Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The appellant, Barry Rashad Harris, was convicted of first-degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm, battery constituting domestic violence, misdemeanor assault, and battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, following a physical altercation with his girlfriend. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years to life. Harris filed a pro se petition for a postconviction writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of pretrial, trial, and appellate counsel. The district court appointed postconviction counsel, who supplemented the petition with additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.Due to a communication error, Harris, who was incarcerated, was not transported to attend the hearing. The district court proceeded with the hearing in Harris's absence, without a waiver from him of his statutory right to be present. The district court concluded that Harris had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the petition.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court violated Harris's statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court clarified that counsel may not waive a petitioner’s right to be present at an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction habeas petition where the record does not indicate that the petitioner personally waived the right to be present. Because the record did not support a valid waiver of the statutory right to be present at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the district court violated Harris’s statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court could not say that this error was harmless given the circumstances presented, and therefore reversed the district court’s order and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "Harris v. Warden" on Justia Law

The case involves Capital Advisors, LLC, and Danzig, Ltd., minority shareholders of Cam Group, Inc. (CAMG), who filed a shareholder derivative action against nine CAMG officers and directors. The defendants included Wei Heng Cai (Ricky) and Wei Xuan Luo (Tracy), who were the only ones to proceed to trial. The plaintiffs alleged that Ricky arranged for a $1.85 million unsecured loan at zero-percent interest to a company called Parko Ltd., and Tracy, as CFO, failed to stop the loan. The loan allegedly drained approximately 80% of the cash reserves for the consolidated CAM companies. Ricky later resigned from CAMG to focus on developing business opportunities for another company, National Agricultural Holdings Limited (NAHL), and his own company, Precursor Management Inc. (PMI).The district court granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of Ricky and Tracy, dismissing all causes of action. The court found that officers and directors of a parent company cannot be held liable for actions taken by a wholly owned subsidiary without piercing the corporate veil. The court also awarded Ricky and Tracy over $2 million in attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that officers and directors of a parent company who allow a wholly owned subsidiary to take action adverse to the parent can be held liable without use of the alter ego doctrine. The court also held that shareholders may file derivative suits against officers and directors of a parent company based on wrongful actions that occurred at a wholly owned subsidiary of a wholly owned subsidiary without asserting alter ego. The court concluded that the district court erred by finding that officers and directors of a parent company cannot be held liable for actions taken by a wholly owned subsidiary without piercing the corporate veil. The court also found that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law as to some of their causes of action. View "CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC VS. CAI" on Justia Law

The case involves Jesse Calvin Gilbert, who was pulled over by a law enforcement deputy due to a non-operating license plate light. Gilbert was arrested on an active warrant, and the deputy conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. During the search, the deputy found a handgun under the driver's seat. Gilbert, an ex-felon, was charged with possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was not a true inventory search but a ruse to conduct an investigatory search.The district court denied Gilbert's motion, finding that the deputy appropriately impounded the vehicle and the inventory search was reasonable. Gilbert appealed his subsequent conviction based on the search and the unsuppressed evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that an investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search as long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have happened absent any such motivation. The court also stated that a court deciding a suppression motion must determine the search's reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances by evaluating the extent to which law enforcement departed from the standardized procedures, whether the scope of the search was as expected in light of the underlying justifications for inventory searches, and whether the inventory produced served the purposes of an inventory search. The court concluded that the search was reasonable and denied Gilbert's motion to suppress. View "GILBERT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the City of Las Vegas and 180 Land Co., LLC over a 35-acre parcel of land. 180 Land Co. purchased the land, which was part of a larger 250-acre golf course, with the intention of developing it for residential use. The land was zoned for residential development, but was also designated as "Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space" in the city's General Plan. The City of Las Vegas denied 180 Land Co.'s applications to develop the property, citing public opposition and concerns about piecemeal development.In response, 180 Land Co. sued the City for inverse condemnation, arguing that the City's actions had deprived it of all economically beneficial use of the property. The district court agreed, finding that the City's handling of 180 Land Co.'s development efforts rendered any future attempts to develop the property futile. The court also ruled that the residential zoning of the property took precedence over the open space designation in the General Plan. The court awarded 180 Land Co. $48 million in compensation, including the value of the property, property taxes, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.The City appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in determining that a regulatory taking had occurred and in its calculation of the compensation award. 180 Land Co. also appealed, challenging the amount of prejudgment interest awarded by the district court.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety. The court agreed that the City's actions constituted a per se regulatory taking and that 180 Land Co. was entitled to just compensation. The court also upheld the district court's calculation of the compensation award, including the amount of prejudgment interest. View "City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague. View "Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, D.C. Jr., who was charged with murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. Jr., who has an IQ of 66, was 14 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. His counsel requested a competency determination before proceeding to the certification hearing. After an initial finding of incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile court declared D.C. Jr. competent to proceed. However, the court did not explicitly address the conflicting expert testimony regarding D.C. Jr.