Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Enacted in 2005, in response to the "debt treadmill," NRS Chapter 604A regulates the payday loan industry, including deferred deposit loans and loans with an annual interest rate greater than 40 percent. If a borrower cannot repay such a loan within 35 days, NRS 604A.480 subsection 1 allows for an extension but a licensee cannot extend the period beyond 60 days and cannot "add any unpaid interest or other charges accrued ... to the principal amount of the new deferred deposit loan or high-interest loan." However, under subsection 2, certain new deferred deposit or high-interest loans are exempt from those restrictions: A licensee may offer a new loan to satisfy an outstanding loan for a period of not less than 150 days and at an interest rate of less than 200 percent. The licensee must follow all of subsection 2's requirements for the new loan to be exempted. Subsection (2)(f) permits a loan under subsection 2 if the licensee does “not commence any civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension or repayment plan thereof." Reversing the district court, the Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 604A.480(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on a refinancing loan made under NRS 604A.480(2) and is not merely a condition precedent to making a refinancing loan under the subsection. View "State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. Dollar Loan Center., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of one count each of conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon and two counts each of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and murder with the use of a deadly weapon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated right to a public trial by closing the courtroom to members of the public during jury selection without making sufficient findings to warrant the closure. The Supreme Court held that, under Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010), this violation constituted structural error, but because Defendant did not preserve the error for appellate review, under Nevada law, Defendant must demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights. Following the United States Supreme Court’s guidance in Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. __ (2017), the Supreme Court held that Defendant failed to satisfy plain error review. Further, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his other claims, and Defendant’s death sentences were supported by review of the record under Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.055(2). View "Jeremias v. State" on Justia Law

The Dezzanis own a condominium and are members of the Homeowners' Association (HOA). Kern, an attorney, represents the HOA and advises its governing board. In a dispute regarding an extended deck on the Dezzani unit, the board issued a notice of violation with drafting assistance from Kern. Kern notified the Dezzanis that she represented the HOA. Kern and the Dezzanis exchanged several letters. The board held a hearing and upheld the notice. Throughout this time, Kern advised the HOA regarding the Dezzanis' and other members' deck extensions. The Dezzanis filed suit against Kern under NRS 116.31183, which allows a unit owner to bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs when an “executive board, a member of an executive board, a community manager or an officer, employee or agent of an association" takes retaliatory action against a unit's owner. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of their action, noting that the Dezzanis did not specify how Kern retaliated against them. An attorney is not an "agent" under NRS 116.31183 for claims of retaliatory action where the attorney is providing legal services for a common-interest community homeowners' association. In a consolidated case, the court held that attorneys litigating pro se and/or on behalf of their law firms cannot recover fees because those fees were not actually incurred by the attorney or the law firm, but they can recover taxable costs in the action. View "Dezzani v. Kern & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Dezzanis own a condominium and are members of the Homeowners' Association (HOA). Kern, an attorney, represents the HOA and advises its governing board. In a dispute regarding an extended deck on the Dezzani unit, the board issued a notice of violation with drafting assistance from Kern. Kern notified the Dezzanis that she represented the HOA. Kern and the Dezzanis exchanged several letters. The board held a hearing and upheld the notice. Throughout this time, Kern advised the HOA regarding the Dezzanis' and other members' deck extensions. The Dezzanis filed suit against Kern under NRS 116.31183, which allows a unit owner to bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs when an “executive board, a member of an executive board, a community manager or an officer, employee or agent of an association" takes retaliatory action against a unit's owner. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of their action, noting that the Dezzanis did not specify how Kern retaliated against them. An attorney is not an "agent" under NRS 116.31183 for claims of retaliatory action where the attorney is providing legal services for a common-interest community homeowners' association. In a consolidated case, the court held that attorneys litigating pro se and/or on behalf of their law firms cannot recover fees because those fees were not actually incurred by the attorney or the law firm, but they can recover taxable costs in the action. View "Dezzani v. Kern & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants’ petitions for judicial review challenging a 2007 decision by the Nevada Tax Commission regarding a tax refund request, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petitions for judicial review because they were untimely.In 2008, Appellants filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for judicial review (Case 3). The ALJ affirmed the Commission’s 2007 decision. In 2014, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Appellants then filed a second petition for judicial review (Case 4) challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision. The district court consolidated the Case 3 and Case 4 petitions for judicial review and affirmed the Commission’s 2007 and 2014 decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ Case 3 petition for judicial review and thus lacked the authority to consider the merits of Appellants’ Case 4 petition. View "K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants’ petitions for judicial review challenging a 2007 decision by the Nevada Tax Commission regarding a tax refund request, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petitions for judicial review because they were untimely.In 2008, Appellants filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for judicial review (Case 3). The ALJ affirmed the Commission’s 2007 decision. In 2014, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Appellants then filed a second petition for judicial review (Case 4) challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision. The district court consolidated the Case 3 and Case 4 petitions for judicial review and affirmed the Commission’s 2007 and 2014 decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ Case 3 petition for judicial review and thus lacked the authority to consider the merits of Appellants’ Case 4 petition. View "K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

Deng defaulted on special assessments on Las Vegas residential real property, which entered delinquency and underwent a duly noticed and authorized sale (NRS Chapter 271). On January 27, 2014, Pawlik purchased the property at the sale and was issued a sales certificate. Under NRS 271.595(1), Deng had a two-year redemption period from that date. On January 7, 2016, Pawlik began attempting to serve Deng with notice of the upcoming expiration of the redemption period and Pawlik's intent to apply for a deed pursuant to NRS 271.595(3). NRS 271.595 creates a clear redemption period of two years and also creates an ambiguous 60-day redemption window after notice that the certificate holder will demand a deed. On March 14, 2016, 47 days after the Dengs' two-year redemption period expired and 67 days after Pawlik began attempting service, Pawlik applied for a deed. The treasurer denied the request. Deng redeemed on April 6, 2016, with full payment to the city. Pawlik sought to quiet title and applied for a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the deed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that the 60-day period does not overlap with the two-year period. NRS 271.595 requires that the 60-day notice and additional redemption period begin after the end of the two-year redemption period. Pawlik attempted service on Deng before the end of the two-year redemption period, which provided Deng with less than two years and 60 days of redemption. View "Pawlik v. Deng" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.3385 creates a separate offense for each schedule I controlled substance.The State charged Defendant with trafficking in a controlled substance after discovering two bags of heroin totaling 9.445 grams and three bags of methamphetamine totaling 9.532 grams in Defendant’s apartment. Specifically, the State charged Defendant with possessing 14 grams or more, but less than 28 grams, of a schedule I controlled substance in violation of section 453.3385(2). Defendant moved to strike the trafficking counts, arguing that the State could not charge him with “an aggregate of completely separate controlled substances” and that the State could not charge him for having a mixture of heroin and meth because the drugs were not mixed into one bag. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the weight of different schedule I drugs simultaneously possessed by a defendant may be aggregated under section 453.3385. A jury convicted Defendant of the charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in section 453.3385, the Legislature intended to create a separate offense for each controlled substance simultaneously possessed by a person; and (2) the weights of different controlled substances may not be aggregated together to form a single offense under section 453.3385. View "Andrews v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case had “an adequate opportunity” (see Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 482 (Nev. 2009)) to cross-examine a witness when, immediately after the State’s direct examination at the preliminary hearing, Defendant waived his right to continue the preliminary hearing.Jeffrey Baker was charged with sexually motivated coercion and eight counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. At the preliminary hearing, C.J. testified regarding two instances in which Baker attempted to engage her in sexual activity. When C.J. finished testifying, Defendant waived his right to continue the preliminary hearing and plead guilty to one count of attempted lewdness with a minor. The court rejected Baker’s plea. C.J. subsequently committed suicide. The State moved to admit at trial the transcript of C.J.’s testimony at the preliminary hearing. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Baker did not have an adequate opportunity cross-examine C.J. at the preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity to cross-examine and does not give defendants a sword to strike adverse testimony that the defendant chose not to contest. View "State v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The district court’s preliminary injunction order enjoining media outlets from reporting on a redacted, anonymized autopsy report that they and other members of the media obtained through a Nevada Public Records Act request did not comport with the First Amendment.A district judge ruled that the autopsy reports of the victims of the October 1, 2017 shooting at the Route 91 Harvest music festival constituted public records subject to inspection and release but directed the Clark County Coroner to redact the victims’ names and personal identifying information. After the Coroner publicly released the redacted autopsy reports, the wife and the estate of one of the victims (collectively, the Hartfield parties) filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The district judge granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and barred the Las Vegas Review Journal and the Associated Press from sharing the redacted autopsy report of the victim. The Supreme Court granted writ relief to the Review Journal, holding that the Hartfield parties failed to demonstrate a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest that would warrant the prior restraint imposed in this case. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law