Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in a tort action, holding that, in determining whether the communications were made in good faith, the court must consider the "gist or sting" of the communications as a whole, rather than parsing each individual word in the communications to assess it for its truthfulness.In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged libel per se, slander per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, determining that Defendant did not meet her burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because she did not show that the statements were made in good faith. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its analysis of whether Defendant's statements were made in good faith; and (2) Defendant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that she made the statements in good faith under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Plaintiff could not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on this claim under the second prong. View "Rosen v. Tarkanian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a discovery ruling compelling Petitioner to disclose the identity of his sources in a tort action, holding that digital media falls within the protections of Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.275.The current version of section 49.275 protects journalists who are associated with newspapers, press associations, periodicals, and radio and television programs from mandatory disclosure of confidential sources. Petitioner in this case was a blogger who was sued for defamation. During discovery, Petitioner invoked the news shield statute under section 49.275 and refused to provide the identity of his sources. Respondent filed a motion to compel Petitioner to reveal his sources, arguing that the news shield statute does not apply to bloggers. The district court granted the motion to compel. Petitioner then filed this petition challenging that decision as well as the order allowing limited discovery. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that digital medial falls within the protections of section 49.275 but that the case required a remand so the district court could reconsider whether Petitioner's blog fell within the protection of the statute. View "Toll v. Honorable James Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the State met its burden under the preponderance of the evidence standard.Defendant was charged with attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon and other crimes. When the State sought to admit Defendant's daughter's out-of-court statements to a district court's office investigator Defendant asserted his right to confrontation. The trial court admitted the statements, finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof; and (2) the district court applied the correct standard, and the court did not err in its application of the exception. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to reconsider well-settled Nevada law that when a district court imposes a sentence in a criminal case it must give a defendant credit for any time the defendant was spent in presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the defendant ineligible for such credit and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to give Appellant the required credit for time served in presentence confinement.Defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny of an automobile, less than $3,500, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. After she was sentenced Defendant appealed, arguing that the distrixt court erred by failing to give her credit for time served in presentence confinement. The State urged the Supreme Court to overrule established precedent holding that sentencing courts must award credit for time served in presentence confinement. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no compelling reason to overturn precedent, and based on that precedent, held that the district court erred in forfeiting Defendant's presentence credit as a condition of probation. View "Poasa v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction habeas petition, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that Appellant was not allowed to raise direct appeal issues related to his 1995 capital trial in this appeal from an amended judgment of conviction entered in 2017.In 1995, Appellant was sentenced to death for first-degree murder. Amended judgments required Appellant to pay an indeterminate portion of restitution. Appellant litigated the judgment of conviction for more than two decades with a direct appeal and various state and federal court proceedings. In the instant proceeding, Appellant filed in 2017 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his conviction was not final because the judgment of conviction contained an indeterminate restitution provision. The district court denied the petition but amended the judgment of conviction to delete the indeterminate part of the restitution provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where for a dozen years Appellant treated the judgment of conviction as a final judgment, Appellant was estopped from now arguing that the judgment was not final; and (2) although the amended judgment of conviction is appealable, the appeal is limited in scope to issues stemming from the amendment. View "Witter v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, holding that evidence that has been suppressed in justice court proceedings on a felony complaint is not "legal evidence" that may be presented to the grand jury in support of an indictment.The State filed a criminal complaint charging Defendant with murder with use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Before the preliminary hearing, Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police and the gun. The justice court granted the motion. The State thendismissed the criminal complaint and went to the grand jury on the charge of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, presenting the evidence that the justice court had suppressed. The grand jury indicted Defendant on the charge. After Defendant filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment, without success, he brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the State was precluded from presenting the suppressed evidence to the grand jury. View "Gathrite v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners' petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying the Parole Board's petition for modification of Marlin Thompson's sentence pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.033(2), holding that the district court misapplied the law.In 1992, Thompson, who was convicted of first-degree murder, was granted parole and has remained on parole since. In 2017, the Parole Board petitioned to modify Thompson's sentence. The district attorney's office opposed the petition, asserting that the minimum term for first-degree murder at the time of Thompson's offense was a life term, and therefore, the court could not reduce Thompson's maximum term. The district court agreed and denied the petition. The Parole Board filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the court's order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the parole eligibility term prescribed by the penal statute sets the limit for reducing the life sentence under section 176.033(2); and (2) the district court relied on a misunderstanding of the law in denying the Parole Board's petition. View "State Board of Parole Commissioners v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498 (Nev. 1985), and its conclusion that a suggestion of death emanating from the deceased party must identify the deceased party's successor or representative to trigger the deadline set forth in Nev. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) to file a motion to substitute, holding that Barto expanded rule 25(a)(1) beyond its plain language.James McNamee was sued for damages. During the litigation, McNamee died. Counsel for McNamee filed a suggestion of death without naming a successor or representative. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Susan Clokey as special administrator to defend the negligence suit. McNamee's attorney later filed a motion to substitute Clokey as the party defendant in the negligence suit. The district court denied the motion and named Fred Waid as general administrator of McNamee's estate. McNamee's attorney moved to dismiss the personal injury case because his motion to substitute had been denied. The district court denied the motion and substituted Waid as the defendant in place of McNamee. The Supreme Court held (1) a suggestion of death that is properly served triggers the deadline for filing a motion to substitute regardless of whether it identifies the deceased party's successor or representative; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner's motion to substitute. View "McNamee v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint because he filed it, though he did not serve it, without an affidavit and expert report, holding that an initial pleading filed under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) is void ab initio only when it is served without a concurrent filing of the required attorney affidavit and expert report.In dismissing Appellant's complaint the district court relief on a statement in Otak Nevada, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 260 P.3d 408 (2011), that "a pleading filed under [section] 11.258 without the required affidavit and expert report is void ab initio." The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting the motion to dismiss and remanded the matter to the district court for further consideration, holding that a pleading is void ab initio under section 11.258(1) only where the pleading is served without a concurrent filing of the required attorney affidavit and expert report, not where the pleading is merely filed. View "Reif v. Aries Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and affirmed the judgment of conviction as to the other charges for which Defendant was convicted, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on the murder charge, holding (1) a district court must instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter when requested so long as the instruction is supported by some evidence, even if that evidence is circumstantial; (2) because the circumstantial evidence in this case strongly suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law