Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court held that although Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1) generally applies only to objects left in a patient's body during the at-issue surgery, it can also apply in cases where, as in the instant case, the sole purpose of the at-issue surgery is to remove medical devices and related hardware implanted during a previous surgery.Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice case alleging that Defendants breached the professional standard of care by overlooking or unintentionally leaving surgical clips in her body following a 2014 surgery. Relying on section 41A.100(1), Plaintiff did not attach a medical expert affidavit to her complaint. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she intentionally left the surgical clips in Plaintiff's stomach following the at-issue surgery because removal would be too risky. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that section 41A.100(1)(a) did not apply and, therefore, Plaintiff was required to present an expert affidavit to establish negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not conclusively negate the statutory presumption of negligence and that Plaintiff was not required to provide expert testimony to survive summary judgment. View "Cummings v. Barber" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's quiet title action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), holding that the limitations period in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.080 does not run against an owner who is in undisputed possession of the land, and because the facts alleged did not establish whether or when possession was disturbed here, the complaint was improperly dismissed.Six and one-half years after purchasing property at a homeowners' association foreclosure sale Appellant filed this action seeking a judicial declaration that the foreclosure extinguished the deed of trust that secured the prior homeowner's mortgage. At issue was whether the action was barred by section 11.080 because Appellant had been in possession of the property for more than five years before commencing the quiet title action. The district court concluded that the limitations period in section 11.080 began to run against Appellant when he acquired the property at the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the district court did not consider the fact that the statute of limitations ran from the time Appellant's ownership or possession of the property was disputed the court erred in granting Respondent's motion to dismiss. View "Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the Love Ranch's petition for a writ of mandamus and compelling the Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation (DETR) to comply with the Love Ranch's public records request for various records related to audits of the Love Ranch and other legal brothels, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.265 did not categorically exempt the requested records from disclosure.After the DETR's Employment Security Division (ESD) audited the Love Ranch the Love Ranch made a formal records request asking that DETR produce all records related to the audit and past audits and decisions regarding the Love Ranch and other brothels. DETR denied the request. The Love Ranch then petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 612.265 protects from disclosure a person's or employing unit's identity but otherwise does not prohibit disclosure of the ESD's records; and (2) because the request in this case expressly excluded any records that would reveal a person's or employing unit's identity and the district court did not compel disclosure of any records beyond those requested, the district court properly granted the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "State, Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation v. Sierra National Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner's writ petition requesting that the Supreme Court order the district court to grant his motion to dismiss four counts for which he was indicted based on the grand jury's lack of authority to inquire into those criminal offenses, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.105 empowers a grand jury to inquire into an offense so long as the district court that empaneled the grand jury may appropriately adjudicate the defendant's guilt for that offense.A Washoe County grand jury indicted Petitioner on ten counts, four of which concerned offenses committed in Douglas County. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Douglas County counts. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a grand jury's authority to return an indictment under section 172.105 extended statewide to all felony offenses. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order so it may reconsider Petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted section 172.105. In reconsidering Defendant's motion, the Supreme Court directed the district court to determine, based on the evidence presented to the Washoe County grand jury, if venue was proper in the Second Judicial District Court for the Douglas County charges under the applicable statutes. View "Guzman v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this homeowners' association (HOA) lien foreclosure dispute between the holder of the first deed of trust on the property and the assignee of the buyer at the lien foreclosure sale the Supreme Court held that while a homeowner can cure a superpriority default the district court did not decide whether the homeowner's partial payments in fact cured the superpriority lien default.After receiving a notice of delinquency, the homeowner made partial payments to the HOA but did not specify whether she wanted the HOA to apply to the superpriority or subpriority portion of the lien. The district court concluded that because the homeowner's payments exceeded the defaulted superpriority lien amount the default was cured such that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying summary judgment to the buyer's assignee but vacated its grant of summary judgment to the holder