Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Norman Dupree was arrested and incarcerated in county jail. Justin Bros Bail Bonds and International Fidelity Insurance Company (collectively, Justin Bros) posted Dupree’s bond (bond number one). Dupree was later remanded to custody based on a pretrial supervision violation. Bonafide Bail Bonds posted bond (bond number two). Dupree failed to appear for his arraignment but later surrendered himself. Justin Bros posted another bond (bond number three). Dupree failed to appear for the arraignment. The district court entered a judgment of forfeiture for bond number one. Justin Bros filed a motion for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, Dupree surrendered. The district court denied the motion. After Dupree pled guilty and was sentenced, Justin Bros filed a motion to set aside the bond forfeiture judgment or to exonerate bond number one. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Dupree failed to appear for his arraignments, he breached the agreement to answer the charges specified and to be amenable to the court process; and (2) consequently, the district court was prohibited from exonerating bond number one unless one of Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.509(1)’s enumerated conditions materialized, which did not occur in this case. View "Justin v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Nevada Constitution prohibits the Legislature from amending or repealing a voter-initiated statute for three years after it takes effect. Scenic Nevada, Inc. qualified an initiative for submission to general-election voters in 2000. The initiative passed, and the Initiative Ordinance, which related to the construction of new billboards, became effective. Within three years of the new law’s effective date, the City of Reno enacted two billboard-related ordinances, the Conforming Ordinance and the Banking Ordinance, which amended the Initiative Ordinance. In 2012, the City enacted the Digital Ordinance, which reenacted and amended the Conforming and Banking Ordinances. Scenic Nevada sued the City, seeking to invalidate the Digital Ordinance because it incorporated the Conforming and Banking Ordinances, which were enacted within the first three years of the voters’ 2000 Initiative Ordinance. The district court entered judgment for the City, concluding that the three-year legislative moratorium does not apply to municipal initiatives. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the three-year legislative moratorium applies to municipal initiatives; and (2) although the City enacted the Conforming and Banking Ordinances within three years of its passage, the subsequent reenactment of those ordinances after the three-year legislative moratorium cured the constitutional defect. View "Scenic Nevada, Inc. v. City of Reno" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for 15 counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant argued that 14 of his 15 convictions for possessing child pornography must be vacated because NRS 200.730 penalizes possession, and the State proved only "a singular act of digital possession of items seized on the day the police took the computers into police custody." The court held, consistent with case law and the rule of lenity established in its law, that defendant's simultaneous possession at one time and place of 15 images depicting child pornography constituted a single violation of NRS 200.730. Therefore, the State proved one, not 15, violations. The court concluded that defendant's remaining claims are either meritless or harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment of conviction. View "Castaneda v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in municipal court of failing to stop his vehicle at a stop sign, a misdemeanor offense. At issue on appeal is whether NRS 189.030(1) confers a duty on a municipal court, rather than a misdemeanor appellant, to provide a transcript for a defendant's misdemeanor appeal and whether a district court may dismiss an appeal for an appellant's failure to obtain transcripts from the municipal court. The court held that a misdemeanor appellant is responsible for requesting transcripts and, if not indigent, paying for those transcripts. Furthermore, the court held that the district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a misdemeanor appeal where the appellant fails to prosecute an appeal or comply with the court's orders. Although the district court has that authority, dismissal is an extreme remedy, and therefore, the better practice is to allow the appeal to proceed and to decide the case based upon the documents submitted and any briefs filed. In this case, the district court acted within its jurisdiction and did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Accordingly, the court denied the pro se petition for writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, and writ of certiorari. View "Sparks v. Bare" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred at sentencing by failing to pronounce the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment as required by statute. The court concluded that it was error for the district court not to aggregate the sentences in the judgment of conviction but that error does not warrant a new sentencing hearing as it does not affect the sentences imposed for each offense. Because defendant failed to demonstrate that his convictions or sentences are infirm, the court affirmed the conviction. However, the court remanded for the district court to correct the judgment of conviction to include the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of his consecutive sentences as required by NRS 176.035(1). View "Mason v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant was sentenced to death for felony murder. Defendant's two codefendants were also convicted on the same charges but received life sentences without the possibility of parole. The court previously held in Flanagan v. State that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it allows evidence of the codefendants' sentences. The court reaffirmed its holding in Flanagan, concluding, specifically, that the district court has discretion to admit evidence of a codefendant's sentence in a first-degree murder sentencing hearing. The court further concluded that defendant's challenge to the district court's ruling allowing the State to argue twice during closing arguments at the penalty hearing lacks merit. Defendant's contention that his sentence is excessive also lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "Harte v. State" on Justia Law

G&V received settlement funds from a personal injury claim without first filing perfection notices. NRS 18.015(3) requires an attorney to perfect a lien by serving notice "upon the party against whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien." NRS 18.015(4) provides that the lien attaches to recovery "from the time of service of the notices required." The court held that in order to comply with both subsections of the statute, attorneys must, prior to recovery, perfect their liens by serving notice that states both the attorney's percentage of the recovery and that the lien will include court costs and out-of-pocket costs advanced by the attorney in an amount to be determined. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's decision to order a pro-rata distribution because G&V did not perfect its lien until well after it recovered funds in the personal injury settlement. The court affirmed the denial of costs. The court clarified that an attorney need not deposit funds with the court in an interpleader action so long as the attorney keeps the funds in his or her client trust account for the duration of the interpleader action. View "Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, as the custodial parent, sought child support payments from respondent. The district court entered a child support order; appellant subsequently moved for enforcement and alleged that respondent had child support arrearages; and respondent, who had received public assistance during a portion of the time she owed support, asserted that her child support obligation should be suspended under NRS 425.360(4). The court concluded that the provisions of NRS 425.360 are only implicated when public assistance has "creat[ed] a debt for support to the Division" of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services. It does not apply to suspend child support payments owed by one parent to another. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for recalculation of child support arrearages. View "Valdez v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

After respondent received a judgment for child support arrears and penalties against appellant in Nevada, as well as an award of attorney fees, appellant appealed the order. Under NRS 125.040(1)(c), a district court has discretion in a divorce suit to require one party to pay an amount of money necessary to assist the other party in carrying on or defending the suit. The court held that a district court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees pendente lite for the costs of an appeal pursuant to NRS 125.040. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Griffith v. Gonzales-Alpizar" on Justia Law

After the Borrower defaulted on a loan, the Guarantor (the petitioner) allegedly breached the guaranty. Omni (the real party in interest) filed a complaint against the Guarantor for the alleged default on the guaranty. At issue on appeal is whether a creditor's amended complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against petitioner may relate back to a timely complaint against a different party pursuant to NRCP 15(c), so as to satisfy NRS 40.455(1)'s six-month deadline for an application for a deficiency judgment against petitioner. The court concluded that the district court erred in permitting the real party in interest's amended complaint to relate back to the timely original complaint pursuant to NRCP 15(c), so as to satisfy the six-month deadline for an application for a deficiency judgment against petitioner, as required by NRS 40.455(1); the timely complaint against the borrowers does not constitute a valid application for deficiency judgment against the unnamed petitioner; and petitioner did not waive his right to object under NRS 40.455(1). Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment in the guaranty action and motion to dismiss in the borrower action, and the court granted the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Badger v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law