Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing this litigation malpractice suit as time-barred, holding that a litigation malpractice claim accrues upon the issuance of remittitur from the Supreme Court and that, unless the remittitur is stayed, the filing of an unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court does not extend the statute of limitations.At issue in this appeal was the rule that a malpractice claim does not accrue and the two-year state of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207(1) does not start to run until the client’s damages are no longer contingent on the outcome of an appeal. Specifically at issue was how the rules applies when the client unsuccessfully petitions for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court without seeking a stay of remittitur from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held as set forth above and affirmed the district court’s order dismissing this suit as time-barred, holding that because Appellant filed its malpractice action more than two years after the Court issued the remittitur in the case involving the alleged malpractice, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint under section 11.207(1). View "Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of three count of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that the admission of photographs of the victims was an abuse of the district court’s discretion, but the error was harmless, and none of Defendant’s other claims warranted relief.After Defendant shot and killed a motorist, the motorist’s car struck a taxicab, killing the driver and a passenger. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission at trial of photographs of the taxicab victims. The Supreme Court held (1) the challenged photographs, including images of the taxicab victims’ bodies disfigured by fire and subsequent autopsies, should have been excluded because they added little to the State’s case but did create a significant risk of inflaming the jury, but the admission of the photographs was harmless; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims on appeal were unavailing. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice suit, the Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment of the district court entering judgment on the jury verdict and the district court’s orders awarding fees and costs and dismissed the cross-appeal challenging the constitutionality of Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The jury in this case found that Defendant-doctor’s negligence caused Plaintiff harm and awarded Plaintiff damages. On appeal, Defendant challenged several rulings by the district court, alleged that Plaintiff’s attorney committed misconduct in closing argument, and that the award of attorney fees and costs was an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the constitutionality of section 42.021. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in the proceedings below; and (2) Plaintiff lacked standing to appeal from the final judgment because he was not an aggrieved party. View "Capanna v. Orth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the underlying proceeding filed by the plaintiff’s attorney seeking to substitute for the deceased plaintiff where the defendant filed the suggestion of death on the record, holding that the suggestion of death filed on the record, rather than the deceased party’s actual date of death, triggers the ninety-day time limitation prescribed in Nev. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).The plaintiff’s attorney in the underlying complaint filed the motions seeking to substitute for the deceased plaintiff within ninety days of the deceased plaintiff’s actual date of death. The district court denied the motions and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plaintiff’s attorney filed the motions at issue before the expiration of the ninety-day limitation; but (2) the motions failed to identify the property party for substitution under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.100. View "Gonor v. Dale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s interlocutory appeal from a district court order granting a motion to suppress evidence, holding that the State failed to demonstrate “good cause” as contemplated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.015(2).At issue was the district court’s suppression order suppressing Defendant’s incriminating statements made during a recorded interrogation on the ground that the statements were involuntary. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to establish that a miscarriage of justice would result if the Court did not entertain its appeal. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for exploitation of a vulnerable person and theft, holding that the district court erred by instructing the jury that a person’s status as a joint account holder does not by itself provide lawful authority to use or transfer another's assets for their own benefit and that the error was not harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued, in part, that the instruction was a misstatement of law because it directly contradicts Nev. Rev. Stat. 100.085. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the instruction was inconsistent with section 100.085 and did not accurately and completely reflect the reasoning and conclusion in Walch v. State, 909 P.2d 1184 (1996); and (2) therefore, the jury instruction was not a correct statement of the law, and the error in giving the instruction was not harmless. View "Natko v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed an order of the district court awarding attorney fees against a police department ordered to return a large amount of cash and other property seized pursuant to a criminal search warrant, holding that neither Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(a) nor section 18.010(2)(b) permitted the award of attorney fees.Section 18.010(2)(a) permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action when that party recovers a money judgment in an amount less than $20,000. Plaintiff in this case sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 18.010(2) against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) after her seized property was ordered to be returned. The district court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees under section 18.010(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.010(2)(a) does not permit a fee award against LVMPD because an order to return seized cash is an order to return physical property, not a money judgment; and (2) the attorney fee award cannot be affirmed under section 18.010(2)(b) in the absence of any relevant findings or clear evidence that LVMPD brought or maintained its defense without reasonable ground. View "In re Execution of Search Warrants" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the district court that Glenn Miller Doolin was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.010, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465(8)(d) precluded application of statutory credit.In so holding, the Court reasoned that both the sentence and category of conviction are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010, and because such an adjudication will always enhance a conviction for a lower category felony to either a category A or B felony, section 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of the statutory credit to the offender’s parole eligibility and minimum term. The Court then held that where Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010(1)(a), he was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. View "Doolin v. State, Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as procedurally barred, holding that the district court did not err by finding that Defendant failed to overcome the procedural bars.Plaintiff, who was convicted of first-degree murder, filed the instant postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus more than twenty years after the remittitur was issued from his direct appeal. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to the retroactive benefit of the narrowed definition of “willful, deliberate and premeditated” murder announced in Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000) and thus was entitled to a new trial. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally time-barred, concluding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural bars. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)(b),(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. __ (2016), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016), do not constitute good cause to raise a procedurally barred claim arguing that a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively. View "Branham v. Baca" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada by holding that, under Nevada law, an insurer’s liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense. Instead, an insurer may be liable for any consequential damages caused by its breach. Further, good faith determinations are irrelevant for determining damages upon a breach of the duty to defend.Respondents filed suit against Appellant-insurer for breach of contract and other causes of action. The federal court concluded that Appellant did not act in bad faith but did breach its duty to defend. The federal court subsequently entered an order staying the proceedings until resolution of the certified question by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered as set forth above, holding that an insured may recover any damages consequential to the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend, and therefore, an insurer’s liability for breach of that duty is not capped at the policy limits, even if the insurer did not act in bad faith. View "Century Surety Co. v. Andrew" on Justia Law