Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Catherine Rodriguez defaulted on her loan and elected for foreclosure mediation. At a third, unsuccessful mediation between Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, as the agent of the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), and Rodriguez, Nationstar presented an uncertified, inaccurate copy of the promissory note. Thereafter, BONY filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure. Upon learning that the note presented at the third mediation was inaccurate, Rodriguez filed a petition for judicial review of the mediation against Nationstar and BONY (collectively, Nationstar). The district court excused the untimeliness of the petition based on good cause and found that the note’s certification was false and that Nationstar knew of the falsity. The court sanctioned Nationstar $100,000. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review because the filing of such a petition is not permitted beyond the thirty-day time period provided in Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Rule 21(2), even when a party discovers fraud months after the mediation. View "Nationstar Mortgage v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against Defendant for injuries she received during an accident. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $719,776. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by, inter alia, denying his motion for a mistrial due to jury indoctrination, dismissing jurors for cause that displayed concerns about their ability to award large verdicts, excluding evidence of Plaintiff’s medical liens, and awarding costs to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision as to the award of expert witness fees and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s questioning of the jurors during voir dire did not reach the level of indoctrination; (2) the district court erred by dismissing for cause five jurors, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the medical lien’s existence to prove bias in Plaintiff’s medical providers, but the error was harmless; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by awarding Plaintiff expert witness fees in excess of $1,500 per expert because it did not state a basis for its award. View "Khoury v. Seastrand" on Justia Law

Kelli Barrett filed a complaint against Humboldt General Hospital and Dr. Sharon McIntyre, alleging, inter alia, battery based on an alleged lack of informed consent. Barrett filed the complaint without a supporting medical expert affidavit. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071’s requirement that an expert affidavit be filed with “medical malpractice” actions. The district court denied the motion as to the battery claim. Defendants filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s denial of their motion as Barrett’s battery claim. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that a battery claim against a medical provider based on an allegation of lack of informed consent is subject to section 41A.071’s medical expert affidavit requirement. View "Humboldt Gen. Hosp. v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children as stated in a stipulated order. One provision of the order provided for “teenage discretion” in determining time spent with either parent when a child reaches the age of fourteen, and another provision conferred authority to resolve disputes to a “parenting coordinator” and authorized the district court to issue an order that defines the coordinator’s role. Father later filed a motion to modify the original stipulated child custody order, arguing that the two provisions at issue should be rendered void because they were against public policy. The district court denied modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither contractual provision was against the best interest of the children, which is the paramount public policy concern in child custody matters, and the parenting coordinator provision did not improperly delegate decision-making authority. View "Harrison v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Appellant was a convicted sex offender on lifetime supervision. When Appellant had been on lifetime supervision for five years, the State Board of Parole Commissioners imposed additional conditions that were not enumerated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.1243. The State later filed a complaint charging Appellant with violation of conditions of lifetime supervision and prohibited acts by a sex offender. The jury found Appellant guilty of violating the conditions of his lifetime supervision. On appeal, Appellant argued that section 213.1243 does not delegate authority to the Board to impose additional supervision conditions not enumerated in the statute, and therefore, he did not violate the statute even if he violated the additional conditions imposed by the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of section 213.1243 does not grant the Board authority to impose additional conditions, and this omission was intentional; and (2) because the Board-imposed conditions were unlawful and any Board violations cannot be separated from any section 213.1243 violations, the case must be remanded for a new trial. View "McNeill v. State" on Justia Law

Sumona Islam entered into an agreement with her employer, Atlantis Casino Resort Spa (Atlantis), to refrain from employment or association with any other gaming establishment within 150 miles for one year following the end of her employment. After Islam resigned from Atlantis and began working as a casino host at Grand Sierra Resort (GSR), she entered altered and copied gaming customers’ information from Atlantis’ computer management system into GSR’s computer management system. GSR used this and other information conveyed by Islam to market to those customers without knowing the information was wrongfully obtained. Atlantis filed a complaint against both Islam and GSR, alleging tort and contract claims. All three parties appealed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly found that the noncompete agreement was unreasonable and unenforceable; (2) properly denied Atlantis’ conversion claim based on Islam’s alteration of the electronic information; and (3) properly found that GSR did not misappropriate Atlantis’s trade secrets. View "Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam" on Justia Law

In making sentencing recommendations to district courts in a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) the Division of Parole and Probation uses a Probation Success Probability (PSP) form that places the defendant within a range of sentences on a Sentence Recommendation Selection Scale and provides the basis for the PSI’s sentence recommendation. At issue in these two appeals was whether scoring errors in Defendants’ PSPs adversely influenced the Division’s sentencing recommendations in the PSIs. The Supreme Court held (1) in the first case, the scoring error in the PSP resulted in a flawed PSI recommendation, and Defendant’s sentence was prejudiced as a result; and (2) in the second case, Defendant’s sentence was not prejudiced by potential errors. View "Blankenship v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with possession of a controlled substance. At his preliminary hearing, Petitioner moved to suppress evidence he argued was obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the justice court lacked the authority to hear and rule on the motion to suppress. The justice court concluded that it had authority to rule on suppression issues and suppressed the evidence, concluding that the search was unlawful. The court then dismissed the case against Petitioner for lack of probable cause. The district court remanded the case, ruling that Nevada’s justice courts are limited jurisdiction courts without the power to adjudicate suppression issues in the context of a preliminary hearing. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition seeking a writ directing the district court to vacate its order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that justice courts have express and limited inherent authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings. View "Grace v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

During the course of the guardianship proceedings involving the decedent’s estate in this case the district court entered several orders, including a distribution order. The previous guardian of the decedent’s estate later petitioned the district court for distribution of money held in an operating account associated with certain real property. The district court entered a stipulation and order without the participation, signature, or agreement of the decedent’s judgment creditor. At issue on appeal was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.1365 or the district court’s distribution order governed the distribution of funds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if the source of the funds is the sale of real property, Chapter 159 applies, and if the source of the funds was not the sale of the property, the district court must determine whether its distribution order or Chapter 159 applies, and the district court erred by failing to identify the source of the funds in the operating account; and (2) a valid stipulation requires mutual assent to its terms and either a signed writing indicating assent by the party against whom the stipulation is offered or the presence of all interested parties, and the district court in this case erred by approving the stipulation. View "In re Guardianship & Estate of Echevarria" on Justia Law

Father and Mother divorced in 2011. In 2013, the district court ordered Father to pay additional child support for failing to previously pay child support. In 2014, Mother filed a motion to modify custody and enforce the 2013 order. After a hearing, at which Father represented himself, the district court awarded Mother primary physical custody of the child. The district court then held Father in contempt of court for failing to pay child support. The court sentenced Father to a total of eighty days in jail and stayed the contempt sentence on the condition that Father “follow the Orders of the Court.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a contempt order that does not contain a purge clause is criminal in nature, and because the district court’s contempt order did not contain a purge clause, the district court violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by imposing a criminal sentence without providing Appellant with counsel; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to modify custody on Appellant’s failure to comply with a court order and by failing to consider and set forth its findings as to the Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.480(4) factors for determining the child’s best interest. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law