Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress drugs and drug paraphernalia police discovered while searching her backpack, holding that the district court properly determined that the search of Defendant's backpack was beyond the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest.After officers arrested Defendant, they placed her inside a patrol car, placed her backpack in the trunk of the patrol car, and transported her to jail. Thereafter, the officers searched Defendant's backpack. On appeal, the State argued that the contraband was discovered in a lawful search incident to arrest or, alternatively, would have been inevitably discovered in a lawful inventory of the backpack's contents. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the search incident to arrest was invalid; and (2) because the evidence would not have been discovered through a lawful inventory search, the evidence was not admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. View "State v. Nye" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 258.007 does not give the Clark County Board of Commissioners (Board) power to remove a constable from office or necessitate quo warranto proceedings because the statute works an automatic forfeiture of office if the constable fails to become certified as a category II peace officer.Section 258.007 requires a constable to become certified as a category II peace officer within a certain amount of time or forfeit the office. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada certified a question to the Supreme Court, asking whether the statute gives the Board the power to remove a constable from office or whether a constable can be removed only through a quo warranto action. The Supreme Court answered the first part of the certified question in the negative, which necessarily resolved the second part of the certified question, holding that the Board has neither the authority nor the need to declare a forfeiture because that forfeiture occurs automatically upon the constable's failure timely to certify as a category II peace officer. View "Clark County v. Eliason" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, holding that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial and that the communication at issue in this case was made in good faith.At issue was a presentation that James Taylor, as Deputy Chief of the Enforcement Division of Nevada Gaming Control Board (GCB), gave at the Global Gaming Expo organized by American Gaming Association (AGA). During a section of the presentation on the use of cheating devices, Taylor presented a video clip depicting an individual playing blackjack. Nicholas Colon, the individual depicted in the video clip, sued Taylor, GCB, and AGA for defamation, claiming that the video clip was presented untruthfully as an alleged example of cheating. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, arguing that Taylor's presentation was a good faith statement made in direct connection with a matter of public concern in a public forum. The district court denied the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate Colon's constitutional right to a jury trial; and (2) Defendants demonstrated that Taylor's presentation was made in good faith. View "Taylor v. Colon" on Justia Law

In this appeal regarding the scope of the law-enforcement exception to the "going and coming rule" in workers' compensation matters the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer, holding that the appeals officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer's accident.Plaintiff, a police officer, was struck by another vehicle during his drive home from work. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries he sustained in the accident. His claim was denied. On appeal, the appeals officer also denied the claim, concluding that Plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment. The district court granted Plaintiff's petition for judicial review and concluded that Plaintiff's accident indeed arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court must look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis in determining whether the law-enforcement exception to the going and coming rule applies; and (2) Plaintiff qualified for the law-enforcement exception under the totality of the circumstances test. View "Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that a large MGM Grand sign located on top of a 150-foot tall steel pylon was not a product within the contemplation of the doctrine of strict products liability, holding that the MGM sign was a product for purposes of strict liability.Plaintiff was seriously injured while servicing the MGM sign. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that Defendant designed, manufactured, and sold the allegedly defective sign to MGM, and therefore, Defendant should be strictly liable for his injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that the sign was not a product that was subject to the doctrine of strict liability. The Supreme Court reversed after applying the principles set forth in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts and relevant jurisprudence, holding that the MGM pylon sign was a product within the meaning of strict products liability. View "Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of guilty but mentally ill on charges of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and discharging a firearm at or into an occupied structure, holding that the district court improperly limited a psychiatric expert witness's testimony by not allowing her to opine about Defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.Defendant was indicted for fatally shooting his mother and for discharging a firearm into a neighbor's home. The jury found Defendant guilty but mentally ill on both charged offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should have allowed his psychiatric expert witness, Melissa Piasecki, M.D., to opine about his mental state. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by preventing Dr. Piasecki from opining about Defendant's mental state for purposes of supporting his not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Pundyk v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of ten counts of sexual conduct between a teacher and student and two counts of first-degree kidnapping, holding sexual conduct between school employees and students who are old enough to consent to sexual conduct is not a predicate offense for first-degree kidnapping, and therefore, Defendant's first-degree kidnapping convictions cannot stand.Appellant, a high school history teacher, developed a sexual relationship with a seventeen-year-old female student. The sexual conduct was consensual, but consensual sexual conduct between a teacher and a seventeen-year-old student is a crime under Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.540. Defendant was charged with ten counts of violating section 201.540 and two counts of first-degree kidnapping because on two occasions Defendant transported the student to hotels to have sex. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's first-degree kidnapping convictions, holding that a violation of section 201.540 is not a predicate offense for first-degree kidnapping. View "Lofthouse v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that the identity of a substance is an element of the crime articulated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337 such that each schedule I or II controlled substance simultaneously possessed with the intent to sell constitutes a separate offense.Section 453.337 prohibits a person from possessing, for the purpose of sale, flunitrazepam, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, or any schedule I and II controlled substance. Defendant pleaded guilty to being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States. The federal district court imposed a 16-level sentencing enhancement due to Defendant's previous conviction in Nevada for violating section 453.337. Defendant appealed, arguing that his section 453.337 conviction did not qualify as a predicate drug trafficking offense under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no controlling Nevada precedent clearly resolved whether a substance's identity is an element of the crime described in section 453.337 and filed its certified questions with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the identity of a substance is an element of the crime set forth in section 453.337. View "Figueroa-Beltran v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline that imposed a public reprimand on a family court judge, holding that the the Commission misapplied the statutes governing judicial discipline and, accordingly, erred in imposing a public reprimand.The Commission imposed a public reprimand on Clark County Family Court Judge Rena Hughes after Hughes entered an order holding a mother in contempt and changing custody of a minor child from the mother to the father. The Commission concluded that Judge Hughes had violated canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct because the change in custody was purportedly entered as a contempt sanction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commission found neither a knowing or deliberate violation of a canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct nor aggravating factors the Commission imposed discipline contrary to the statutes governing judicial discipline; (2) the Commission erred in instituting disciplinary proceedings where relief could be found in the appeals process; and (3) the Commission erred in interpreting Judge Hughes' orders and relying inappropriately on court minutes. View "In re Honorable Rena G. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "common knowledge" exception to the affidavit requirement for professional negligence claims against a provider of health care can also be applied to determine whether a claim that appears to sound in professional negligence, and does not fall under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100, actually sounds in ordinary negligence and thus is not subject to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071.A nursing home nurse mistakenly administered morphine to a patient that had been prescribed for another patient. The patient died three days later from morphine intoxication. The patient's estate sued the nursing home but did not explicitly assert any claim for professional negligence or file an expert affidavit under section 41A.071. The district court granted summary judgment for the nursing home, concluding that the complaint's allegations sounded in professional negligence and, therefore, the estate was required to file an expert affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the mistaken administration of another patient's morphine constituted ordinary negligence that a lay juror could assess without expert testimony, and such a claim is not subject to section 41A.071's medical expert affidavit requirement; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the allegations regarding the failure to monitor, as those allegations required expert testimony to support. View "Estate of Mary Curtis v. Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC" on Justia Law