Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice generally conveys "prevailing party" status upon the defendant for purposes of an award of attorney fees and costs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.020, but district courts should consider the circumstances surrounding the voluntary dismissal with prejudice in determining whether the dismissal conveys prevailing party status.The Residences at MGM Grand - Tower A Owners' Association (the Association) was sued after it was discovered that a unit at The Signature at MGM Grand had mold damage. The Association requested dismissal from the case because it was not a proper party to the action. Eventually, the parties stipulated to dismiss the Association from the case with prejudice. Thereafter, the Association moved for attorney fees and costs. The Trust argued that the Association could not be considered a prevailing party because the case had not proceeded to judgment. The district court concluded that the Association was the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, the dismissal with prejudice was substantively a judgment on the merits, and therefore, the Association was a prevailing party for purposes of sections 18.010(2) and 18.020. View "145 East Harmon II Trust v. Residences at MGM Grand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Respondent was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs under Nev. Rev. Stat. 239.011(2), holding that the requesting party prevails for purposes of an award of attorney fees and costs when the parties reach an agreement that affords the requesting party access to the requested records before the court enters a judgment on the merits.Plaintiff submitted a public records request to Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) seeking records related to a murder. When LVMPD did not respond to the request to Plaintiff's satisfaction, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to inspect of obtain copies of all records related to the murder within LVMPD's custody and control. Before an evidentiary hearing, the parties reached an agreement regarding the production of the records. The district court awarded attorney fees to Plaintiff. On appeal, LVMPD argued that Plaintiff did not prevail for purposes of section 239.011(2) because the district court did not enter an order compelling production of the records. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting and applying the catalyst theory, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. View "Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank seeking to foreclose on a defaulted loan, holding that because U.S. Bank presented evidence to meet its burden to show that the original note was lost, it was entitled to enforce the note because the facts established that the action may proceed.U.S. Bank acquired the deed of trust secured by Appellant's residence and sought to foreclose on the defaulted loan. The original lender did not execute an assignment of the note to U.S. Bank when assigning the deed of trust to U.S. Bank. The loan servicer, however, swore an affidavit certifying that the note was lost. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because U.S. Bank showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it acquired ownership of the note from a party that had the right to enforce it, that the note was not lost as a result of a transfer or lawful seizure, and that the note could not be reasonably obtained, U.S. Bank satisfied the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3309 and was entitled to seek a judicial foreclosure on Appellant's default. View "Jones v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff relying on Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100's rebuttable presumption for a prima facie case of negligence need not provide expert testimony to survive a defendant's summary judgment motion but, rather, must only establish the facts that entitle her to the statute's rebuttable presumption of negligence.Plaintiff, special administrator to the estate of Maria Jaramillo, sued Defendant for medical malpractice under section 41A.100(1), asserting that Defendant breached the professional standard of care by unintentionally leaving a wire in Jaramillo's left breast. Relying on section 41A.100(1)(a), Plaintiff did not attach a medical expert affidavit. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant rebutted the presumption of negligence by providing expert testimony about the standard of care, and that, in the absence of contrary expert testimony from Plaintiff, it was uncontroverted that the unintentional leaving of a wire fragment in Jaramillo's body was not a result of negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the expert declaration Defendant presented supporting her summary judgment did not conclusively negate the statutory presumption of negligence but merely created a material factual dispute for trial on the issue of negligence; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of negligence. View "Jaramillo v. Ramos" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court held that although Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1) generally applies only to objects left in a patient's body during the at-issue surgery, it can also apply in cases where, as in the instant case, the sole purpose of the at-issue surgery is to remove medical devices and related hardware implanted during a previous surgery.Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice case alleging that Defendants breached the professional standard of care by overlooking or unintentionally leaving surgical clips in her body following a 2014 surgery. Relying on section 41A.100(1), Plaintiff did not attach a medical expert affidavit to her complaint. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she intentionally left the surgical clips in Plaintiff's stomach following the at-issue surgery because removal would be too risky. