Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order disqualifying the Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division (LCB Legal) on conflict of interest grounds, holding that the district court erred in applying Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.7 to disqualify LCB Legal.The district court granted a motion to disqualify LCB Legal from representing two defendants in the underlying action - Senate Majority Leader Nicole Cannizzaro and Senate Secretary Claire Clift (together, Defendants) - on the grounds that LCB Legal's representation of those defendants was directly adverse to another of its clients - the eight Nevada State Senators (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued Defendants in their official capacities for actions taken on behalf of the Legislature related to the passage of two bills. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to move to disqualify LCB Legal because (1) LCB Legal's defense of Defendants was ancillary to its defense of the bills themselves; (2) because Plaintiffs were not similarly acting on the Legislature's behalf in challenging the legislation they were not considered LCB Legal's client; and (3) therefore, Plaintiffs did not have an attorney-client relationship with LCB Legal other than in their roles as members of the Legislature acting on the Legislature's behalf. View "State ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault of a minor under sixteen years of age, holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and the jury instruction errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that that the district court erred by instructing the jury that the age of consent to sexual penetration is sixteen years old and that consent is not a defense to the crime of sexual assault of a minor under the age of sixteen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the victim's age, by itself, was not dispositive of any element of sexual assault, and therefore, the district court's instructions as to the victim's age were incorrect statements of law; and (2) the district court erred by rejecting Defendant's proposed inverse jury instruction; and (3) the district court's jury instruction errors were not harmless. View "Honea v. State" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from the self-help repossession of a vehicle, the Supreme Court considered what constitutes a breach of the peace such that the privilege to enter real property without judicial process and retake collateral no longer applies to those engaged in the repossession effort, holding that breach of the peace occurs when a secured party acts at a time or in a manner that is not reasonable during a self-help repossession.Plaintiffs sued those involved in the repossession, and the district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) In evaluating breach of the peace in the self-help repossession context, Nevada courts should follow the Second Restatement's reasonableness standard, and therefore, self-help repossessions must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner and that a breach of the peace occurs when a secured party fails to satisfy either or both of these obligations; (2) the district court erred when it concluded that the factual circumstances did not constitute a breach of the peace and trespass as a matter of law; (3) summary judgment was correctly granted against the Plaintiffs on four of their tort claims; and (4) as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims, genuine issues of material fact remained. View "Droge v. AAAA Two Star Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant's convictions for robbery but affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects after adopting factors to guide the Court in deciding whether to consider an error's harmlessness despite the State's failure to argue it, holding that the district court's error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless.Defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with detectives before his arrest. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court then adopted three factors to help determine whether the Court should consider an error's harmlessness when the State has not argued harmlessness in a death penalty case. After weighing those factors, the Court held (1) sua sponte harmless error review was appropriate in this matter, and the complained-of error was harmless; (2) one of the convictions for robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) no other issue warranted relief. View "Belcher v. State" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis of claim preclusion, holding that Appellant's action in Case 2 could not have been brought in Case 1, and therefore, Case 2 was not precluded.In Case 1, Appellant claimed that its neighbors' masonry wall and other property improvements were compromising Appellant's retaining wall. Appellant sought only monetary damages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the neighbors. The neighbors subsequently sold their property to Respondents. In Case 2, Appellant filed a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that it had a right to remove its own retaining wall, even if doing so would impact the structural integrity of Respondents' masonry wall. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's declaratory relief action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1; (2) Appellant's action in Case 2 was not based on the same facts or alleged wrongful conduct as its claims in Case 1; and (3) therefore, Appellant's action in Case 2 was not precluded. View "Rock Springs Mesquite II Owners' Ass'n v. Raridan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioners challenging a district court order compelling the production of allegedly privileged documents in a trust dispute with a beneficiary, holding that the documents were undiscoverable and that this Court expressly declines to recognize the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in Nevada.Petitioners, former trustees, challenged a district court order compelling a group of documents containing a former trustee's notes related to a phone call with counsel and a second group of documents containing the former trustee's notes taken during a meeting with other trustees, counsel, the opposing party, and an independent appraiser. The Supreme Court held that the district court acted in excess of jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents because (1) the first group of documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) the second group of documents were protected by the work-product doctrine. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order sua sponte modifying a discovery sanction in this negligence case, holding that the district court committed legal error by modifying the sanction and that the timing of the modification was prejudicial.Appellant was injured in a collision with Respondent's son. Appellant filed a complaint against Respondent alleging negligent entrustment and liability and against both Respondent and her son for punitive damages. At issue was whether Respondent permitted her son to drive the vehicle on the day of the accident. During discovery, Respondent produced a requested insurance claims file but redacted a claims note pertinent to the permissive use issue. The district court judge granted a discovery sanction against Respondent that established permissive use as a matter of law. Subsequently, a new judge sua sponte determined that establishing permissive use as a matter of law was unfair because it would prevent Respondent from defending against Appellant's punitive damages claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) permissive use, established as a matter of law, does not prevent a defendant from defending a claim for punitive damages; and (2) the timing of the district court's modification of the discovery sanction was prejudicial, as trial had begun. View "Garcia v. Awerbach" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer denying benefits to Respondent, holding that the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.366(1) did not exclude the possibility of benefits for hearing loss when at least part of Respondent's current hearing disability was attributable to some level of hearing loss before he began his job that made the hearing loss worse.While serving as a police officer for the City of Henderson, Respondent suffered progressive hearing loss to the point where he was assigned to desk duty. Respondent sought compensation under Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.430 and .440, which entitle employees to workers' compensation benefits if they suffer a disability caused by an "occupational disease." Because Respondent already had some level of hearing loss, perhaps genetically induced, before his employment as a police officer, the appeals officer denied benefits. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer applied the relevant statutes incorrectly as a matter of law. View "City of Henderson v. Spangler" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ relief challenging the district court's denial of his motion for a protective order, holding that the district court and its judge (collectively, Respondents) did not engage in the proper process courts must use when determining the scope of discovery under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) or use the framework provided by this Court for courts to apply when determining whether a protective order should be issued for good cause under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).Joyce Sekera allegedly slipped and fell on the Venetian Casino Resort's (Petitioner) marble flooring and was seriously injured. During discovery, Sekera requested that Petitioner produce incident reports relating to slip and falls on the marble flooring for three years preceding her injury. Petitioner provided sixty-four incident reports but redacted the personal information of the injured parties. When Sekera insisted on receiving the unreacted reports the Venetian moved for a protective order. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion when it did not consider proportionality under section 26(b)(1) prior to allowing discovery; and (2) should have determined whether Petitioner demonstrated good cause for a protective order under section 26(c)(1). View "Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree but affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During trial, defense counsel argued that Defendant shot the victim in a sudden heat of passion and that the killing was not premeditated. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, concluding that the evidence did not establish that offense. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to the murder charge and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) the circumstantial evidence suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation, and therefore, the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Defendant's defense theory of voluntary manslaughter, and the error was not harmless; and (2) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law