Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over a noncompete agreement (NCA) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that an NCA must be limited to the geographical areas in which an employer has particular business interests and emphasized that this precedent remains applicable in instances where the NCA imposes a nationwide restriction on the former employee. The Court further clarified that an employer seeking a preliminary injunction enforcing an NCA bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the NCA’s reasonableness.In this dispute over an NCA, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Respondent, an employer, seeking to enforce the terms of a noncompete agreement (NCA) against Appellant, a former employee, holding that Respondent failed to make a prima facie showing that the NCA was reasonable by showing its restrictions did not extend beyond date geographical areas in which Respondent conducted business. View "Shores v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board’s use of the Static-99R recidivism risk assessment comports with Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.1214’s assessment requirements, that changes to parole procedures do not constitute an ex post facto violation, and that the use of the Static-99R assessment does not violate an inmate’s due process rights.As part of Appellant’s parole review, his recidivism risk was assessed with the Static-99R risk assessment. The assessment classified Appellant as a high risk to recidivate, and the Parole Board denied parole. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the Static-99R assessment. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the Static-99R assessment was not formally adopted as or determined to be a “currently accepted standard of assessment” for use in Appellant’s parole hearing; (2) because Appellant failed to show that changes to the parole statute enacted after his conviction created a risk of prolonged imprisonment, they did not constitute impermissible ex post facto punishment; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the use of the Static-99R violated his due process rights. View "Coles v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Supreme Court should adopt a rule of admissibility that would limit the use of a probationer’s testimony at a revocation hearing in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The issue stemmed from the tension between the due process right to have an opportunity to be heard and present mitigating evidence at a revocation hearing and the right against self-incrimination as to criminal charges related to the alleged probation violation.The Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers and adopted an admissibility rule in the interest of basic fairness and the administration of justice to limit the use of a probation’s testimony given at a probation revocation hearing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment based upon discretionary-act immunity in this action arising from a vehicular accident involving a police officer responding to an emergency.A police officer collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle while responding to an emergency call early one morning. Plaintiff sued the officer and the City of North Las Vegas, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the doctrine of discretionary-act immunity provided them with qualified immunity.In resolving this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the tension between Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.032(2), which provides immunity to government officials acting within their discretionary purview, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 484B.700, which allows a police officer to proceed past a red traffic signal in an emergency subject to certain conditions. The Court held (1) the discretionary-act immunity is unavailable in this case because the language of section 484B.700(4) mandates that the police officer drive with due regard for the safety of others, and this duty is not discretionary; and (2) the police officer in the instant case breached section 484B.700(4)’s duty of care. View "Glover-Armont v. Cargile" on Justia Law

When a plea agreement allows a defendant to plead guilty to a first offense for a second domestic battery conviction, it is reasonable for the defendant to expect first-offense treatment of the conviction for all purposes unless the defendant receives appropriate warning, or explicitly agrees, that the State may count the conviction as a second offense for future enhancement purposes.At issue was the increasingly serious penalties imposed by Nevada law on repeat domestic battery offenders, a first such offense being a misdemeanor and a third offense within seven years constituting a felony. John Kephart was convicted of domestic battery, his third such offense in seven years. Kephart’s second domestic battery conviction resulted from a plea bargain by which Kephart pleaded guilty to a “first offense” domestic battery. The district court refused to consider Kephart’s second “first offense” conviction at sentencing for enhancement purposes because it would be "unfair." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that using Kephart’s two prior “first offense” convictions to enhance his third domestic battery conviction to a felony did not violate the plea bargain by which the second conviction was obtained because, before entering his plea, Kephart acknowledged that the State could use the second “first offense” and any prior offenses for enhancement purposes should Kephart commit another domestic battery within seven years. View "State v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Wynn Las Vegas, LLC in its breach of contract action to collect $1 million in unpaid casino markers from Appellant, holding that the district court erred when it precluded Appellant from testifying at trial by video conference from Italy and excluded evidence of his intoxication.The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion under the Nevada Supreme Court Rules Part IX-B(B) when it summarily denied Appellant’s request to testify at trial via video conference and an interpreter; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it applied an incorrect standard to exclude any evidence of intoxication. View "LaBarbera v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

The foreclosure sale in this case was not invalid due to a lack of notice.At issue was the competing interests of the purchase of property at a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale and the beneficiary of a deed of trust on that property at the time of the sale. The district court determined that Respondent’s deed of trust survived the HOA foreclosure sale where the HOA failed to provide the statutorily required preforeclosure notice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Respondent’s rights were not prejudiced by the HOA’s failure to provide the preforeclosure notice, the district court erred in holding that the defective notice allowed Respondent’s deed of trust to survive the foreclosure sale. View "West Sunset 2050 Trust v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting uncharged acts as evidence in this juvenile proceeding.The State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court charging N.J. with one count of battery and one count of harassment. N.J. objected to the admission of testimony regarding two uncharged acts. The district court overruled the objections based on the res gestae doctrine and adjudicated N.J. delinquent on both counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony regarding the two uncharged acts. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

The district court erred in awarding Respondent costs and attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(8) after Respondent successfully obtained a judgment quieting title against Appellant.After acquiring interest in a property pursuant to a homeowners’ association foreclosure sale Respondent filed an action to quiet title pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.010, claiming that the section 116.3116 foreclosure sale at which it acquired title extinguished all junior liens. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent requested costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 116.3116(8). The district court granted Respondent’s request on the basis that Respondent’s claims were brought under section 116.3116. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent was not entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 116.3116(8) because Respondent’s action was not brought under section 116.3116. Rather, Respondent’s action was brought under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.010 et seq., which authorizes actions to quiet title. View "Carrington Mortgage Holdings LLC v. R Ventures VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant’s request to represent himself was properly denied as “untimely” when the request was made twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled trial date.Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, first degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his deadly weapon sentencing enhancements, holding (1) under Lyons v. State, 796 P.2d 210 (Nev. 1990), which is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, a defendant’s request to represent himself may be denied as untimely if granting it will delay trial; (2) the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant’s convictions for robbery and kidnapping even when both convictions stemmed from Defendant’s actions over the course of a single incident; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that Defendant’s “weapon” satisfied an applicable definition of deadly weapon. View "Guerrina v. State" on Justia Law