Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied in part and granted in part a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition filed by Petitioner, an attorney who was being investigated by the State Bar of Nevada for potential ethical violations after he testified at his personal bankruptcy proceedings that he had not implemented a reliable or identifiable system of accounting for his client trust account. The State Bar served Petitioner with two subpoenas duces tecum seeking production of client accounting records and tax records. Petitioner objected to the subpoenas, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board (Board) rejected Petitioner’s objections to the subpoenas. This petition for writ relief followed. The Supreme Court held (1) with regard to the requested client accounting records, this court adopts the three-prong test under Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), to conclude that the right against self-incrimination does not protect Petitioner from disclosure; but (2) with regard to the requested tax records, the Board must hold a hearing to determine how the records are relevant and material to the State Bar’s allegations against Petitioner and whether there is a compelling need for those records. View "Agwara v. State Bar of Nevada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Parent challenging the district court’s placement decision following the termination of Parent’s parental rights where Parent entered into a stipulation agreeing to the termination of her parental rights but reserving the right to participate in a contested pre-termination hearing regarding the child’s placement. The Supreme Court held that Parent lacked standing to challenge the placement decision because Parent’s parental rights were clearly terminated, and therefore, Parent no longer had any substantial interest that could be affected by the court’s placement decision. Further, the Supreme Court’s prior order denying writ relief did not confer standing on Parent. View "In re Parental Rights as to T.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions for burglary, robbery, coercion, and other crimes and Appellant’s sentence as a habitual criminal. The court held (1) contrary to Appellant’s argument on appeal, the district court properly considered Appellant’s prior conviction from 1984 in sentencing Appellant as a habitual criminal because the conviction was not stale, and the prior conviction resulting from an offense Appellant committed as a minor could be used for habitual criminal sentencing; (2) Appellant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and (3) because there was no error established by Appellant on this appeal, there was none to cumulate. View "Mullner v. State" on Justia Law

The general rule of privilege between psychologist and patient set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.209 applies when a criminal defendant seeks records related to a patient who is court-ordered to partake in therapy.J.A., a minor, was placed on probation for soliciting prostitution. As a condition of probation, J.A. was required to complete counseling with Dr. Shera Bradley. Based on J.A.’s statements to the police, Dontae Hudson was charged with first-degree kidnapping, sex trafficking of a child under the age of sixteen, and related crimes. Hudson filed a motion for discovery, including requests for J.A.’s counseling records. The district court ordered that Dr. Bradley disclose J.A.’s counseling records for in camera review. Dr. Bradley filed this petition for relief in the form of a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of prohibition ordering the district court to halt the production of the documents, holding that the psychologist-patient privilege applies to J.A. and Dr. Bradley’s confidential communications, and Hudson failed to show that an exception to the privilege applied or that the privilege was waived. View "Bradley v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and robbery and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court held (1) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not deprive Defendant of his right under the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause to be present at every stage of the trial when it excused Defendant from the courtroom for two hours on the first day of trial due to his disruptive conduct; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the lead investigator in this case to testify that his investigation into the victim’s death led to Defendant’s arrest; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. View "Collins v. State" on Justia Law

At issue was whether seven managers of an LLC were subject to suit for personal negligence as individual tortfeasors or under an alter ego theory of liability.Petitioners brought a negligence suit against an LLC and its two LLC managing members (the member LLCs). Petitioners subsequently moved for leave to amend their complaint to add as individual defendants seven persons who had an ownership interest in, or managed, the member LLCs. Petitioners sought to assert direct claims for negligence against the managers in their individual capacities and sought to plead allegations supporting an alter ego theory of liability. The district court denied Petitioners’ motion, concluding that amendment would be futile because Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.371 protected the managers from any liabilities insured by the various LLCs, and Nevada’s LLC statues contained no alter ego exception to that statutory protection. The Supreme Court granted writ relief for Petitioners and directed that Petitioners be allowed to amend their complaint, holding (1) section 86.371 is not intended to shield members or managers of an LLC for liability for personal negligence; and (2) the corporate alter ego doctrine applies to LLCs. View "Gardner v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

A post-judgment vexatious litigant determination may be considered in an appeal from an otherwise appealable order.In 2015, Appellant and Respondent were divorced via a divorce decree. Appellant subsequently filed several motions to reopen the decree and alter its terms. The district court eventually entered an order granting Respondent additional sums from certain accounts and declaring both Appellant and Respondent to be vexatious litigants. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court questioned whether the portion of the order declaring Appellant to be a vexatious litigant was appealable where no statute or court rule appeared to authorize an appeal from such an order. The court concluded that it could consider the vexatious litigant determination in the context of this appeal because the post-judgment vexatious litigant determination was contained within an otherwise independently appealable order. View "Yu v. Yu" on Justia Law

In the wake of Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n v. New York Community Bankcorp, Inc., 355 P.3d 1105 (Nev. 2016), the Supreme Court took the opportunity in this case to provide further clarification as to whether a homeowners’ association (HOA) foreclosure sale can be set aside based on commercial unreasonableness or solely on low sales price.Saticoy Bay instituted a quiet title action after buying property located in a neighborhood governed by an HOA at a foreclosure sale held by the HOA. Saticoy Bay named Nationstar Mortgage as a defendant and sought a declaration that the sale extinguished Nationstar’s deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Saticoy Bay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commercial reasonableness standard, derived from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, has no applicability in the context of an HOA foreclosure involving the sale of real property; (2) Shadow Wood did not overturn the court’s longstanding rule that inadequacy of price is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale absent fraud, unfairness or oppression that brings about the price inadequacy; and (3) because Nationstar’s identified irregularities did not establish that fraud, unfairness or oppression affected the sale, summary judgment was properly granted for Saticoy Bay. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon" on Justia Law

Exposure to a hazard can be demonstrated by facts establishing that exposure to the hazard is reasonably predictable.Appellant in this case argued that the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA) improperly cited it for violating 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(f), which requires employers to provide training regarding the use of personal protective equipment to employees exposed to hazards requiring the use of such equipment. Specifically, Appellant argued that it was improperly cited for a violation because no facts established that its employees were actually exposed to such a hazard in the course of their work or were required to have fall protection training. The Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Review Board upheld NOSHA’s citation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a statute or regulation requires NOSHA to establish employee exposure to a hazard, the Board’s decision regarding a NOSHA citation may be upheld if NOSHA presents substantial evidence demonstrating that exposure to the hazard was or would be reasonably predictable; and (2) the Board in this case relied on an incorrect standard in evaluating the citation. View "Sierra Packaging & Converting, LLC v. Chief Administrative Officer of Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

Judicial marshals are “peace officers” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 289.040, 289.057 and 298.060, which provisions are intended to provide job-related protections to peace officers employed by law enforcement agencies, but the Eighth Judicial District Court (EJDC) is not a “law enforcement agency” as statutorily defined.Appellant, who was employed by the EJDC first as a bailiff and then as an administrative marshal, was terminated for misconduct. According to the terms of a written memorandum of understanding between the Clark County Marshal’s Union and the EJDC, Appellant’s appeal resulted in arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the EJDC’s decision to terminate Appellant. Appellant petitioned the district court to set aside the arbitrator’s decision, arguing that the EJDC violated his statutory rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 289 by disclosing and relying upon his prior disciplinary history as justification for his termination. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provisions of Chapter 289 in this case did not apply to Appellant; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator either exceeded his authority or manifestly disregarded the law. View "Knickmeyer v. State" on Justia Law