Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioners challenging a district court order compelling the production of allegedly privileged documents in a trust dispute with a beneficiary, holding that the documents were undiscoverable and that this Court expressly declines to recognize the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in Nevada.Petitioners, former trustees, challenged a district court order compelling a group of documents containing a former trustee's notes related to a phone call with counsel and a second group of documents containing the former trustee's notes taken during a meeting with other trustees, counsel, the opposing party, and an independent appraiser. The Supreme Court held that the district court acted in excess of jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents because (1) the first group of documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) the second group of documents were protected by the work-product doctrine. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order sua sponte modifying a discovery sanction in this negligence case, holding that the district court committed legal error by modifying the sanction and that the timing of the modification was prejudicial.Appellant was injured in a collision with Respondent's son. Appellant filed a complaint against Respondent alleging negligent entrustment and liability and against both Respondent and her son for punitive damages. At issue was whether Respondent permitted her son to drive the vehicle on the day of the accident. During discovery, Respondent produced a requested insurance claims file but redacted a claims note pertinent to the permissive use issue. The district court judge granted a discovery sanction against Respondent that established permissive use as a matter of law. Subsequently, a new judge sua sponte determined that establishing permissive use as a matter of law was unfair because it would prevent Respondent from defending against Appellant's punitive damages claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) permissive use, established as a matter of law, does not prevent a defendant from defending a claim for punitive damages; and (2) the timing of the district court's modification of the discovery sanction was prejudicial, as trial had begun. View "Garcia v. Awerbach" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer denying benefits to Respondent, holding that the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.366(1) did not exclude the possibility of benefits for hearing loss when at least part of Respondent's current hearing disability was attributable to some level of hearing loss before he began his job that made the hearing loss worse.While serving as a police officer for the City of Henderson, Respondent suffered progressive hearing loss to the point where he was assigned to desk duty. Respondent sought compensation under Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.430 and .440, which entitle employees to workers' compensation benefits if they suffer a disability caused by an "occupational disease." Because Respondent already had some level of hearing loss, perhaps genetically induced, before his employment as a police officer, the appeals officer denied benefits. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer applied the relevant statutes incorrectly as a matter of law. View "City of Henderson v. Spangler" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ relief challenging the district court's denial of his motion for a protective order, holding that the district court and its judge (collectively, Respondents) did not engage in the proper process courts must use when determining the scope of discovery under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) or use the framework provided by this Court for courts to apply when determining whether a protective order should be issued for good cause under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).Joyce Sekera allegedly slipped and fell on the Venetian Casino Resort's (Petitioner) marble flooring and was seriously injured. During discovery, Sekera requested that Petitioner produce incident reports relating to slip and falls on the marble flooring for three years preceding her injury. Petitioner provided sixty-four incident reports but redacted the personal information of the injured parties. When Sekera insisted on receiving the unreacted reports the Venetian moved for a protective order. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion when it did not consider proportionality under section 26(b)(1) prior to allowing discovery; and (2) should have determined whether Petitioner demonstrated good cause for a protective order under section 26(c)(1). View "Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree but affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During trial, defense counsel argued that Defendant shot the victim in a sudden heat of passion and that the killing was not premeditated. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, concluding that the evidence did not establish that offense. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to the murder charge and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) the circumstantial evidence suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation, and therefore, the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Defendant's defense theory of voluntary manslaughter, and the error was not harmless; and (2) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the State's petition challenging the district court's order denying the State's proposed jury instruction regarding the level of mens rea the State must prove to convict David Radonski of arson, holding that the State must prove that Radonski engaged in violation conduct coupled with a specific intent to harm.The State charged Radonski with multiple counts of arson in connection with the 2018 Perry Fire that burned over 51,000 acres. The State argued that Radonski could be liable for arson if he merely intended to commit the proscribed act of starting a fire, regardless of whether he intended to cause resulting harm. Radonski objected to the State's proposed jury instruction, arguing that the State must prove that he specifically intended to cause harm emanating from misconduct. The district court determined that arson is a specific-intent crime and denied the State's proposed jury instruction. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Nevada's arson statutes plainly require that the State prove that Radonski "willfully and maliciously" caused a fire, which means that the State must prove a specific intent to harm in addition to a volitional act. View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' petitions for extraordinary relief in part and denied the petitions in part, holding that intervention after final judgment is impermissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 12.130 and that an action that reached final judgment has no pending issues and, therefore, consolidation is improper.In 2007, Gary Lewis struck Cheyenne Nadler in an automobile accident. When Lewis and his insurer, United Automobile Insurance Company (UAIC), failed to defend Nalder's tort action, a default judgment was entered. In 2018, Nadler attempted to collect on the judgment through a new action. UAIC moved to intervene in and consolidate the 2007 case and the 2018 action. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in granting intervention in the 2007 action because a default judgment had been entered, but the court properly granted intervention in the 2018 action because a final judgment had not yet been entered; (2) the district court improperly consolidated the two cases; and (3) the district court properly vacated a judgment erroneously entered by the district court clerk when a stay was in effect. View "Nalder v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this case involving the extent to which a judgment debtor's rights of action are subject to execution to satisfy a judgment the Supreme Court held that a judgment debtor's claims that are unassignable cannot be purchased at an execution sale.Respondents filed a motion to substitute themselves in place of Appellants and to voluntarily dismiss this appeal because they purchased Appellants' rights and interests in the underlying action at a judgment execution sale. The Supreme Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, holding (1) because Appellants' claims for fraud and elder exploitation were personal in nature, they were not assignable and not subject to execution at a sheriff's sale, and therefore, Respondents did not purchase the rights to these claims at the execution sale; and (2) Appellants' claims of negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract were assignable and subject to execution, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed as to these claims. View "Reynolds v. Tufenkjian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendants' petitions for writ of mandamus challenging the district court's bail process and decisions, holding that, to safeguard against pretrial detainees sitting in jail simply because they cannot afford to post bail, certain due process protections are constitutionally required, and there was no relief to provide to Defendants in this case.Each defendant filed a motion to vacate or reduce their bail amount, contending that the bail amounts were excessive and that the bail process violated their right to due process and equal protection. The district court denied the motions. Both defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court elected to entertain the writ petitions but denied the petitions because there was no relief it could provide to Defendants, holding (1) bail may be imposed only where it is necessary to reasonably ensure the defendant's appearance at court proceedings or to protect the community, and a defendant who remains in custody after arrest is entitled to an individualized hearing; and (2) because Defendants were no longer subject to pretrial detention, their petitions for writs of mandamus are denied. View "Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this dispute between a trust's trustee and beneficiary the Supreme Court granted the trustee's original writ petition seeking a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, mandamus on the grounds that a discovery order was improper as a matter of law, holding that neither the trust instrument nor Nevada trust law required the trustee to consider the beneficiary's other assets before making distributions from the trust.This case concerned three trusts - the Raggio Trust and its two subtrusts, the Marital Trust and the Credit Shelter Trust. The Raggio Trust named Trustee as the trustee and life beneficiary of the subtrusts. Respondents were named as remainder beneficiaries of the Marital Trust. Respondents sued Trustee alleging that Trustee improperly distributed funds from the Marital Trust and paid herself distributions in amounts that were more than necessary for her proper support, care and maintenance. To prove their claim, Respondents sought discovery of Trustee's accounting and distributions of the Credit Shelter Trust. The district court granted the motion to compel discovery. The Supreme Court granted Trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 163.4176 nor the Raggio Trust required Trustee to consider her other assets in making distributions from the Marital Trust, and therefore, information about those assets was irrelevant. View "Raggio v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law