Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Roy and Shirley Senholtz took out a loan from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a division of Walls Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The loan was secured by a deed of trust on property governed by an a homeowners’ associations’ (HOA) CC&Rs. When the Senholtzes failed to pay their HOA dues and mortgage, the HOA conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay LLC. Satico Bay filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the property and a declaration that it was the rightful owner of the property free and clear of any encumbrances or liens. The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116-.31168 violated Wells Fargo’s due process rights. The statutes grant an HOA a superpriority lien for certain unpaid assessments and allow an HOA to nonjudicially foreclose on such a lien if specific requirements are met. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes do not implicate due process because neither the HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure nor the Legislature’s enactment of the statutes constitute state action; and (2) the extinguishment of a subordinate deed of trust through an HOA’s nonjudicial foreclosure does not violate the Takings Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is when a notice of completion has been “issued” for purposes of determining the commencement date under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.2055(1)(b) for Chapter 11’s construction defect statutes of repose. Appellants owned homes developed by Respondent. Approximately ten years after notices of completion of Appellants’ residences were signed, notarized, and recorded, Appellant served notices of construction defect on Respondent. Respondent moved to dismiss the claims on the grounds that their claims were untimely under Chapter 11’s statutes of repose for construction defect claims. Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the statutes of repose began to run on the date the notices of completion were recorded rather than the dates the notices of completion were signed and notarized. The district court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were time-barred under the ten-year statute of repose in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.203. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a notice of completion is “issued” on the date it is recorded, not when it is signed and notarized. View "Dykema v. Del Webb Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, more than twenty-five years after remittitur issued from Appellant’s direct appeal in 1989, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. The petition was both successive and untimely filed. The district court denied the petition, concluding that the petition was procedurally barred and that Appellant failed to demonstrate the good cause and prejudice required for consideration of the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to consider his good cause argument regarding Riley v. McDaniel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that Riley would provide good cause, Appellant did not establish prejudice because he did not demonstrate that the result of trial would have been different had a different instruction been given. View "Leavitt v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Adams died after striking Susan Fallini’s cow while driving on a portion of highway designated as open range. Adams’ estate sued Fallini for negligence. The district court entered a final judgment against Fallini for $1,294,041. Thereafter, Fallini brought a motion pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b), contending that the district court should set aside the judgment because the Estate’s counsel committed a fraud upon the court. The district court granted the motion. Fallini then filed a motion for entry of final argument, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 568.360 provided a complete defense to the Estate’s claims. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this court had jurisdiction to consider challenges to the district court’s Rule 60(b) order in this appeal; (2) the district court did not err in addressing the merits of Fallini’s the Rule 60(b) motion; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief based on fraud upon the court. View "Estate of Adams v. Fallini" on Justia Law

Appellant filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was later converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Prior to filing, Appellant was involved in two personal injury cases. As part of his bankruptcy proceedings, Appellant claimed two personal injury exemptions, one for the personal injury settlement stemming from a dog attack and another stemming from an automobile accident. The bankruptcy court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether a debtor is entitled to more than one personal injury exemption under Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.090(1)(u) if the debtor has more than one personal injury accident. The Supreme Court held that section 21.090(1)(u) entitles a debtor to an exemption for each personal injury claim, on a per-claim basis. View "Kaplan v. Dutra" on Justia Law

The Clark County grand jury indicted Defendant for the murder of his wife. Prior to trial, Defendant sought to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the district attorney violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.145(2) by failing to submit exculpatory evidence in the State’s file to the grand jury. Specifically, Defendant asserted that the district attorney improperly failed to present to the grand jury two notes from his deceased wife’s hospital chart. The district court denied relief, concluding that no violation of section 172.145(2) occurred because the district attorney was not aware of the notes and their potential exculpatory value when he presented the case to the grand jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district attorney did not violate section 172.145(2). View "Mayo v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner loaned Debtors, including Darren Badger, approximately $10,000,000. Debtors defaulted on the loan. A California court issued a judgment against Debtors in the amount of $2,497,568. Pacific Western later domesticated the judgment in Nevada. In order to collect on the judgment, Petitioner served Wells Fargo Advisors (WFA), a company that administered three financial accounts under 26 U.S.C. 529 (529 accounts) on behalf of Badger, with a writ of execution and garnishment. Badger claimed that the 529 accounts were outside of the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction because they were located in New Mexico and that the funds held in the 529 accounts were completely exempt under New Mexico law. The district court quashed the writs of execution and garnishment served upon WFA, ruling that Petitioner must attempt to execute upon Badger’s 529 accounts in New Mexico. The Supreme Court entertained Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the petition in part, holding (1) funds contained in 529 accounts are a debt, not a chattel; and (2) accordingly, the district court had the power to garnish the debt through device of a writ of garnishment upon WFA. View "Pacific Western Bank v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of trafficking in a controlled substance. During a break in deliberations, two jurors individually conducted experiments testing the parties’ theories of the case. The next morning, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Defendant filed a motion to declare a mistrial and order a new trial due to juror misconduct. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the verdict was affected by the two jurors’ independent experiments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial because (1) the juror misconduct in this case was prejudicial, and (2) the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction prohibiting jurors from conducting independent investigations or experiments constituted a reversible error. Remanded. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

The Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution guarantees that employees be paid a specific minimum wage and gives an employee the right to bring an action against his employer to remedy any violation of the MWA. The MWA, however, does not specify a statute of limitations for the right of action it establishes. At issue in this case was whether the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.260 or the four-year statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.220 applies to claims asserted under the MWA. Here, Appellant filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Respondent failed to pay her and other similarly situated employees the minimum wage required by the MWA. Citing the two-year statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.260, Respondent sought judgment in its favor on claims for damages that were more than two years old when Appellant filed suit. The district court applied section 608.260 to Appellant’s claims and dismissed the claims after concluding that MWA claims are closely analogous to those provided for in Chapter 608. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the MWA is most closely analogous to section 608.260 and that applying section 608.260’s limitations period is consistent with Nevada minimum wage law. View "Perry v. Terrible Herbst, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution, if an employer provides health benefits, it may pay its employees a lower minimum wage than if no such health benefits are provided. The MWA also requires that health benefit premiums be capped at ten percent of the employee’s gross taxable income from the employer. The employees in these consolidated cases argued that employers must actually enroll employees in health benefit plans to be eligible to pay the lower-tier minimum wage and that the ten-percent cap does not include tips in its calculation of taxable income. The Supreme Court held (1) an employer need only offer a qualifying health plan to pay the lower wage; and (2) tips are not included in the calculation of taxable income. View "MDC Restaurants, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law