Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of prohibition directing the district court to grant Petitioner's motion to dismiss the underlying petition for judicial review and clarifying that premature petitions for judicial review do not vest subject matter jurisdiction in the district court.After the administrative agency in this case stated its disposition on the record the petition for judicial review was filed. The agency's statement, however, did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law with an explicit statement of the underlying facts in support. The Supreme Court granted this petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the disposition that was stated on the record did not constitute a final decision for purposes of commencing the period in Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(d) in which an aggrieved party may seek judicial review; and (2) therefore, the petition failed to comply with the relevant statutory requirements and thus did not vest jurisdiction in the district court. View "Nevada State Board of Architecture v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the district court granting a petition for judicial review of a decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and vacated the ALJ's order finding that the Grace Period Payment Deferment Agreement (GPPDA) marketed by TitleMax of Nevada, Inc. violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.445 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.210, holding that the GPPDA impermissibly extended the duration of the loan.In 2014, TitleMax began offering the GPPDA, marketed as an amendment and modification to its 210-day loan and under which TitleMax collected seven months of interest-only payments calculated based on a static principal balance and then collected seven months of payments amortizing principal. The Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division brought the underlying administrative disciplinary action alleging that TitleMax violated sections 604A.445(3) and 604A.210. The ALJ ordered TitleMax to cease and desist offering the GPPDA and sanctioned TitleMax for willfully violating the statutes. The district court vacated the ALJ's order. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the GPPDA required borrowers to make unamortized payments and consequently charged "additional interest" it violated the pertinent statutes; and (2) TitleMax's statutory violation was not "willful" and thus did not warrant statutory sanctions. View "State, Department of Business & Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. TitleMax of Nevada, Inc." on Justia Law

In this homeowners' association (HOA) foreclosure case, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to U.S. Bank, N.A. and remanded for entry of summary judgment for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, holding that the mere fact that a foreclosure sale was held in violation of a bankruptcy stay is not by itself evidence of unfairness.The homeowner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, which imposed an automatic stay on actions against her real property. In violation of the stay, the HOA sold the property at a foreclosure sale. SFR, the purchaser, sought to quiet title. The bankruptcy court issued a limited order retroactively annulling the bankruptcy stay of the stay, which has the legal effect of validating the sale. The district court, however, set aside the sale and granted summary judgment for U.S. Bank finding that the HOA's foreclosure sale being conducted in violation of the bankruptcy stay was evidence of unfairness and that the sale price was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that U.S. Bank failed to produce any evidence showing how the sale's violation of the automatic stay constituted unfairness and that SFR met its burden of showing that the HOA foreclosure sale complied with the procedures in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 116. View "SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court awarding attorney fees in a wrongful termination suit, holding that because Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim rested on a novel yet arguable construction of the limitations period the district court should not have awarded attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b).Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination more than two years after she was terminated. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e) applied and that the wrongful termination period had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded Defendant attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred; but (2) because this Court has not previously addressed the appropriate limitations period for a wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff's argument presented a matter of first impression, and therefore, the district court should not have awarded attorney fees on the basis that Plaintiff's claim was untimely filed and thus groundless under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b). View "Patush v. Las Vegas Bistro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to reinstate Happy Creek, Inc.'s original water rights' priority dates in equity, holding that, under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the district court properly granted equitable relief for Happy Creek.As mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.410 the State Engineer canceled Happy Creek's ground water permits after Happy Creek's agent missed a filing deadline by a few weeks. Accordingly, Happy Creek lost more than fifty years of priority in water rights despite having invested $1 million in improving water-use efficiency and having met the other substantive criteria for maintaining priority of its water rights. Happy Creek's groundwater rights were in an over-appropriated basin, and therefore, Happy Creek was threatened with complete loss of use of water. The district court granted equitable relief by restoring Happy Creek's original senior priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to State Engineer v. American National Insurance Co., 498 P.2d 1329 (Nev. 1972), and its progeny, the district court properly granted Happy Creek equitable relief. View "State Engineer v. Happy Creek, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision affirming his conviction and disagreeing with Petitioner's argument that he was erroneously denied the right to a jury trial, holding that the offense of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence is a serious offense such that the right to a jury trial is triggered.Petitioner was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Petitioner made a demand for a jury trial, but the municipal court denied the demand. Petitioner then entered a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge. Before the Supreme Court Petitioner argued that recent changes by the legislature made the offense a serious one. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because statutes now limit the right to bear arms for a person who has been convicted of misdemeanor battery constituting a domestic violence and because the Legislature has determined that the offense is a serious one, a jury trial is required. View "Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this claim for workers' compensation benefits the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court affirming the appeals officer's decisions as to compensability and liability and reversing as to the award amount, holding that the liability determination and award amount determination were improper.Plaintiff sought benefits after her husband died as a result of heart disease. The decedent's former employer and its former insurer denied benefits. The appeals officer reversed, concluding that the decedent's death was caused by a compensable occupational heart disease, that his employer was liable as the self-insurer, and that the amount of the claim was based on the decedent's income from his private employer at the time of death. The district court reversed in part, concluding that the award should be based on the decedent's wages on the date of disablement, or death, which were zero. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the last injurious exposure rule determines the liable insurer for an occupational disease claim that arose out of and in the course of employment even if the employee no longer works for that employer; and (2) death benefits should have been based on the decedent's wages at the time he last worked for the employer. View "Demaranville v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of multiple sex offenses against children and related offenses, holding that the trial judge's behavior and statements during voir dire constituted judicial misconduct and that the misconduct interfered with Defendant's right to an impartial jury.During the second day of voir dire in this case, a prospective juror stated that she did not think she could be unbiased toward Defendant. Thereafter, the trial judge threw a book against the wall, cursed, and berated, yelled at, and threatened that prospective juror. After a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on most of the counts with which Defendant was charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's misconduct during voir dire and the denial of his request for a new venire violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the judicial misconduct in this case deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. View "Azucena v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the record supported the court's conclusion that the State met its burden of proof in invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause.Relying on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception the trial court admitted the out-of-court statements despite Defendant's assertion of his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof for purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the trial court did not err in its application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to admit the witness's out-of-court statements. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case brought by Plaintiffs seeking to enforce a settlement agreement the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995, which requires agreements that include an arbitration provision also to include a specific authorization for the arbitration provision showing that the parties affirmatively agreed to that provision.The parties in this case entered into a settlement agreement that referenced a licensing agreement that included an arbitration provision. When Plaintiffs sued to enforce the settlement agreement Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint because the settlement agreement incorporated the licensing agreement's arbitration clause. The district court concluded that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it did not include the specific authorization required by section 597.995. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute did not void the arbitration clause; and (2) the claims in the underlying complaint were subject to arbitration. View "MMAWC, LLC v. Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust" on Justia Law