Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Striking a prospective juror based on sexual orientation is impermissible under the United States and Nevada Constitutions.The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for robbery and misdemeanor battery, holding that the district court did not commit any error from the time it held a competency hearing for Defendant to when it entered the judgment of conviction. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err with respect to Defendant’s competency hearing; (2) the delay in Defendant’s subsequent transfer to a psychiatric facility for the purpose of restoring competency to stand trial did not warrant dismissal of the charges; (3) the district court did not err with respect to jury selection and closing arguments; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.604, which prohibits a person from knowingly and intentionally capturing an image of another person’s private area without her consent under circumstances in which she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, does not prohibit a person from copying, without permission, a consensually recorded video depicting sexual acts.Defendant, a police officer, was charged and convicted of violating section 200.604 for copying sexual videos of an arrestee and her boyfriend on the arrestee’s cell phone. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because he did not take a video of the arrestee’s physical body directly. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that section 200.604 does not criminalize copying a consensually recorded image of a sexual act. View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

A familial placement preference survives the termination of parental rights, but the placement preference is then governed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.110(2) rather than Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.550(5).These consolidated petitions for writs of mandamus challenged a district court order directing that a minor child be removed from her adoptive foster home and placed with maternal relatives based on a familial placement preference under section 432B.550(5). The placement order was entered after parental rights to the child were terminated. The Supreme Court granted the writs, holding (1) the district court erred in applying the familial placement preference under section 432B.550(5) because section 128.110(2) was the applicable standard; (2) the maternal relatives had a reasonable excuse for their delay in seeking placement, and they were entitled to a familial placement preference; but (3) the district court failed to set forth adequate factual findings concerning the child’s best interest or give appropriate weight to the Department of Family Services’ discretion to determine placement under section 128.110(2). View "Philip R. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The common law absolute privilege has been abrogated by the statutory conditional privilege in Nev. Rev. Stat. 616D.020 in the context of defamatory statements in a workers’ compensation claim to which section 616D.020 is applicable.Appellant filed a complaint against Respondents, the company that employed him and the company's owner, for defamation. The allegedly defamatory statements regarded Appellant’s alleged abuse of the workers’ compensation program to obtain prescription pain medication, a violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616D.300. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). The district court granted the motion, concluding that Respondents’ statements were absolutely privileged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that all of Respondents’ statements were absolutely privileged justifying dismissal of the complaint, as a matter of law, without considering the impact of the conditional privilege provided in section 616D.020. View "Fitzgerald v. Mobile Billboards, LLC" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 600A.030 does not preclude a defendant from demonstrating that certain information is readily ascertainable and not a trade secret even where the defendant acquired the information through improper means.An employee of Peppermill Casino, Inc. accessed slot machines of a casino owned by MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC (GSR) to obtain their theoretical hold percentage information (par values). GSR filed suit against Peppermill and its employee, asserting violation of Nevada’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Peppermill, finding that GSR’s stolen par values did not constitute a trade secret under section 600A.030 because GSR had failed to prove that its par information was not readily ascertainable by proper means. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in instructing the jury concerning trade secrets under section 600A.030; and (2) GSR’s other assignments of error lacked merit. View "MEI-GSR Holding, LLC v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

Here, the Supreme Court adopted the common interest rule that allows attorneys to share work product with third parties that have common interest in litigation without waiving the work-product privilege.Petitioner shared purported work-product material through emails with third parties who were intervening plaintiffs in the litigation and were suing the same defendants on similar issues. The district court concluded, without reviewing the emails, that Petitioner must disclose the emails based on his insufficient showing of common interest between him and the intervening plaintiffs. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief and directed the district court to refrain from compelling disclosure of the emails before it conducts an in camera review to establish clear findings concerning the work-product privilege, holding that Petitioner and the intervening Plaintiffs shared common interest in litigation. View "Cotter v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The time limitations set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.080(5)-(6) do not apply to an action challenging a Nev. Rev. Stat. chapter 107 nonjudicial foreclosure where it is alleged that the deed of trust had been extinguished before the sale because such an action challenges the authority to conduct the sale, rather than the manner in which the foreclosure was conducted.Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations in section 107.080(5)-(6) because Plaintiff failed to file its complaint within ninety or 120 days of the deed-of-trust foreclosure sale. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 107.080(5) only applies to actions challenging the procedural aspects of a nonjudicial deed-of-trust foreclosure sale; and (2) Plaintiff’s action for quiet title in this case was appropriately governed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.080, which provides for a five-year statute of limitations. View "Las Vegas Development Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Where the record showed that, when faced with a resign-or-be-fired option, Appellant’s decision to resign was freely given and stemming from his own choice, such a resignation was voluntary pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.380.Appellant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Employment Security Division (ESD). An ESD claims adjudicator denied the claim based on section 612.380, stating that Appellant voluntarily resigned because he resigned from his employment in anticipation of being discharged or laid off. An administrative referee and Board of Review upheld the decision. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant voluntarily resigned pursuant to section 612.380; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals referee’s determination that Appellant lacked good cause to resign, which rendered him ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Dolores v. State, Department of Employment Security Division" on Justia Law

Nev. R. Civ. P. 62(d) must be read in conjunction with Nev. R. Civ. P. 62(e) such that, upon motion, state and local government appellants are generally entitled to a stay of a money judgment pending appeal without being required to post a supersedes bond or other security.The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner’s motion to stay enforcement of the attorney fees and costs judgment awarded to Las Vegas Review-Journal (LVRJ) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 239.011(2) after LVRJ prevailed on its public records request to obtain certain autopsy reports. The Court held that, under rules 62(d) and 62(e), the Coroner’s Office, as a local government entity that moved for a stay, was entitled to a stay of the money judgment without bond or other security as a matter of right. View "Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner v. Las Vegas Review-Journal" on Justia Law

In this construction defect action brought by Homeowners, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not govern the arbitration agreement contained in the common-interest community’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) because, contrary to the conclusion of the district court, the underlying transaction involved interstate commerce. Further, to the extent that Nevada case law concerning procedural unconscionability disfavors arbitration of disputes over transactions involving interstate commerce, that case law is preempted by the FAA. The Court remanded this case for entry of an order directing the parties to arbitration. View "U.S. Home Corp. v. Michael Ballesteros Trust" on Justia Law