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that section 41A.100(1)(a) did not apply and, therefore, Plaintiff was required to present an expert affidavit to establish negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not conclusively negate the statutory presumption of negligence and that Plaintiff was not required to provide expert testimony to survive summary judgment. View "Cummings v. Barber" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's quiet title action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), holding that the limitations period in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.080 does not run against an owner who is in undisputed possession of the land, and because the facts alleged did not establish whether or when possession was disturbed here, the complaint was improperly dismissed.Six and one-half years after purchasing property at a homeowners' association foreclosure sale Appellant filed this action seeking a judicial declaration that the foreclosure extinguished the deed of trust that secured the prior homeowner's mortgage. At issue was whether the action was barred by section 11.080 because Appellant had been in possession of the property for more than five years before commencing the quiet title action. The district court concluded that the limitations period in section 11.080 began to run against Appellant when he acquired the property at the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the district court did not consider the fact that the statute of limitations ran from the time Appellant's ownership or possession of the property was disputed the court erred in granting Respondent's motion to dismiss. View "Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the Love Ranch's petition for a writ of mandamus and compelling the Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation (DETR) to comply with the Love Ranch's public records request for various records related to audits of the Love Ranch and other legal brothels, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.265 did not categorically exempt the requested records from disclosure.After the DETR's Employment Security Division (ESD) audited the Love Ranch the Love Ranch made a formal records request asking that DETR produce all records related to the audit and past audits and decisions regarding the Love Ranch and other brothels. DETR denied the request. The Love Ranch then petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 612.265 protects from disclosure a person's or employing unit's identity but otherwise does not prohibit disclosure of the ESD's records; and (2) because the request in this case expressly excluded any records that would reveal a person's or employing unit's identity and the district court did not compel disclosure of any records beyond those requested, the district court properly granted the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "State, Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation v. Sierra National Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner's writ petition requesting that the Supreme Court order the district court to grant his motion to dismiss four counts for which he was indicted based on the grand jury's lack of authority to inquire into those criminal offenses, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.105 empowers a grand jury to inquire into an offense so long as the district court that empaneled the grand jury may appropriately adjudicate the defendant's guilt for that offense.A Washoe County grand jury indicted Petitioner on ten counts, four of which concerned offenses committed in Douglas County. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Douglas County counts. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a grand jury's authority to return an indictment under section 172.105 extended statewide to all felony offenses. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order so it may reconsider Petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted section 172.105. In reconsidering Defendant's motion, the Supreme Court directed the district court to determine, based on the evidence presented to the Washoe County grand jury, if venue was proper in the Second Judicial District Court for the Douglas County charges under the applicable statutes. View "Guzman v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In this homeowners' association (HOA) lien foreclosure dispute between the holder of the first deed of trust on the property and the assignee of the buyer at the lien foreclosure sale the Supreme Court held that while a homeowner can cure a superpriority default the district court did not decide whether the homeowner's partial payments in fact cured the superpriority lien default.After receiving a notice of delinquency, the homeowner made partial payments to the HOA but did not specify whether she wanted the HOA to apply to the superpriority or subpriority portion of the lien. The district court concluded that because the homeowner's payments exceeded the defaulted superpriority lien amount the default was cured such that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying summary judgment to the buyer's assignee but vacated its grant of summary judgment to the holder of the first deed of trust, holding that the homeowner has the ability to cure a default as to the superpriority portion of an HOA lien, and allocating partial payments by a homeowner to her HOA depends on the intent and actions of the homeowner and the HOA. View "9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss filed by Steve Sanson and Louis Schneider, holding that Sanson's allegedly defamatory statements regarding Jennifer Abrams' conduct at and following a family court proceeding against Schneider, opposing counsel, fell within the protection of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes but that the district court erred as to Sanson's private telephone statements to nonparty David Schoen.Schneider allegedly gave video of a closed-court hearing in the family law case to Sanson, who published articles on his website concerning Abrams' courtroom conduct and practices. The articles were sent to email subscribers and published through social media outlets. Abrams sued Sanson and Schneider alleging, inter alias, defamation. The district court granted Defendants' special motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Sanson met his burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims; and (2) the district court erred as to Sanson's statements to Schoen because private telephone conversations are not statements made in a place open to the public or in a public forum. View "Abrams v. Sanson" on Justia Law