Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case requiring the correct interpretation of the garbage lien statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 444.520, and the procedures required to perfect and foreclose on a garbage lien the Supreme Court held that the reference to the mechanics' lien statute in Nev. Rev. Stat. 444.520(3) incorporates only the mechanics' lien statute's procedural requirements for foreclosure, as set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 108.226 and that no limitations period applies to the foreclosure of a garbage lien.The district court concluded that Appellant, a municipal waste company, did not properly record a garbage lien because it failed to record it within ninety days of the completion of the work. Alternatively, the district court held that Appellant could not foreclose on its liens because a two-year limitations period applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court erred in applying both the lien perfection requirements set forth in section 108.226 and the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(b) to the foreclosure of those liens under section 444.520; and (2) a garbage lien is not subject to the statute of limitations, and therefore, Appellant may foreclose upon such a lien at any time so long as it properly perfects the lien under section 444.520(4). View "Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. v. West Taylor Street, LLC" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellants' claims, holding that the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Respondents were time barred by Nevada's statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims.Appellants filed a complaint in Nevada's federal district court claiming legal malpractice as to Charles Damus, Esq. The federal court granted Damus' motion to dismiss. While the federal action was ongoing Appellants entered into a legal services agreement with Respondents. Appellants later filed a malpractice complaint in state court against Respondents arguing that Respondents failed to sue Damus in state court. At issue was the interplay between Nevada's litigation malpractice tolling rule and 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), a federal tolling statute, on a legal malpractice claim. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held (1) 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) tolled claims brought by Appellants only until the claims were dismissed, and therefore, the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Damus were tolled until the remaining claims in the federal action were also dismissed; and (2) the litigation malpractice tolling rule did not apply to the claims against Respondents, and therefore, the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Respondents were time-barred. View "Kim v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault but upheld his remaining convictions for other sexually-related counts, including attempted sexual assault, holding that there was insufficient evidence for the sexual assault conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred when it allowed the victim to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and that the district court erred in convicting him of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault because they were based on the same underlying conduct. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim, who was admitted to an out-of-state residential treatment center, to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission at trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial without holding a competency hearing; and (3) the State should have charged the sexual assault and attempted sexual assault counts in the alternative, which it did not, and the district court compounded the error by convicting Defendant of both counts. View "Lipsitz v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting judicial review of the decision of the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Board to overturn a workplace safety citation on the basis that Employer lacked knowledge of the violative conduct, holding that the Review Board properly overturned the citation for lack of Employer knowledge.Employer challenged a citation issued for a workplace safety violation based on violative conduct of a supervisor, arguing that Employer did not have actual knowledge of the violative conduct or that the supervisor's violative conduct was foreseeable under the circumstances presented. The Review Board held a hearing on Employer's complaint and concluded that Respondent, Nevada's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA), failed to demonstrate a violation of OSHA law. The district court reversed the order, holding that the Review Board lacked sufficient evidence to support its factual findings and legal conclusions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Review Board's conclusion that NOSHA failed to demonstrate Employer's knowledge of the violative conduct at issue in this case. View "Original Roofing Co. v. Chief Administrative Officer of Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this contract action, holding that any failure by landlords to strictly comply with any contractual notice provisions when declaring a lease in default is excused when the allegedly defaulting party receives actual notice of the default despite noncompliance.Treasure Island, LLC and its prime tenant, Rose, LLC, entered into a lease for space inside of Treasure Island's hotel/casino that was subleased to Señor Frog's and used to operate a restaurant. Treasure Island declared the lease in default when Rose failed to make timely rent payments. Thereafter, Treasure Island sued Rose alleging breach of the lease agreement and seeking declaratory relief. Rose counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory relief, arguing (1) the district court erred in declaring the lease terminated because Treasure Island failed to give proper notice of the default, and (2) the judgment was void because Señor Frog's was a necessary party and was not joined in the action in violation of Nev. R. Civ. P. 19. The trial court entered judgment for Treasure Island. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rose suffered no prejudice because it received actual notice of the default; and (2) Señor Frog's was not a necessary party to the litigation. View "Rose, LLC v. Treasure Island, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's procedurally barred postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was entitled to a new penalty hearing, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the procedural bars.Defendant claimed that he demonstrated good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars based on Hurst v. Florida, 477 U.S. __ (2016). Specifically, Defendant that Hurst established that the weighing component of Nevada's death penalty procedures is a "fact" that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that Hurst clarified that all eligibility determinations are subject to the beyond the reasonable doubt standard. The Supreme Court previously rejected the first argument in Jeremais v. State, 412 P.3d 43 (Nev. 2018), and rejected the second argument in Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235 (Nev. 2011). The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly denied Defendant's petition because Defendant failed to demonstrate that these prior decisions were incorrect or that Hurst compelled a different result. View "Castillo v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction resulting in Defendant receiving a longer sentence after successfully appealing his first conviction, holding that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a different judge imposes a more severe sentence.On appeal from his first conviction Defendant received a new trial and sentencing hearing before a new district court judge. Following the second trial the judge imposed a longer sentence on some counts than the original judge had. Defendant appealed, arguing that the more severe sentence violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a different judge presided over Defendant's second trial and at sentencing, due process did not require a presumption of vindictiveness. View "Bowser v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court dismissing Michael Tricarichi's fraud, conspiracy, and racketeering claims against Respondents, holding that Tricarichi failed to establish personal jurisdiction.Tricarichi brought this action alleging that Respondents lured him into an intermediary tax shelter scheme that left him liable as a transferee for a multimillion federal tax deficiency and penalty. The district court dismissed Tricarichi's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Respondents lacked minimal contacts with Nevada to satisfy due process and support personal jurisdiction; and (2) Nevada's long-arm statute encompasses a conspiracy-based theory of personal jurisdiction, which this Court adopts as a basis upon which specific jurisdiction may lie, but Tricarichi failed to establish personal jurisdiction under that theory. View "Tricarichi v. Coöperatieve Rabobank, U.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the petition filed by the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) seeking judicial review of a hearing officer's decision to reinstate Brian Ludwick's employment after NDOC terminated Ludwick for a first-time offense, holding that the hearing officer committed legal error in relying on an invalid regulation to set aside Ludwick's termination.The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the hearing officer erred in relying on a regulation that the State Personnel Commission had not approved as statutorily required; and (2) in light of O'Keefe v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 431 P.3d 350 (Nev. 2018), the hearing officer did not properly consider whether Ludwick's actions constituted violations of the valid regulations NDOC charged him with violating and, if so, whether those violations warranted termination as a first-time disciplinary measure. View "State, Department of Corrections v. Ludwick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the State Engineer granting Intermountain Water Supply Ltd., which held water rights permits to transmit water to Lemmon Valley for municipal use, an extension of time in which to apply the water to beneficial use, holding that the anti-speculation doctrine applies to requests for extensions of time and that Intermountain failed to show reasonable diligence to apply the water to beneficial use.In its extension request, Intermountain submitted an affidavit claiming that it had an option agreement with two unidentified "worldwide engineering and construction firms." The Supreme Court held (1) a generic option contract does not save an applicant from the anti-speculation doctrine, and the State Engineer abused his discretion in determining that Intermountain's averred option agreements satisfied the anti-speculation doctrine; and (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate reasonable diligence under Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.380(3)-(4) and Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 841 (Nev. 1997). View "Sierra Pacific Industries v. Wilson" on Justia Law