Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A criminal defendant in Nevada, Jamie Marie Chittenden, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking the dismissal of charges against her because her preliminary hearing was scheduled 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied the petition because it found that good cause existed for this delay. Chittenden appealed this decision, arguing that the delay violated her statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. The Court of Appeals of Nevada concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in scheduling Chittenden’s preliminary hearing. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus on other grounds. The court held that when deciding whether good cause exists to delay a preliminary hearing, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. The court also must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable. View "Chittenden v. Justice Court of Pahrump Township" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law

This is a criminal appeal of a murder and sexual assault conviction. The appellant, Bryce Edward Dickey, was convicted for the murder and sexual assault of sixteen-year-old Gabrielle Ujlaky. He claimed that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies and evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the trial court's admission of testimony from Dickey's ex-girlfriend, who testified that Dickey choked her during otherwise consensual sex, was not error because it was relevant to Dickey's intent. The court also concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct a complete analysis regarding the qualification of a witness as an expert was harmless. Additionally, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Dickey's sexual assault conviction, despite Dickey's argument that there was insufficient evidence of forced penetration. The court concluded that the cumulative impact of the identified errors did not warrant reversal since they did not deprive Dickey of a fair trial. View "Dickey v. State" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reversed and remanded a district court order that had dismissed a professional negligence action for being time-barred. The case was brought by Gina Engelson, as the special administrator of the estate of Lenore Meyer, against Dignity Health (doing business as St. Rose Dominican Hospital-Siena Campus) and Grape Holdings LLC (doing business as Sage Creek Post-Acute). Lenore Meyer had developed a severe bedsore while being treated at these facilities. Meyer's family alleged that the care provided by the facilities fell below the standard of care in multiple ways, including failing to timely and adequately treat the bedsore. Meyer eventually died, and exactly one year after her death, Engelson filed a professional negligence complaint against the facilities. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the complaint was filed more than a year after the estate and its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant legal injury.Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court of Appeals clarified that an affidavit of merit, which is required to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim, need not opine as to the element of causation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that the estate or its special administrator discovered or should have discovered the legal injury more than a year before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Engelson v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MCCORD VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress. View "BLIGE VS. TERRY" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

In this case, Tashami J. Sims, the appellant, had pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon in the Eighth Judicial District Court. At one of his sentencing hearings, Sims expressed a desire to represent himself, stating, "I'll go pro per." However, the district court did not allow him to do so at that time. Sims did not reiterate his request at subsequent hearings, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 to 72 months in prison.On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, Sims argued that the district court erred by not conducting a canvass to determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. The Court of Appeals, in a decision of first impression, held that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal request to represent themselves where the district court has not conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has abandoned their request.Applying this standard, the court found that Sims had abandoned his request to represent himself. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered factors such as Sims' failure to reassert his request at subsequent hearings, his collaboration with his counsel to obtain his mental health records, and the fact that he waited until after his conviction to raise the issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Sims v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation. View "Highroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority" on Justia Law