of the first deed of trust, holding that the homeowner has the ability to cure a default as to the superpriority portion of an HOA lien, and allocating partial payments by a homeowner to her HOA depends on the intent and actions of the homeowner and the HOA. View "9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss filed by Steve Sanson and Louis Schneider, holding that Sanson's allegedly defamatory statements regarding Jennifer Abrams' conduct at and following a family court proceeding against Schneider, opposing counsel, fell within the protection of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes but that the district court erred as to Sanson's private telephone statements to nonparty David Schoen.Schneider allegedly gave video of a closed-court hearing in the family law case to Sanson, who published articles on his website concerning Abrams' courtroom conduct and practices. The articles were sent to email subscribers and published through social media outlets. Abrams sued Sanson and Schneider alleging, inter alias, defamation. The district court granted Defendants' special motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Sanson met his burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims; and (2) the district court erred as to Sanson's statements to Schoen because private telephone conversations are not statements made in a place open to the public or in a public forum. View "Abrams v. Sanson" on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, holding that the district court erred in finding that Defendant failed to satisfy prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis so as to shift the burden to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the claims should be allowed to proceed.Third-party comments posted to Defendant's Facebook page criticized Plaintiff for his handling of wild bears in his capacity as a biologist with the Nevada Department of Wildlife. Based on these comments, Plaintiff sued. Defendant moved to dismiss the claims pursuant to an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that the comments at issue were not in the public interest and were not made in good faith and that Defendant met her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Stark v. Lackey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ), which had petitioned the district court to compel production of unreacted juvenile autopsy reports under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) after the Clark County Coroner's Office refused, holding that a governmental entity is not immune from an attorney fees award to which a prevailing records requester is entitled under Nev. Rev. Stat. 239.011.The Coroner's Office argued that it may refuse to disclose a juvenile autopsy report once it has provided the report to a Child Death Review (CDR) team and that juvenile autopsy reports may include sensitive information that may be properly redacted as privileged. The Coroner's Office further argued that action 239.012 immunizes a governmental entity from an award of attorney fees when that entity withholds public records in good faith. The Supreme Court held (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 423B.407(6)'s applies strictly to the CDR team as a whole; (2) the district court erred when it ordered the production of unreacted juvenile autopsy reports; and (3) the award of attorney fees must be vacated because it cannot yet be determined whether LVRJ is a prevailing party in its underlying NPRA action. View "Clark County Office of the Coroner v. Las Vegas Review-Journal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that a deed of trust beneficiary's agent was excused from making a formal tender, such that under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (Nev. 2018), the ensuing foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust, holding that substantial evidence supported this finding.In Bank of America, the Supreme Court held that a deed of trust beneficiary can preserve its deed of trust by tendering the superpriority portion of a homeowners' association's (HOA) lien before the foreclosure sale is held. At issue was whether an offer to pay the superpriority amount when that amount is determined constitutes a tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative but held that a formal tender is excused when evidence shows that the party entitled to payment had a known policy of rejecting such payments. Specifically, the Court held (1) the beneficiary was excused from making a formal tender because, pursuant to a known policy, its tender would have been rejected; and (2) therefore, the beneficiary preserved its interest in the property such that the property was purchased subject to the beneficiary's first deed of trust. View "7510 Perla Del Mar Ave Trust v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus sought by Petitioners, holding that Petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the complaint filed by the State Commissioner of Insurance because Nev. Rev. Stat. 78.138(7) applies to all claims of individual liability against directors and officers, precluding the imposition of liability for grossly negligent breaches of fiduciary duties.Petitioners formerly served as directors of a Nevada risk retention group. After a receivership action was filed, the district court entered a liquidation order appointing the Commissioner as receiver. As receiver, the Commissioner filed a complaint against Petitioners alleging claims of gross negligence and deepening insolvency. Petitioners filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that gross negligence cannot support a claim for personal liability against Petitioners pursuant to section 78.138. The district court denied the motion. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the district court to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) claims against individual directors and officers cannot proceed based only on allegations of gross negligence; and (2) the gross negligence-based allegations in the complaint failed to state an actionable claim under section 78.138(7). View "Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law