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel.The juvenile court certified D.C. Jr. for prosecution as an adult. The court's decision was based on the assumption that the competency standards for juvenile court applied, which was a mistake. The court did not adequately support its determination with findings, and it appears to have applied an incorrect standard.The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the certification order and the competency determination. The court held that a juvenile facing the possibility of prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges must meet the adult criminal court standard for competence. The court remanded the case for the juvenile court to reassess D.C. Jr.'s competency using the correct standard. The court emphasized that the stakes were high, and the record did not show that the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C. Jr.'s competency to proceed. The court also vacated the order certifying D.C. Jr. for criminal proceedings as an adult, which followed the competency determination. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Laura Graham against International Property Holdings, LLC (IPH) and its sole member, Ovidiu Ene. Graham sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a sprinkler box on IPH's property. During the trial, Graham moved to assert that Ene was the alter ego of IPH, meaning he should be held personally liable for the injuries she sustained on the company's property.The district court found that Ene, as the sole member and manager of IPH, was indeed the alter ego of the company. The court based its decision on several factors: Ene had his own personal gate code to the property and used it for personal reasons without paying IPH or the property management company; Ene's father maintained a garden and a chicken coop on the property; the property's insurance was in Ene's name; and Ene remained the guarantor on the mortgage loan for the property.The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed with the district court's findings. The court clarified that the alter ego analysis for a limited liability company is the same as the analysis applied to a corporation. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the district court's determination that Ene was the alter ego of IPH. The court concluded that while Ene did influence and govern IPH, there was not a unity of interest and ownership such that Ene and IPH were inseparable. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that recognizing IPH as a separate entity from Ene would sanction fraud or promote injustice. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ene v. Graham" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a property dispute between two neighboring parties, Bo and Dan Jones (appellants), and Hamed Ghadiri (respondent). A block wall, erected before either party owned their respective properties, did not follow the property line, resulting in Ghadiri being denied use of a portion of his property. When Ghadiri sought to remove the wall and build a new one on the property line, the Joneses filed a complaint in the district court for a prescriptive easement or adverse possession.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. It found that the Joneses could not claim adverse possession as they had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. It also ruled that a prescriptive easement was unavailable as it would result in Ghadiri's complete exclusion from the subject property. The Joneses appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified the distinction between adverse possession and prescriptive easements, noting that the former results in the acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property, while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property. The court acknowledged that comprehensive prescriptive easements, which result in the owner of the servient estate being completely excluded from the subject property, may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. However, it found that the Joneses had not demonstrated such exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. View "Jones v. Ghadiri" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an initiative petition proposed by Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom (NRF) to establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom. The petition would grant every individual the right to make decisions regarding all matters related to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Respondents Donna Washington and Coalition for Parents and Children challenged the petition in district court, alleging that it failed to meet statutory and constitutional requirements and sought to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. They argued that the initiative petition violated the single-subject requirement because it considered multiple medical procedures, instead of being limited to only pregnancy or abortion. The district court granted the injunction, finding the initiative petition invalid for three reasons: it does not contain a single subject, its description of effect is misleading, and it requires an expenditure of money without raising the necessary revenue.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision. The court found that all the medical procedures considered in the initiative petition concern reproduction and are germane to each other and the initiative's single subject of establishing a right to reproductive freedom. The court also concluded that the description of effect was legally sufficient and the initiative petition does not require an expenditure of funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in preventing the Secretary of State from placing the initiative petition on the ballot. View "Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lance and Eva Posner purchased a property with an outstanding loan secured by a deed of trust, which they assumed responsibility for. The deed of trust was later assigned to U.S. Bank. In 2012, U.S. Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against the Posners, alleging that the amount owing under the note had become accelerated. However, U.S. Bank did not pursue the judicial foreclosure and voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit without prejudice in 2013. The Posners remained in default on the loan through 2019.U.S. Bank's dismissal of its judicial foreclosure action led to a dispute in 2022. The Posners filed a state-court action asserting a claim for quiet title, alleging that the 10-year period in NRS 106.240 was triggered in 2012 when U.S. Bank filed its judicial foreclosure action, such that by 2022, the deed of trust had been extinguished as a matter of law. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent U.S. Bank's scheduled nonjudicial foreclosure sale.The district court denied the request for an injunction, finding the Posners' claims had no likelihood of success. The Posners appealed, arguing that the district court erred in relying on NRS 107.550, which only applies to judicial foreclosure actions commenced on or after October 1, 2013.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that instituting judicial foreclosure proceedings does not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. The court concluded that the Posners' quiet title claim had no likelihood of success on the merits because the judicial foreclosure action did not trigger the 10-year time frame in NRS 106.240. Therefore, the lien on the subject property was not discharged as a matter of law in 2022. View "Posner v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law