Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Certain real property was sold in violation of an automatic stay from the homeowners’ bankruptcy proceedings. Because the property was situated in Nevada, and the bankruptcy proceedings commenced in Texas, the Supreme Court was presented with a purported conflict of laws issue. Appellant sought to quiet title in the district court. Respondent disputed the validity of the sale by filing a complaint in intervention. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied, Respondent had standing as a creditor enforce the automatic stay in the homeowners’ bankruptcy, and the foreclosure sale was void due to the violation of the automatic stay. On appeal, Appellant argued that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit law applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because, under both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, a sale conducted during an automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings is invalid. View "LN Management LLC Series 5105 Portraits Place v. Green Tree Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting a writ mandating disclosure of public records. The public records sought were copies of the business licenses of persons operating medical marijuana establishments (MME) in the City of Sparks. The City produced the business licenses but redacted the licensees’ identifies from the documents. Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the redacted information. The district court granted the petition, concluding that the City’s duty under the Nevada Public Records Act to disclose the identities of the business was not exempted by Nev. Admin. Code 453A.714’s confidentiality provision. The City appealed, arguing that a petition for a writ of mandamus was not the appropriate means of seeking judicial relief when challenging an administrative code and that section 453A.714 rendered confidential the identifying information of MME business license holders. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondent’s petition for a writ of mandamus was a procedurally proper means for seeking the disclosure of public records; but (2) the identifying information of MME business license holders was confidential under section 453A.714 and thus was exempt from disclosure. View "City of Sparks v. Reno Newspapers, Inc." on Justia Law

South California Edison (Edison) was not due a refund of use tax paid to Nevada because it did not demonstrate the existence of substantially similar entities that gained an unfair tax advantage because of the unconstitutional tax, and Edison was not owed a tax credit in an amount equal to the transaction privilege tax (TPT) levied by Arizona because the TPT did not qualify as a sales tax paid by Edison within the meaning of Nev. Admin. Code 372.055.Edison filed a claim with the State Department of Taxation for a refund of the use tax it paid between 1998 and 2000. The Department and Nevada Tax Commission denied the requested refund. Edison then filed an independent action in the district court seeking a refund of the taxes it paid. The district court concluded that, while the negative implications of the dormant Commerce Clause rendered Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.270 (the use tax exemption) unconstitutional, Edison was not entitled to a refund because it did not have favored competitors that benefitted from the discriminatory taxation scheme. The Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons set forth above. View "Southern California Edison v. State Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court’s holding in SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) that foreclosures under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 extinguish first security interests applies to all foreclosures conducted since section 116.3116’s inception.Respondent in this case employed the three-factor test established by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) and argued that SFR could not apply retroactively because this court established a new principle of law, a retroactive application would not further the purposes of section 116.3116, and a retroactive application would product inequitable results. The Supreme Court held (1) the Chevron Oil factors do not apply, but rather, that the court’s analysis in Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 383 P.3d 246 (Nev. 2016), governs the present matter; and (2) SFR did not create new law or overrule existing precent, and therefore, that decision applies retroactively. View "K&P Homes v. Christiana Trust" on Justia Law

The provisions of Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116, which provides homeowners’ associations (HOAs) a superpriority lien on up to nine months of unpaid HOA dues, are not preempted by federal law when the first deed of trust on the property is insured through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).Homeowners bought a home using a mortgage insured through the FHA insurance program, and the promissory note and deed of trust were eventually assigned to Respondent. Homeowners’ HOA eventually initiated foreclosure proceedings pursuant to section 116.3116. Appellant purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then filed suit to quiet title to the property. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the chapter 116 foreclosure sale of federal insured property was void under the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the provisions of section 116.3116 were preempted when a homeowner’s first mortgage was insured through the FHA insurance program. View "Renfroe v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

A defendant can be convicted of aiding and abetting a negligent or reckless crime upon sufficient proof that the aider and abettor possessed the necessary intent to aid in the act that caused the harm.The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for seven counts of performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm and seven counts of criminal negligence of patients resulting in substantial bodily harm (collectively, the endangerment crimes) but reversed Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder. The court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to show that Defendant acted with awareness of the reckless or negligent conduct and with the intent to promote or further that conduct in the endangerment crimes for which he was convicted; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of second-degree murder because there were intervening causes between Defendant’s actions and the victim’s death. View "Desai v. State" on Justia Law

In these related original petitions for extraordinary relief the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether documents otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege must be disclosed when the business judgment rule is asserted as a defense and under what circumstances a document may be protected by the work-product privilege even if it is at issue in the litigation. In docket no. 70050, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it compelled Wynn Resorts to produce certain attorney-client privileged documents from its attorneys on the basis that Wynn Resorts invoked the business judgment rule as a defense. The court thus granted Wynn Resorts’ petition for relief. In docket no. 70452, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Wynn Resorts waived the attorney-client privilege by placing a report at issue in the initial litigation. However, because the work-product privilege may apply to some of the documents compiled in the preparation of the report, the court granted in part Wynn Resorts’ petition for relief and directed the district court to consider whether the work-product privilege applied to the documents underlying the report. View "Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct and his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish any prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel failed adequately to develop the record to assess whether he was prejudiced by juror misconduct; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide the jury with a supplemental clarifying instruction on malice aforethought. View "Jeffries v. State" on Justia Law

The one-action rule, which generally requires a creditor seeking to recover debt secured by real property to proceed against the security prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally, must be timely interposed as an affirmative defense in a party’s responsive pleadings or it is waived.Plaintiff contributed more than $2 million toward funding a loan that was secured by the personal residence of Defendant. When the borrower defaulted on the loan and Defendant refused to repay the loan under a personal guaranty agreement, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages against Defendant. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court granted based on Defendant’s failure to oppose the motion on the merits. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, raising the one-action rule defense for the first time. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the one-action rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant failed to raise the one-action rule defense until prior to the commencement of the second trial in this case, Defendant failed timely to interpose the one-action rule defense. View "Hefetz v. Beavor" on Justia Law

Poverty is not, and never has been, a valid basis for terminating one’s parental rights.After a bench trial, the district court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to all four of her children. Mother appealed, arguing that the district court terminated her parental rights due to her poverty and that poverty is not a valid basis for terminating one’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while poverty is not a valid basis for terminating a parent’s parental rights, the district court is not prohibited from considering a parent’s failure to maintain housing or employment in contravention of a state-issued case plan; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court’s finding that Mother’s failure to reunite with her children was not due to her poverty and that she made only token efforts toward reunification. View "In re Parental Rights as to R.T." on Justia Law