Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Malfitano v. County of Storey
The district court did not violate Appellant’s due process or equal protection rights when the Storey County Liquor Board denied Appellant’s applications for liquor licenses. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the district court, requesting that the court compel Respondents to approve the applications. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Storey County Code 5.12.010(A), which requires an applicant for a liquor license to provide the board with proof of financial standing “to warrant an expected satisfactory and profitable business operation” is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the Liquor Board did not violate Appellant’s due process or equal protection rights in denying his liquor license applications. View "Malfitano v. County of Storey" on Justia Law
Rawson v. Ninth Judicial District Court
A final order adjudicating a judgment debtor proceeding is appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(1), and such an appeal is generally a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that precludes extraordinary writ relief.Petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the portion of the district court’s order that added her to a default judgment as a joint debtor. Petitioner failed to appeal the judgment. In challenging whether the challenged order was a final judgment from which she could have appealed, Petitioner argued that the order was interlocutory and that writ relief was appropriate because the order adding her to the default judgment was void on due process grounds. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) an order resolving a joint debtor proceeding is a final, appealable order, rendering extraordinary relief unavailable; and (2) extraordinary writ relief is not available when Petitioner View "Rawson v. Ninth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Contracts
Delucchi v. Songer
Portions of the 2013 amendments to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes clarified existing law such that they apply retroactively, but the remaining applicable portions of the 2013 amendments effected a substantive change in the prior anti-SLAPP legislation such that those portions are not applicable retroactively.Based on the findings found in a report prepared by Pat Songer, the Town of Pahrump terminated Appellants’ employment. Appellants filed a complaint against Songer alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Songer filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes. The district court applied the 2013 statutory amendments retroactively in deciding Songer’s special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) properly applied the 2013 clarifying portions of the amendments in determining that Songer’s communication was potentially protected, but (2) erred in applying the remaining substantive portions of the 2013 amendments retroactively in determining that Appellants failed to meet the burden set forth in the 2013 amendments of establishing a probability of prevailing on their claims. View "Delucchi v. Songer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury
Anselmo v. Bisbee
The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief requesting the Nevada Parole Board to reconsider its decision to deny parole, holding that Petitioner was entitled to a new parole hearing because the Board infringed upon Petitioner’s statutory right to receive proper consideration for parole by basing its decision in part on an inapplicable aggravating factor. The court held that, while Nevada inmates have no protectable liberty interest in release on parole, eligible Nevada inmates nevertheless do have a statutory right to be considered for parole by the Board, and when the Board misapplies its own internal guidelines in assessing whether to grant parole, it cannot be said that the inmate received the consideration to which he was statutorily entitled. View "Anselmo v. Bisbee" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
Pimentel v. State
Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.450 - which provides that if any person, “upon previous concert and agreement,” fights with any and person and one person dies in the fight, the surviving fighter is guilty of first-degree murder - is not vague or overbroad.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 200.450 is neither vague nor overbroad; (2) the district court properly instructed the jury regarding self-defense and its inapplicability to challenge-to-fight murder theory; (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claim that the presence in the courtroom of the State’s expert witness violated the exclusionary rule; and (4) the State’s expert witness impermissibly exceeded her scope as an expert witness, but the error was harmless. View "Pimentel v. State" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Vaile v. Porsboll
Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 130.207, a Nevada child support order controlled over a Norway order.Mother and Father were granted a divorce from a Nevada court. Their children habitually resided in Norway. At issue in this case was a child support order entered in Norway. The district court concluded that the Nevada support order controlled because Norway lacked jurisdiction to modify the Nevada order. Father appealed this conclusion as well as other court rulings. The court of appeals concluded that Nevada’s child support order controlled over Norway’s order and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Father’s challenges to certain contempt findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Nevada child support order controlled; and (2) this court had jurisdiction over the challenges to contempt findings and sanctions in the order appealed from, but the court need not consider them because Appellant failed to assert cogent arguments or provide relevant authority in support of his claims. View "Vaile v. Porsboll" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court
The Barton doctrine is extended to a court-appointed accountant in the capacity of a special master, thus requiring an individual to seek leave of the appointing court prior to filing suit in a non-appointing court against a court-appointed special master for actions taken in the scope of his court-derived authority.Larry Bertsch and his accounting firm (collectively, Bertsch) were appointed as special master in a lawsuit between Vion Operations, LLC and Jay Bloom (the Lion litigation). The district court later discharged Bertsch from his duties as special master. When the Vion litigation was dismissed, Bloom filed the underlying complaint against Bertsch alleging, inter alia, gross negligence and fraudulent concealment based on Bertsch’s allegedly wrongful actions in the Vion litigation. Bertsch filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Bertsch petitioned for a writ of mandamus arguing, in part, that Bloom’s complaint was jurisdictionally improper because Bloom did not first seek leave of the appointing court before instituting the underlying action. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Bloom must first have filed a motion with the appointing court in order to sue Bertsch personally. View "Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Personal Injury
Nguyen v. Boynes
The district court did not err in granting Robert Boynes paternity over a child adopted by Ken Nguyen under the equitable adoption doctrine.During their relationship, Rob and Ken decided to adopt a child. The parties ended their relationship mere months after they received the newborn child. Ken later formally adopted the child. Thereafter, Rob filed a petition for paternity and custody. The district court concluded that Rob was entitled to a presumption of paternity under Nev. Rev. Stat. 126.051(1)(d) and that Rob and Ken were to have joint legal and physical custody of the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting Rob paternity under the equitable adoption doctrine; (2) the district court’s order did not violate equal protection principals; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rob joint legal and physical custody. View "Nguyen v. Boynes" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Board of Review v. Second Judicial District Court
Based on the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.530(1), the requirement that all relevant parties be named as defendants must be completed as timely as the rest of the petition.The Board of Review and the Administrator of the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division (ESD) awarded unemployment compensation benefits to Jessica Gerry, a former employee of McDonald’s of Keystone. McDonald’s filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The ESD moved to dismiss the petition for judicial review on the ground that the caption failed to identify Gerry as a defendant, rendering the petition defective under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.530(1). The district court denied the ESD’s motion to dismiss and granted McDonald’s motion to amend, concluding that the naming of all relevant parties as defendants was not a jurisdictional requirement. The Supreme Court granted the ESD’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding that McDonald’s failure to follow the statutory requirements of section 612.530(1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear its petition for judicial review. View "Board of Review v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
The servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar in a quiet title action.Nationstar Mortgage, LLC was assigned a deed of trust. When Respondent purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, Respondent filed a third-party complaint against Nationstar, arguing that Nationstar’s security interest was extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Nationstar argued that its security interest survived the sale pursuant to the Federal Foreclosure Bar because Freddie Mac had purchased the loan, and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) had placed Freddie Mac under conservatorship. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that, although there was a factual dispute as to whether Freddie Mac or the FHFA had an interest in the deed of trust, Nationstar lacked standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on behalf of Freddie Mac or the FHFA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the servicer of a loan owned by a regulated entity has standing to argue that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law