Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a district court order dismissing a complaint against a medical treatment center for failure to attach a medical expert affidavit pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because his claims were based in ordinary negligence and not medical malpractice, as determined by the district court, and therefore, an affidavit was not required. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellant’s claims for negligence, malpractice, gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision were not for medical malpractice and should not have been dismissed for failure to attach the section 41A.071 affidavit; and (2) Appellant’s claim for professional negligence sounded in medical malpractice and was properly dismissed for failure to attach a medical expert affidavit. View "Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Center" on Justia Law

A parent cannot be compelled to admit to a criminal act in order to maintain his or her parental rights.Appellant was required to admit to a crime for her to be considered in compliance with her case plan. The district court eventually terminated Appellant’s parental rights. On appeal, Appellant argued that terminating her parental rights on the sole basis that she refused to admit that she intentionally harmed her child violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the district court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights constituted a violation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (2) there was not substantial evidence supporting the district court’s findings of parental fault and that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of her children. View "In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L." on Justia Law

When the Supreme Court reverses a death sentence on direct appeal and remands for a new penalty hearing, there is no longer a final judgment that triggers the one-year period set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) for filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Appellant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s death sentences and remanded with instructions for the district court to conduct a new penalty hearing. On remand, the jury returned death sentences for the murder convictions, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction setting forth the death sentences. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Within one year after remittitur issued from that decision, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions and death sentences. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s petition was timely filed; and (2) the district court did not err in denying the petition on the merits. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015, which provides for the enforcement of liens for attorney fees, as amended in 2013, provides for the enforcement of a retaining lien for attorney fees.Respondent represented Appellant in a paternity action. Respondent later filed and served a notice of a retaining lien against Appellant for $13,701 for unpaid legal fees. Respondent filed a motion asking the district court to adjudicate the rights of counsel, for enforcement of attorney’s lien, and for a judgment for attorney fees. Appellant argued that Respondent was asserting a charging lien, not a retaining lien, and that the purported charging lien failed as a matter of law. The district court granted Respondent’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of section 18.015 unambiguously permits an attorney to enforce a retaining lien; and (2) the district court did not err by enforcing Respondent’s valid retaining lien against Appellant under section 18.015. View "Fredianelli v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Where an offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute that requires a minimum term of not less than a set number of years but does not mention parole eligibility, credits apply to eligibility for parole as provided in Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465(7)(b), which provides that credits earned pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 apply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute that specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes eligible for parole.Appellant was convicted of six counts of driving a vehicle with a prohibited substance in her blood or urine causing death. Appellant later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that she was entitled to have credits earned pursuant to section 209.4465 apply to her eligibility for parole. The district court denied the petition, concluding that a prison must serve his or her minimum term before being eligible for parole and, therefore, the credits did not apply to Appellant’s eligibility for parole. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that credits that Appellant earned under section 209.4465 should be applied to her parole eligibility for any sentence she is currently serving and on which she has not appeared before the parole board. View "Williams v. State, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Where a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge pursuant to a plea agreement and fails to comply with the terms of that agreement, he waives his right to be protected from prosecution on a greater charge.Petitioner was charged with felony battery constituting domestic violence. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty in justice court to one count of battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor, and in district court to one count of battery constituting substantial bodily harm, a felony. Petitioner subsequently pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor battery but refused to plead guilty in the district court. Consequently, the State filed an amended information reinstating the original felony battery constituting domestic violence charge. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition alleging that since he had already been convicted of misdemeanor battery in the justice court, double jeopardy protections barred his prosecution for felony battery constituting domestic violence in the district court. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner waived his right to be free from multiple prosecutions when he voluntarily failed to comply with the terms of his plea agreement with the State. View "Sweat v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent-casino, holding that the district court’s foreseeability analysis under Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.015 was too restrictive.Appellants sued Respondent for injuries they suffered during an altercation with another patron on Respondent’s casino floor. The district court concluded that Respondent did not owe a duty to Appellants under section 651.015 because Respondent had no “notice or knowledge” the other patron would assault Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings, holding that the district court failed properly to consider section 651.015(3)(b) - which requires a case-by-case analysis of similar wrongful acts, including the level of violence, location of the attack, and security concerns implicated - and that the record showed Respondent’s knowledge of similar on-premises wrongful acts. View "Humphries v. New York-New York Hotel & Casino" on Justia Law

Both the general principles of claim preclusion and the terms in a Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment are implicated when a party seeks to relitigate claims after entry of a final judgment pursuant to the Rule 68 offer, even when they arise out of facts discovered during the Rule 68 offer’s ten-day irrevocable period for acceptance. Further, these subsequent claims are barred where principles of claim preclusion apply or, alternatively, where the terms of the offer of judgment indicate that such claims are barred.The district court in this case concluded that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Appellants’ action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were barred both by the doctrine of claim preclusion and by the terms of the offer of judgment between the parties. View "Mendenhall v. Tassinari" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a risk-utility test for strict product liability design defect claims and confirmed that claims of design defect grounded on strict product liability in Nevada will continue to be governed by the consumer-expectation test.Respondent brought this suit against Ford Motor Company, alleging a design defect in the roof of the Ford Excursion and seeking damages based on theories of strict products liability and common law negligence. The case proceeded to trial on the strict products liability theory, and the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Respondent. The district court entered judgment on the jury’s $4.5 million damages award. On appeal, Ford urged the Supreme Court to adopt the risk-utility test for claims of strict product liability design defect, as set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Third Restatement). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this court declines to adopt the risk-utility test; (2) the jury was properly instructed on the consumer-expectation test; and (3) Respondent presented sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted two questions of law certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals, answering (1) a hyperlink to source material about a judicial proceeding may suffice as a report within the common law fair report privilege; and (2) Delucchi v. Singer, 396 P.3d 826, 830 (Nev. 2017), explains that application of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, prior to the most recent amendments in 2013, is not limited to communication addressed to a government agency but includes speech “aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action.”Plaintiff in this case filed a defamation action against Respondents, who posted an online petition to pressure presidential candidate Mitt Romney to reject Appellant’s campaign contributions, alleging that the petition was false and defamatory. The federal district court concluded that Nevada law governed the controversy and dismissed Appellant’s complaint, ruling that the state’s anti-SLAPP statutes applied. On appeal, the court of appeals certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the questions and held (1) the fair report privilege immunizes Respondents from civil liability; and (2) communications with either the government or the public that are intended to influence an electoral result potentially fall under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(1). View "Adelson v. Harris" on Justia Law