Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the district court that Glenn Miller Doolin was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.010, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465(8)(d) precluded application of statutory credit.In so holding, the Court reasoned that both the sentence and category of conviction are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010, and because such an adjudication will always enhance a conviction for a lower category felony to either a category A or B felony, section 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of the statutory credit to the offender’s parole eligibility and minimum term. The Court then held that where Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010(1)(a), he was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. View "Doolin v. State, Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as procedurally barred, holding that the district court did not err by finding that Defendant failed to overcome the procedural bars.Plaintiff, who was convicted of first-degree murder, filed the instant postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus more than twenty years after the remittitur was issued from his direct appeal. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to the retroactive benefit of the narrowed definition of “willful, deliberate and premeditated” murder announced in Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000) and thus was entitled to a new trial. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally time-barred, concluding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural bars. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)(b),(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. __ (2016), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016), do not constitute good cause to raise a procedurally barred claim arguing that a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively. View "Branham v. Baca" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada by holding that, under Nevada law, an insurer’s liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense. Instead, an insurer may be liable for any consequential damages caused by its breach. Further, good faith determinations are irrelevant for determining damages upon a breach of the duty to defend.Respondents filed suit against Appellant-insurer for breach of contract and other causes of action. The federal court concluded that Appellant did not act in bad faith but did breach its duty to defend. The federal court subsequently entered an order staying the proceedings until resolution of the certified question by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered as set forth above, holding that an insured may recover any damages consequential to the insurer’s breach of its duty to defend, and therefore, an insurer’s liability for breach of that duty is not capped at the policy limits, even if the insurer did not act in bad faith. View "Century Surety Co. v. Andrew" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a library district, holding that Senate Bill 175 (SB 175) does not preempt a library district from banning the possession of firearms on its premises.In 2015, the Legislature enacted SB 175, which declares that the regulation of firearms in the State is within the exclusive domain of the Legislature and that any other law, regulation, or rule to the contrary is null and void. The library district in this case had a policy prohibiting patrons from bringing firearms onto the district’s premises. Plaintiff filed a declaratory relief action seeking a ruling that SB 175 preempted the district from enforcing its policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the library district. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because SB 175’s plain language expressly pertains only to counties, cities, or towns with respect to firearm regulation, library districts are not within the field of governmental entities that the Legislature expressly stated SB 175 would preempt. View "Flores v. Las Vegas-Clark County Library District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting a petition for review of a decision of a hearing officer to reinstate a classified employee after that employee was terminated by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), holding that the hearing officer applied the wrong standard of review.After the DMV terminated the employee’s employment for disciplinary reasons, the employee requested a hearing to challenge the decision. The hearing officer reversed the DMV’s decision to terminate the employee and recommended the lesser discipline of a suspension. The district court granted the DMV’s petition for judicial review and set aside the hearing officer’s decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whether the employee violated a law or regulation is reviewed de novo, but the agency’s decision to terminate the employee is entitled to deference; and (2) the hearing officer did not apply that deferential standard in this case. View "O’Keefe v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

At issue was the correct interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.578, under which an employer may qualify for reimbursement on a workers’ compensation claim if the employer proves that it retained its employee after requiring knowledge of the employee’s permanent physical impairment and before a subsequent injury occurs.After noting that the statutory definition of a “permanent physical impairment” must support a rating of permanent impairment of six percent or more of the whole person the Supreme Court held (1) section 616B.578 requires an employer to prove that it had knowledge of a preexisting permanent physical impairment that would support a rating of at least six percent whole person impairment; (2) the statute cannot be reasonably interpreted to require knowledge of a specific medical diagnosis for an employer to successfully seek reimbursement; and (3) in the instant case, because it was unclear whether the employer knew of any permanent condition that hindered the employee’s employment and whether it could be fairly and reasonably inferred from the record that the employer knew of the employee’s preexisting physical impairment supporting a rating of at least six percent whole person impairment, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District v. Board of Administration of Subsequent Injury Account for Associations of Self-Insured Public or Private Employers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding that the district court had authority to order the State to share criminal history information obtained from databases to which the defense did not have access.Francisco Ojeda, who was charged with murder, filed a pretrial motion seeking an order compelling the State to disclose the criminal histories of veniremembers before jury selection. The district court granted the motion, grounding its authority to order disclosure in Nev. Rev. Stat. 179A.100(7)(j). Thereafter, the State filed the instant petition arguing that the district court did not have the authority to compel the disclosure of the veniremembers’ criminal history records. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) a district court has the authority compel the State to disclose veniremegber criminal histories; and (2) the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in requiring the State to share veniremember criminal history information. View "State v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of battery resulting in substantial bodily harm committed against an older person, holding that the district court did not impermissibly impose double sentencing enhancements for the same primary offense.The district court sentenced Defendant to a maximum of sixty months’ imprisonment for the crime of battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(b) and an additional 120 months’ maximum imprisonment for committing that crime against an older person under Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.167. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the addition of an older person enhancement to Defendant’s sentence under section 200.481(2)(b) did not violate Nevada law prohibiting multiple sentencing enhancements for the same primary offense because the statute is not an enhancement statute. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court’s decision finding Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.290(2) unconstitutional and striking the unconstitutional language from the statute, holding that the statute, which grants the prosecutor veto power over a district court’s sentencing decision, violates Nevada’s separation of powers doctrine.Matthew Green Hearn pleaded guilty to battery by a prisoner. A specialty courts officer deemed Hearn eligible for the veterans court, but at sentencing, the State refused to stipulate to Hearn’s assignment to veterans court pursuant to section 176A.290(2). The district court concluded that the statute violates the separation of powers doctrine by conditioning the judicial department’s discretion to place certain offenders into a treatment program on the prosecutor’s stipulation. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court, holding (1) because section 176A.290(2) grants a prosecutor veto power over a district court’s sentencing decision, the district court correctly deemed the statute unconstitutional; and (2) the district court correctly determined that the unconstitutional language was severable. View "State v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s special motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint filed under Nev. Rev. Sta. 41.660(1), Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, holding that an attorney’s statement on a website summarizing a jury’s verdict was not a statement in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body.Under section 41.660(1), a defendant may file a special motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint if the complaint is based on a defendant’s “good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern,” including a “statement made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a…judicial body.” Plaintiff brought an action asserting defamation per se for the attorney’s statement on a website. The district court denied Defendant’s special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statement was not protected under section 41.660. View "Patin v. Lee" on Justia Law