promptly redeemed Appellant's chips under NGCR 12.060(2)(c). View "Young v. Nevada Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted these consolidated writ petitions filed by the Washoe County District Attorney's Office challenging the Second Judicial District Court's authority to compel it to participate in a record-sealing proceeding, holding that if a district attorney's office chooses not to participate in a proceeding, the district court lacks the authority to compel it to do so.In 2019, the Washoe County DA told the district court it would participate in record-sealing proceedings only when it wanted to oppose the petition. Three petitioners subsequently filed petitions to seal their criminal records. As required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.245(3), the district court notified the Washoe County DA that each petition had been filed. The court then ordered that the DA file a response or opposition to the petition. The Washoe County DA responded by filing three identical writ petitions challenging the district court's authority to compel it to participate in the record-sealing proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petitions, holding that sections 179.245(3) and (4) do not require the Washoe County DA to participate in a record-sealing petition, and the district court otherwise lacked the authority compel the DA to participate. View "Washoe County District Attorney's Office v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this derivative action, the Supreme Court held that a corporation, as a nominal defendant, is precluded from challenging the merits of a derivative action but may challenge a shareholder plaintiff's standing in such an action.Plaintiff filed a derivative action on behalf of a Corporation challenging conduct by the Corporation's board of directors. The district court granted partial summary judgment against certain directors and then ratified the remaining challenged board conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgments and vacated the orders denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding (1) this Court adopts the factors set forth in Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1990), for determining whether a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action fairly and adequately represents the interests of the shareholders under Nev. R. Civ. P. 23.1; (2) a corporate nominal defendant in a derivative action cannot challenge or defend the underlying merits of that action but may challenge a shareholder plaintiff's standing to bring a derivative suit; and (3) Plaintiff in this case lacked standing as an adequate representative of the shareholders. View "Cotter v. Kane" on Justia Law