Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a government entity does not have "possession, custody, or control" over the content on the personal cell phones of former workers hired through a temporary employment agency so as to be required under Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1 to disclose that material.Petitioner, the State of Nevada Department of Taxation, entered into an independent contractor relationship with a temporary employment agency to hire and train eight temporary workers to rank the applications received for recreational marijuana establishment licenses. Real party in interest Nevada Wellness Center, LLC sued the Department alleging that the Department employed unlawful and unconstitutional application procedures in awarding licenses. During discovery, Nevada Wellness moved to compel the production of the temporary workers' cell phones for inspection. The district court granted the motion. The Department petitioned for a writ of prohibition or mandamus barring enforcement of the discovery order, arguing that the Department lacked "possession, custody, or control" over the cell phones pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the temporary workers' cell phones were outside the Department's possession, custody or control and that the district court exceeded its authority when it compelled the Department to produce that information. View "State, Department of Taxation v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court granting summary judgment to Respondents on Appellant's defamation claims and malicious-prosecution claim, holding that the district court erred in relying on the judicial-proceedings privilege in granting summary judgment for Respondents on Appellant's defamation claim based on certain statements.Appellant sued Respondents for defamation based on statements Respondents made during the public comment period of planning commission an improvement district meetings. Appellant also sued for malicious prosecution after he was acquitted on battery and elder abuse charges. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the judicial-proceedings privilege extends to statements made during quasi-judicial proceedings, but the public comment portions of the meetings in this case were not quasi-judicial, and therefore, the district court erred in relying exclusively on this privilege in granting summary judgment; (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Appellant's defamation claims that relied on statements that were undisputedly true; and (3) the district court did not err in applying the law in resolving the malicious prosecution claim. View "Spencer v. Klementi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that it does not have jurisdiction to review a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517 in a family law matter because no court rule or statute permits an appeal of a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction.After Husband filed for divorce, the clerk of court issued a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.85 prohibiting the parties from disposing of any property subject to any community interest claim. After the district court issued a divorce decree the Supreme Court remanded the case to conduct proper tracing to determine community interests. On remand, Wife moved for the district court to reaffirm its prior joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517. The district court issued a preliminary injunction for two assets subject to community property claims but declined to extend the injunction to other assets in a spendthrift trust. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that joint preliminary injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not subject to Nev. R. Civ. P. 65, and therefore, orders denying or granting injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(3). View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that service of a petition for judicial review of an agency's decision does not require personal service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) because a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint filing so an alternative method of service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b) will suffice.After Patricia DeRosa was fired by the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), DeRosa requested a hearing. The hearing officer reversed the NDOC's decision. NDOC filed a petition for judicial review and served the petition on DeRosa by mailing it to her counsel under Rule 5(b). DeRosa moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal service. The district court granted the motion, concluding that personal service was necessary under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint pleading and that personal service is unnecessary and an alternative method of service under Rule 5(b) will instead suffice. View "State, Department of Corrections v. DeRosa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that, based on the record, it was more likely than not that the State used a peremptory challenge for impermissible reasons in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), necessitating a new trial.Defendant faced multiple charges related to a shooting. During jury selection, the State exercised one of its peremptory challenges to remove an African-American veniremember. Defendant made a Batson objection claiming that the peremptory challenge was based on the juror's race. The district court summarily overruled the objection without making any specific findings or explaining its reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the record belied the State's nondemeanor explanations for using a peremptory challenge on the juror, indicating that the explanations were pretextual; and (2) because the district court did not fully engage in the inquiry and consideration required at step three in the Batson analysis, the court clearly erred in denying Defendant's Batson objection. View "Matthews v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order disqualifying the Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division (LCB Legal) on conflict of interest grounds, holding that the district court erred in applying Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7 to disqualify LCB Legal.The district court granted a motion to disqualify LCB Legal from representing two defendants in the underlying action - Senate Majority Leader Nicole Cannizzaro and Senate Secretary Claire Clift (together, Defendants) - on the grounds that LCB Legal's representation of those defendants was directly adverse to another of its clients - the eight Nevada State Senators (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued Defendants in their official capacities for actions taken on behalf of the Legislature related to the passage of two bills. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to move to disqualify LCB Legal because (1) LCB Legal's defense of Defendants was ancillary to its defense of the bills themselves; (2) because Plaintiffs were not similarly acting on the Legislature's behalf in challenging the legislation they were not considered LCB Legal's client; and (3) therefore, Plaintiffs did not have an attorney-client relationship with LCB Legal other than in their roles as members of the Legislature acting on the Legislature's behalf. View "State ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault of a minor under sixteen years of age, holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and the jury instruction errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that that the district court erred by instructing the jury that the age of consent to sexual penetration is sixteen years old and that consent is not a defense to the crime of sexual assault of a minor under the age of sixteen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the victim's age, by itself, was not dispositive of any element of sexual assault, and therefore, the district court's instructions as to the victim's age were incorrect statements of law; and (2) the district court erred by rejecting Defendant's proposed inverse jury instruction; and (3) the district court's jury instruction errors were not harmless. View "Honea v. State" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from the self-help repossession of a vehicle, the Supreme Court considered what constitutes a breach of the peace such that the privilege to enter real property without judicial process and retake collateral no longer applies to those engaged in the repossession effort, holding that breach of the peace occurs when a secured party acts at a time or in a manner that is not reasonable during a self-help repossession.Plaintiffs sued those involved in the repossession, and the district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) In evaluating breach of the peace in the self-help repossession context, Nevada courts should follow the Second Restatement's reasonableness standard, and therefore, self-help repossessions must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner and that a breach of the peace occurs when a secured party fails to satisfy either or both of these obligations; (2) the district court erred when it concluded that the factual circumstances did not constitute a breach of the peace and trespass as a matter of law; (3) summary judgment was correctly granted against the Plaintiffs on four of their tort claims; and (4) as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims, genuine issues of material fact remained. View "Droge v. AAAA Two Star Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant's convictions for robbery but affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects after adopting factors to guide the Court in deciding whether to consider an error's harmlessness despite the State's failure to argue it, holding that the district court's error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless.Defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with detectives before his arrest. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court then adopted three factors to help determine whether the Court should consider an error's harmlessness when the State has not argued harmlessness in a death penalty case. After weighing those factors, the Court held (1) sua sponte harmless error review was appropriate in this matter, and the complained-of error was harmless; (2) one of the convictions for robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) no other issue warranted relief. View "Belcher v. State" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis of claim preclusion, holding that Appellant's action in Case 2 could not have been brought in Case 1, and therefore, Case 2 was not precluded.In Case 1, Appellant claimed that its neighbors' masonry wall and other property improvements were compromising Appellant's retaining wall. Appellant sought only monetary damages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the neighbors. The neighbors subsequently sold their property to Respondents. In Case 2, Appellant filed a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that it had a right to remove its own retaining wall, even if doing so would impact the structural integrity of Respondents' masonry wall. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's declaratory relief action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1; (2) Appellant's action in Case 2 was not based on the same facts or alleged wrongful conduct as its claims in Case 1; and (3) therefore, Appellant's action in Case 2 was not precluded. View "Rock Springs Mesquite II Owners' Ass'n v. Raridan" on Justia Law