Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court awarding attorney fees in a wrongful termination suit, holding that because Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim rested on a novel yet arguable construction of the limitations period the district court should not have awarded attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b).Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination more than two years after she was terminated. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e) applied and that the wrongful termination period had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded Defendant attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred; but (2) because this Court has not previously addressed the appropriate limitations period for a wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff's argument presented a matter of first impression, and therefore, the district court should not have awarded attorney fees on the basis that Plaintiff's claim was untimely filed and thus groundless under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b). View "Patush v. Las Vegas Bistro" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to reinstate Happy Creek, Inc.'s original water rights' priority dates in equity, holding that, under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the district court properly granted equitable relief for Happy Creek.As mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.410 the State Engineer canceled Happy Creek's ground water permits after Happy Creek's agent missed a filing deadline by a few weeks. Accordingly, Happy Creek lost more than fifty years of priority in water rights despite having invested $1 million in improving water-use efficiency and having met the other substantive criteria for maintaining priority of its water rights. Happy Creek's groundwater rights were in an over-appropriated basin, and therefore, Happy Creek was threatened with complete loss of use of water. The district court granted equitable relief by restoring Happy Creek's original senior priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to State Engineer v. American National Insurance Co., 498 P.2d 1329 (Nev. 1972), and its progeny, the district court properly granted Happy Creek equitable relief. View "State Engineer v. Happy Creek, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision affirming his conviction and disagreeing with Petitioner's argument that he was erroneously denied the right to a jury trial, holding that the offense of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence is a serious offense such that the right to a jury trial is triggered.Petitioner was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Petitioner made a demand for a jury trial, but the municipal court denied the demand. Petitioner then entered a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge. Before the Supreme Court Petitioner argued that recent changes by the legislature made the offense a serious one. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because statutes now limit the right to bear arms for a person who has been convicted of misdemeanor battery constituting a domestic violence and because the Legislature has determined that the offense is a serious one, a jury trial is required. View "Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this claim for workers' compensation benefits the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court affirming the appeals officer's decisions as to compensability and liability and reversing as to the award amount, holding that the liability determination and award amount determination were improper.Plaintiff sought benefits after her husband died as a result of heart disease. The decedent's former employer and its former insurer denied benefits. The appeals officer reversed, concluding that the decedent's death was caused by a compensable occupational heart disease, that his employer was liable as the self-insurer, and that the amount of the claim was based on the decedent's income from his private employer at the time of death. The district court reversed in part, concluding that the award should be based on the decedent's wages on the date of disablement, or death, which were zero. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the last injurious exposure rule determines the liable insurer for an occupational disease claim that arose out of and in the course of employment even if the employee no longer works for that employer; and (2) death benefits should have been based on the decedent's wages at the time he last worked for the employer. View "Demaranville v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of multiple sex offenses against children and related offenses, holding that the trial judge's behavior and statements during voir dire constituted judicial misconduct and that the misconduct interfered with Defendant's right to an impartial jury.During the second day of voir dire in this case, a prospective juror stated that she did not think she could be unbiased toward Defendant. Thereafter, the trial judge threw a book against the wall, cursed, and berated, yelled at, and threatened that prospective juror. After a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on most of the counts with which Defendant was charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's misconduct during voir dire and the denial of his request for a new venire violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the judicial misconduct in this case deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. View "Azucena v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the record supported the court's conclusion that the State met its burden of proof in invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause.Relying on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception the trial court admitted the out-of-court statements despite Defendant's assertion of his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof for purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the trial court did not err in its application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to admit the witness's out-of-court statements. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

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In this case brought by Plaintiffs seeking to enforce a settlement agreement the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.995, which requires agreements that include an arbitration provision also to include a specific authorization for the arbitration provision showing that the parties affirmatively agreed to that provision.The parties in this case entered into a settlement agreement that referenced a licensing agreement that included an arbitration provision. When Plaintiffs sued to enforce the settlement agreement Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint because the settlement agreement incorporated the licensing agreement's arbitration clause. The district court concluded that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it did not include the specific authorization required by section 597.995. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute did not void the arbitration clause; and (2) the claims in the underlying complaint were subject to arbitration. View "MMAWC, LLC v. Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Respondents - Nevada Auto Dealership and its surety company, Corepointe Insurance Company - on Appellant's lawsuit brought under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600, holding that Appellant presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact under each of his claims.In his complaint, Appellant alleged that Nevada Auto knowingly failed to disclose material facts about a truck that it sold to him and misrepresented the truck's condition. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents, concluding that Appellant's deceptive trade practices claims and equitable claims all failed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to each of Appellant's statutory claims. View "Poole v. Nevada Auto Dealership Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's timely petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, holding that because Appellant did not demonstrate good cause for untimely serving the petition the district court properly dismissed the petition.Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(5), Appellant had to serve its timely filed petition for judicial review within forty-five days. Appellant, however, served the petition fifteen days after the forty-five-day deadline had passed. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that Appellant did not effect service within the required deadline and did not show good cause to extend the service deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the forty-five-day service requirement is not a jurisdictional requirement because section 233B.130(5) affords the district court discretion to extend the time frame upon a showing of good cause; but (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant failed to show good cause under the circumstances. View "Spar Business Services, Inc. v. Olson" on Justia Law

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In this case where Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360, which makes it a felony for certain categories of prohibited person to possess a firearm, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to counts one through three and reversed and remanded for a new trial as to counts four through six, holding that the State did not satisfy the status elements of the two groups of crimes Defendant was convicted of.Counts one through three charged Defendant with violating section 202.360(2)(a) for possessing firearms as a person who has "been adjudicated as mentally ill" by a state or federal court. The remaining counts charged Defendant with illegally possessing firearms based on his status as a person who is "an unlawful user" of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's assignment to and completion of a Nevada mental health court diversion program did not constitute an adjudication of mental illness that made his subsequent possession of a firearm a felony; and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury by theoretically allowing Defendant to be convicted of illegal possession of a firearm by an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance based on a single current use of the substance. View "Hager v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law