Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., published in 2014, the Supreme Court held that the Minimum Wage Amendment to the Nevada Constitution, enacted in 2006, impliedly repealed Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.250(2)(e)’s exemption of taxicab drivers from minimum wage requirements. In two separate cases, taxicab drivers filed class actions against several taxicab companies seeking unpaid taxicab driver wages dating back to the effective date of the Amendment. The taxicab companies moved to dismiss the complaints, asserting that Thomas applied prospectively, not retroactively. Thereafter, the taxicab companies filed writ petitions arguing that Thomas should apply only prospectively. The Supreme Court consolidated the writ petitions for disposition denied the petitions, holding that section 608.250(2)(e) was repealed when the Amendment became effective rather than from the date Thomas was published. View "Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was cited in Utah for driving under the influence of alcohol. The offense was a third-degree felony under Utah law. In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense. In 2013, Defendant was arrested in Nevada for suspicion of driving under the influence. The State subsequently charged Defendant with felony DUI because of her 2004 Utah felony conviction. The district court adjudicated the offense as a category B felony, determining that Defendant’s 2004 felony DUI conviction in Utah was a violation involving “the same or similar conduct” as Nevada’s felony DUI statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Utah’s DUI laws contain a longer recidivism window but punish the same or similar conduct as Nevada’s DUI laws, and therefore, the district court correctly adjudicated Defendant’s instant offense as a felony; and (2) Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were without merit. View "Sindelar v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant opened three business accounts at Respondent Wells Fargo Bank. Respondent later unilaterally closed the three accounts, stating that the reason for the closure was because Appellant had been involved in a criminal activity. Appellant filed a complaint alleging defamation, false light, and declaratory relief. Appellant then filed a motion to compel Respondent to produce documents regarding the closure of her accounts, as well as the risk assessment processes and analysis for closing these accounts. The discovery commissioner decided that Respondent was not required to provide the requested records under the Bank Secrecy Act. The district court affirmed the commissioner’s report and recommendations but ordered Respondent to provide a privilege log concerning the subject matter at issue. After Respondent submitted a privilege log, the discovery commissioner recommended that the documents be deemed confidential. The district court affirmed and adopted the report and recommendations. Appellant’s cause of action for declaratory relief was ultimately dismissed by the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery commissioner and the district court did not err in concluding that the documents at issue were protected by the Suspicious Activity Report privilege under the Bank Secrecy Act. View "Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In the underlying district court action, Dawnette Davidson filed a motion with the family division of the district court to enforce a term of a decree of divorce from her ex-husband, Christopher Davidson. The term at issue required Christopher to pay Dawnette one-half of the equity in the marital home in exchange for Dawnette quitclaiming the residence to Christopher. Dawnette commenced this action more than six years after she delivered the quitclaim deed. The district court denied Dawnette’s motion, concluding that Dawnette’s action was untimely because an action to enforce a decree of divorce must be commenced within six years pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the accrual time for the limitations period in an action on a divorce decree commences when there is evidence of indebtedness, which in this case occurred when Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher; and (2) therefore, Dawnette’s claim was time-barred. View "Davidson v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Judgment creditor Far West Industries filed suit against Michael Mona, who, together with Rhonda Mona, was a co-trustee of a family trust. A California court found that Michael committed fraud and awarded Far West a $17.8 million judgment against Michael. Far West domesticated the California judgment in Nevada against Michael and the family trust. The Nevada district court requested to examine Rhonda and ordered the Monas to produce some of Rhonda’s personal financial documents. When the Monas did not produce the documents the district court sanctioned them pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 and concluded that the funds on Rhonda’s three bank accounts were subject to execution by Far West pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.320 to partially satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the post-judgment sanctions order, holding that the district court erred in (1) ordering Rhonda to produce documents and appear for an examination regarding her personal finances without Far West proceeding against Rhonda in her individual capacity or without the court clerk issuing a subpoena and Far West serving the subpoena on Rhonda; and (2) ordering Rhonda’s personal bank accounts to be executed upon pursuant to rule 37 and section 21.320 and to be applied to partially satisfy the judgment. View "Mona v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Education Savings Account (ESA) program allows public funds to be transferred from the State Distributive School Account (DSA) into private education savings accounts maintained for the benefit of school-aged children to pay for non-public educational services and expenses. Two complaints were brought challenging the ESA program as violating several provisions of the Education Article in the Nevada Constitution. The district court dismissed one complaint after rejecting the constitutional claims. In the other case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that one of the constitutional challenges had merit. The Supreme Court resolved the appeals together in this opinion and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court orders in both cases, holding (1) the ESA program is not contrary to the legislature’s constitutional duty to provide for a uniform system of common schools and does not violate Article 11, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution; but (2) the use of money appropriated for K-12 public education to instead fund education savings accounts undermines the constitutional mandates to fund public education. Remanded for the entry of a final declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction enjoining the use of any money appropriated for K-12 public education in the DSA to instead fund the education savings accounts. View "Schwartz v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The district court entered a divorce decree granting Diane Mizrachi and Eli Mizrachi joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. The decree provided that Eli would have the child for the “Jewish holidays” every year. Diane subsequently filed a motion to clarify the decree as to the holiday parenting time schedule. After a hearing, the district court concluded that there was not a clear understanding between the parties at the time of an agreement regarding holiday parenting time and then granted Diane’s request to clarify the meaning of the term the "Jewish holidays” as used in the divorce decree. Eli appealed, arguing that, by interpreting the term “Jewish holidays” in the manner that it did, the district court in essence modified the divorce decree without considering whether the modification was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court clarified, rather than modified, the parties’ divorce decree; and (2) while it was proper for the court to clarify the decree, the court did not apply the proper procedure in doing so. Remanded. View "Mizrachi v. Mizrachi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with intent to commit a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to give his proffered instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Defendant’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to an instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime, and the district court erroneously declined to give such an instruction; and (2) the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Manning v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of vehicular manslaughter in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 484B.657(1). Defendant appealed, arguing that certain phrases in the statute rendered section 484B.657(1) void for vagueness. The district court upheld Defendant’s conviction without addressing Defendant’s arguments concerning the vagueness of the phrases at issue. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the constitutionality of section 484B.657(1). The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 484B.657(1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and does not violate due process; but (2) the district court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the statute without interpreting the challenged phrases. View "Cornella v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the justice court convicted Jennifer Schneider of misdemeanor driving under the influence. The district court reversed Schneider’s conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial, concluding that the justice court’s comments at sentencing showed bias that undermined Schneider’s sentence and her right to a fair trial. The State filed an original writ petition challenging the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it found the justice court’s comments at sentencing indicated a bias against Schneider; but (2) because there was no showing that the bias toward Schneider at sentencing interfered with her right to a fair trial, the district court erred in fashioning a remedy without accounting for the state of the evidence of Schneider’s guilt. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law