Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court setting aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale by a unit-owners’ association (UOA), holding that title vested in the purchaser’s name and that there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale.At issue in this appeal was whether a person conducting a sale under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116, governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales by a UOA, has the discretion to refuse to issue a foreclosure deed to the highest bidder at the sale after payment has been made when it is later determined that the delinquency amount may have been paid by the property owner before the sale. The Supreme Court held (1) each party in a quiet title action has the burden of demonstrating superior title in himself; (2) once a bid is accepted and payment is made, the foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser; and (3) the standard for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds is whether there has been a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression affecting the sale. In the instant case, the purchaser in this case demonstrated superior title, and there were no equitable grounds to set aside the sale. View "Resources Group, LLC v. Nevada Ass’n Services, Inc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment determining that a foreclosure sale extinguished a bank's deed of trust when an homeowner's association (HOA) agent told a deed of trust beneficiary's agent that it would reject a superpriority tender if made, holding that such a representation excludes the formal requirement of making a formal tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (2018).Here, the HOA told the deed of trust beneficiary that it would reject a superpriority tender if made. The district court ruled that the foreclosure sale extinguished Bank’s deed of trust and that the HOA's offer was insufficient to constitute a tender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an offer to make a payment at some point in the future cannot constitute a valid tender; (2) a formal tender is excused when the party entitled to payment represents that if a tender is made, it will be rejected; and (3) the deed of trust beneficiary’s agent was excused from making a formal tender in this case, and therefore, the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Jennifer Henry’s petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline’s authority to discipline her, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 1.428, the statute giving the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline its purported jurisdiction over Jennifer Henry as a hearing master, is constitutional.Henry presided over a hearing in the juvenile court, wherein she acted inappropriately. The Commission later filed a formal statement of charges for Henry’s conduct. Henry filed this petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that section 1.428 is constitutional and that Henry falls under the purview of the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Henry v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff-inmate’s complaint to the extent Plaintiff asserted state tort claims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.031 and 41.0337 but reversed the district court’s dismissal as to Plaintiff’s claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that, while a plaintiff must name the State as a party to any state tort claims to comply with sections 41.031 and 41.0337, this statutory requirement does not apply to section 1983 claims.At issue in this case was how sections 41.031 and 41.0337’s requirement that the State be named by a plaintiff as a party to invoke a waiver of Nevada’s sovereign immunity operates when a plaintiff brings an action against state employee pursuant to both those state statutes and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff asserted both state tort claims and section 1983 claims against state employees but did not name the State as party to any claims. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 41’s requirement that a plaintiff name the State as a party to any state tort claims does not apply to section 1983 claims, even when brought in the same complaint as a plaintiff’s state tort claims. View "Craig v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that where an individual has been appointed special administrator of an estate that includes residential real property, the special administrator resides in the property as his or her primary residence, and the special administrator retains an ownership interest via intestate succession laws, the special administrator is entitled to participate in a foreclosure mediation program (FMP) regarding the decedent’s residential real property, despite the fact that the property was purchased in the decedent’s name only.Appellant was the decedent’s spouse and the special administrator of the decedent’s estate. When Respondent commenced foreclosure proceedings on the home the decedent purchased in her name only, Appellant requested foreclosure mediation through Nevada’s FMP. The mediator concluded that the property was not eligible for the FMP because Appellant was not an owner or grantor of the property and because the order appointing him as special administrator did not specifically authorize him to participate in the FMP. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant obtained an ownership interest in the property upon the decedent’s death, the property served as his primary residence, and his status as special administrator authorized him to take action to preserve the decedent’s estate, Appellant was entitled to participate in the FMP. View "Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Labor Commissioner properly determined that the “repair” portion of a maintenance contract is a public work project under Nev. Rev. Stat. 338.010(15), even if the contract is predominantly for maintenance, and is thus not exempt from prevailing wage requirements.This case involved a maintenance contract for an airport shuttle system. The Labor Commissioner determined in this case that because a portion of the work under the contract in this case was repair work, that work was a “public work” project under the statute and thus subject to prevailing wage requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Labor Commissioner properly determined that twenty percent of the work involved repair rather than maintenance and was thus subject to the prevailing wage, and no exceptions applied that would allow Appellant to forego paying prevailing wages on that portion of the contract. View "Bombardier Transportation (Holdings) USA, Inc. v. Nevada Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court permitting the State to introduce evidence of prior, uncharged sexual acts committed by Appellant in the instant prosecution for a sexual offense for purposes of showing propensity under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(3), holding that the district court did not plainly err by permitting the State to introuce evidence of Appellant’s prior conduct for propensity purposes.Specifically, the Court held (1) the plain language of section 48.045(3) permits the district court to admit evidence of a separate sexual offense for purposes of proving propensity in a sexual offense prosecution; (2) while such evidence may be admitted without the district court holding a Petrocelli hearing, evidence of separate acts constituting sexual offenses must be evaluated for relevance and heightened risk of unfair prejudice; and (3) the district court did not commit plain error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior sexual acts for propensity purposes. View "Franks v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a district court order denying Appellant’s special motion to dismiss, holding that the district court properly denied Appellant’s special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes.Appellant was sued under Nevada’s Deceptive Trade Practice and RICO statutes. In denying the special motion to dismiss, the district court found that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his conduct was “a good faith communication that was either truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood,” one of the statutory requirements for anti-SLAPP protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appropriate standard of review for a district court’s denial or grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss is de novo; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s special motion to dismiss because Appellant failed to demonstrate that the challenged claims arose from activity protected by Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660. View "Coker v. Sassone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this criminal case for a new trial, holding that the district court clearly erred when it found that Defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination in challenging the State’s use of peremptory challenges to remove two African-American women during jury selection.Defendant was charged with child abuse, neglect, or endangerment and other offenses. Defendant objected to the State’s exercise of two of its peremptory challenges to remove two African-Americans from the jury. The district court denied Defendant’s Batson challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court clearly erred when it terminated the Batson analysis at step one of the three-step analysis and that the record did not clearly support the denial of Defendant’s objection. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled the holding in Ballin v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 797 P.2d 978, 980 (Nev. 1990), that an order that resolves fewer than all claims in a consolidated action is not appealable as a final judgment even if the order resolves all of the claims in one of the consolidated cases and held that an order finally resolving a constituent consolidated case is immediately appealable as a final judgment even where the other constituent case or cases remain pending.The order challenged in this appeal finally resolved one of three consolidated cases. While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that an order resolving one of several cases consolidated pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) is immediately appealable. Appellants urged the Supreme court to interpret Nev. R. Civ. P. 42(a) as the United States Supreme Court interpreted Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) in Hall. The Supreme Court concluded that compelling circumstances existed warranting departure from the doctrine of stare decisions, overruled its decision in Mallin, and concluded that the appeal in this case may proceed. View "In re Estate of Sarge" on Justia Law