Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other crimes, holding that the district court erred in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the charged crimes which were not punishable with death.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the language in Nev. Rev. Stat. 194.010(8) stating that duress cannot be asserted as a defense to a crime that "is punishable with death" can be interpreted to include crimes that are not punishable with death but require proof of intent to commit a crime that is punishable by death. The Supreme Court held (1) section 194.010(8) cannot be interpreted to limit the duress defense with respect to crimes that are not punishable with death regardless of the relationship between those crimes and another crime that is punishable with death; and (2) the district court's error in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the crimes not punishable by death was not harmless. View "Cabrera v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed nine district court orders directing payment from the Nevada Real Estate Education, Research and Recovery Fund (the Fund), one to Melani Schulte individually and eight to various LLCs in her control, stemming from William Schulte's fraudulent management of properties, holding that the spousal exception to Fund recovery in Nev. Rev. Stat. 645.844(4)(a) applied at the time of the misconduct and that transactions involving one's own properties do not qualify for Chapter 645's protections.The Fund compensates victims of real estate fraud whose judgment against a fraudulent real estate licensee is uncollectible. The district court issued the nine orders stemming from the fraudulent management of properties by William, Melani's then husband. All but one of the properties were jointly owned by the Schultes. The Supreme Court reversed the orders, holding (1) because Melani and William were married at the time of the fraud, the spousal exception prohibits Melani's individual recovery; and (2) because transactions involving one's own properties do not require a real estate license, the district court erred in granting awards to the eight LLCs. View "Chandra v. Schulte" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a prisoner's petition for judicial review challenging the amount of compensation he received, upon his release, in connection with the industrial injury he suffered while incarcerated, holding that the administrative appeals officer properly affirmed the calculation of the prisoner's average monthly wage.Appellant was injured while working for Nevada Division of Forestry while he was incarcerated. Respondent accepted Appellant's workers' compensation claim. After Appellant was released he sought to have the benefits calculated at the minimum wage guaranteed under the Nevada Constitution. Under the modified workers' compensation program for prisoners, however, the amount of compensation a prisoner may receive upon release is based on the average monthly wage the prisoner actually received as of the date of the injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that an administrative appeals officer is not permitted to recalculate the average monthly wage at an amount the prisoner did not actually receive while incarcerated. View "White v. State, Division of Forestry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision applying the pre-2007 version of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 to Defendant's criminal conduct in this case, holding that the 2007 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 applies when the charged offense is continuous in nature but that attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen is not a continuing offense.Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen and was alleged to have committed the offenses between 2006 and 2013. The district court applied the 2003 version of section 209.4465. On appeal, the State argued that section 209.4465(8)(2007) applied to Defendant's offenses because the attempted lewdness counts were charged as continuing offenses through 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen is not a continuing offense; and (2) the district court properly relied on the 2003 version of section 209.4465 and applied Defendant's earned credits to his parole eligibility. View "High Desert State Prison v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Respondent's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, holding that Respondent properly invoked his speedy-trial right, Respondent was entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the State failed to rebut that presumption.The district court concluded that the State violated Respondent's right to a speedy trial because the State's gross negligence caused a twenty-six-month delay between the filing of charges and Respondent's arrest, and the State failed to rebut the presumption that the delay prejudiced Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Respondent was entitled to a presumption o prejudice under the facts enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); and (2) the State did not rebut this presumption or explain on appeal how Respondent was not prejudiced by the delay. View "State v. Inzunza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Appellant took certain nonresidential property subject to Respondent's existing mortgage on the subject property, holding that Appellant took its interest subject to Respondent's deed of trust.The conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the subject property stated that the property owners' association (POA) may enforce delinquent assessment liens pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116-.31168 but not the entirety of Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 116. Specifically, the CC&Rs did not incorporate the provisions of chapter 116 that might invalidate a mortgage savings clause or provide for assessments supporting a lien that would have superpriority status. Appellant purchased the property at a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 116.3116. Thereafter, Respondent recorded a notice of default for nonpayment of mortgage payments and filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the property. Appellant counterclaimed to quiet title, alleging that the nonjudicial foreclosure extinguished Respondent's deed of trust. The district court entered judgment for Respondent, concluding that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish Respondent's deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no portion of the delinquent POA assessment lien had superpriority status as against Respondent's first security interest. View "Vegas United Investment Series 105, Inc. v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of seven counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that Defendant made specific factual allegations that could be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a Defendant choose from a fair cross section of the community and those allegations were not disproved, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.At issue in this case was when an evidentiary hearing may be warranted on a fair-cross-section claim. The Supreme Court held (1) an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement; (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his fair-cross-section challenge; and (3) none of Defendant's other arguments required a new trial. View "Valentine v. State" on Justia Law

In this case involving workers' compensation for "traveling" employees the Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants' petition for judicial review of the denial of their request for workers' compensation benefits, holding that the appeals officer failed to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.612(3).Jason Buma died in an ATV accident while on a required business trip for Respondent, his employer. Appellants, Buma's wife and daughter, filed a workers' compensation claim for workers' compensation benefits. Respondent denied the claim. The hearing officer affirmed, concluding that Buma's death occurred during an activity that was not part of his work duties. The appeals officer affirmed the denial, and the district court denied judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) under section 616B.612(3), a traveling employee is under his employer's control for the duration of his business trip; and (2) because the appeals officer failed to apply the statute the case is remanded for reevaluation under the correct standards. View "Buma v. Providence Corp. Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in a tort action, holding that, in determining whether the communications were made in good faith, the court must consider the "gist or sting" of the communications as a whole, rather than parsing each individual word in the communications to assess it for its truthfulness.In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged libel per se, slander per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, determining that Defendant did not meet her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because she did not show that the statements were made in good faith. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its analysis of whether Defendant's statements were made in good faith; and (2) Defendant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that she made the statements in good faith under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Plaintiff could not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on this claim under the second prong. View "Rosen v. Tarkanian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a discovery ruling compelling Petitioner to disclose the identity of his sources in a tort action, holding that digital media falls within the protections of Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.275.The current version of section 49.275 protects journalists who are associated with newspapers, press associations, periodicals, and radio and television programs from mandatory disclosure of confidential sources. Petitioner in this case was a blogger who was sued for defamation. During discovery, Petitioner invoked the news shield statute under section 49.275 and refused to provide the identity of his sources. Respondent filed a motion to compel Petitioner to reveal his sources, arguing that the news shield statute does not apply to bloggers. The district court granted the motion to compel. Petitioner then filed this petition challenging that decision as well as the order allowing limited discovery. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that digital medial falls within the protections of section 49.275 but that the case required a remand so the district court could reconsider whether Petitioner's blog fell within the protection of the statute. View "Toll v. Honorable James Wilson" on Justia Law