Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. (Grupo), a Mexican company, agreed to guarantee a commercial lease entered into between Famsa, Inc. (Famsa) and Uno LLC (Uno). When Famsa failed to comply with the terms of the lease, Uno filed a complaint against Famsa and Grupo for breach of the commercial lease and guaranty. Uno served Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention). The Mexican Central Authority issued a certificate of proof of international service of process upon Grupo. Grupo filed a motion to quash service of process, arguing that service of process was constitutionally deficient. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash. Grupo subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Grupo. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) service of process on a foreign company pursuant to the Hague Convention does not satisfy constitutional due process when service depends solely upon a certificate of compliance issued by the foreign nation’s central authority; and (2) the district court failed to conduct the necessary fact-finding to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient in this case. View "Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The parties in this case disputed who had rights to certain spring waters. The state engineer adjudicated the parties’ rights and entered a final order of determination. Both parties filed exceptions to the state engineer’s final order. Before the matter was heard before the district court, Respondent filed a motion to supplement his earlier filed exceptions to include property access claims arising from its water rights. The district court granted Respondent’s request. The district court then affirmed the state engineer’s order of determination, as modified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly considered the notice of supplemental exceptions in affirming the state engineer’s order of determination, as modified, including Respondent’s supplemental request that the district court’s judgment confirm Respondent’s right of access to certain property to repair and maintain the facilities necessary to convey water; and (2) the district court’s findings were based on substantial evidence. View "Jackson v. Groenendyke" on Justia Law

In Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada v. Chandler, the Supreme Court held that an insurer may refuse to pay additional funds when a claimant reopens a workers’ compensation claim until the claimant demonstrates that he or she has exhausted any third-party settlement funds. In the instant case, Appellant, a construction driver, was injured by another driver during the course of his employment. Appellant filed a workers’ compensation claim, which his employer, through a workers’ compensation administrator (collectively, Employer), accepted. Employer eventually closed the claim. When Appellant was unable to return to work, he sought to reopen his claim, but Employer denied it. Appellant filed an administrative appeal. An appeals officer granted Employer summary judgment. At issue on appeal was whether Chandler precluded Appellant from reopening his claim because he spent settlement funds on expenses other than medical costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a claimant may reopen his workers’ compensation claim after exhausting his settlement funds on nonmedical expenses; and (2) the appeals officer erred when issuing a decision without detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Poremba v. Southern Nevada Paving" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it admitted Defendant’s inculpatory statements to detectives because he was not advised of his Miranda rights and was subject to an alleged custodial interrogation. The State, in response, claimed that Defendant spoke voluntarily with the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the police subjected him to a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting recordings taken by Defendant, who wore a wire and spoke with others involved in the murder to corroborate his story; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to convicted Defendant of conspiracy and murder. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint asserting claims to quiet title and for adverse possession. On August 11, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice for want of prosecution. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal was premature because the two-year time period in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) had not passed. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. The two appeals were subsequently consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court’s findings of fact, on which it based its conclusions of law and decision to dismiss the action with prejudice, were unsupported by the evidence in the record and that there was no evidence presented that supported a finding that dismissal with prejudice was warranted. View "Hunter v. Gang" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property. Because he could not afford bail, Respondent was incarcerated for one year. Respondent was fired by Employer because of his unexcused absences caused by his incarceration. The Nevada Employment Security Division (ESD) and the ESD Board of Review concluded that Respondent was not entitled to unemployment benefits because, by admitting to the criminal conduct that caused his incarceration, Respondent committed disqualifying misconduct. The district court reversed, ruling that the only misconduct connected with work was Respondent’s absenteeism, which was insufficient to deny benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent’s absence from work was directly caused by his criminal conduct, and therefore, Respondent was disqualified from receiving benefits under Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.385. View "State, Employment Sec. Div. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Washoe County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights as to his three minor children. Father filed a demand for a jury trial. The district court denied Father’s demand, concluding that the right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding is not guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution, common law, or statute. After a bench trial, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his three minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Father’s demand for a jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding, as neither the Nevada Constitution nor the United States Constitution guarantees a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to the three minor children. View "Jesus F. v. Washoe County Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The district court denied Defendant’s motion so suppress statements he made in two interviews with police after his initial appearance before a magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before the magistrate, but Defendant waived his right to have counsel present at the subsequent interviews; but (2) the district court clearly erred when it rejected Defendant’s objection under Batson v. Kentucky to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove an African American from the venire during jury selection. Remanded. View "McCarty v. State" on Justia Law

A psychiatrist filed a petition for court-ordered continued involuntary admission of Petitioner to a mental health facility on the grounds that there was an imminent risk that Petitioner would harm himself or others if he were not involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility. The district court granted the petition. Twelve days after the district court’s involuntary admission order was entered, Petitioner was unconditionally released from the mental health facility. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus asking that the Supreme Court direct the district court to recall from the Central Repository for inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System the previously transmitted record of Petitioner’s involuntary admission. In support of his petition, Petitioner argued, inter alia, that Nev. Rev. Stat. 433A.310(5) did not authorize transmission of the involuntary admission order until that order became final under Nev. Rev. Stat. 433A.310(1). The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for extraordinary writ relief, holding (1) section 433A.310(5)’s plain language requires a district court to transmit an admission order to the Central Repository at the time it is entered; and (2) clear and convincing evidence justified Petitioner’s involuntary admission. View "Vu v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a personal injury suit against Appellant arising from an automobile accident. Before trial, Respondents filed a motion in limine to preclude Appellant from presenting a low-impact defense in the case. The district court granted Respondents’ motion, concluding that the result was required by Hallmark v. Eldridge. During the trial, the court sustained eight objections by Respondents to Appellant’s questions and evidence as violating the pretrial order prohibiting a low-impact defense. Following these alleged violations and violations of two additional pretrial orders, the district court struck Appellant’s answer as a sanction. The court then entered a default judgment against Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the district court erred in extending Hallmark to preclude all argument of a low-impact defense; and (2) any misconduct by Appellant’s trial counsel did not rise to the level requiring the case-ending sanctions imposed by the district court under BMW v. Roth. View "Rish v. Simao" on Justia Law