Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, a contractor, and Appellant, a homeowner, entered into a contract under which Respondent agreed to install automation, sound, surveillance, and landscaping systems in Appellant’s residence. Respondent did not have an electrical contractor’s license when it bid the contract and began the work but did receive a license before it completed the work. When the parties disagreed on the performance of the contract, Appellant refused to tender further payment to Respondent, and Respondent filed a notice of lien against Appellant’s residence. Respondent filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, foreclosure of notice of lien, and declaratory relief, alleging that an electrical license was not required for the work performed on Appellant’s residence and that its lien was proper and perfected. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Respondent’s work on Appellant’s residence required a license and whether Respondent completed the contract in a workmanlike manner, thereby possibly negating Appellant’s obligation to make final payment under the contract. Remanded. View "Tom v. Innovative Home Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 302 (S.B. 302) by filing suit against the State Treasurer. Petitioners, parents seeking to apply for the grant established by S.B. 302, moved to intervene as defendants. Petitioners argued that they satisfied the requirements for intervention of right under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b) or, alternatively, that they should be permitted to intervene under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The district court denied the motion. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant their application to intervene. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene where Petitioners and the State shared the same goal of having the education grant program created by S.B. 302 declared constitutional. View "Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was terminated from her employment with Employer for failing to maintain an intern certification or obtain a counselor certification as required by Employer’s employment policy. Appellant applied to the Department of Employment, Training & Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division (ESD) for unemployment benefits. ESD denied Appellant’s claim, finding that she was terminated for misconduct connected with her work. ESD’s Board of Review denied Appellant’s appeal. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review, concluding that Appellant’s failure to receive her bachelor’s degree within ten years constituted misconduct connected with her employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she made a reasonable, good-faith attempt to maintain her certification or to timely graduate, Appellant’s conduct amounted to disqualifying misconduct. View "Goodwin v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2014, Respondent applied to the Division of Parole and Probation for a change in his probation discharge status under a set of regulations adopted pursuant to a statute (referred to as Section 16) that sunsetted in 2008. The Division denied Respondent’s request due to Respondent’s failure to satisfy his parole obligation of community service. Respondent urged the Division to comply with Section 16, but the Division maintained that Section 16 expired in 2008. Respondent filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Division to comply with Section 16 and grant his application, arguing that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously and denying his application because the Division granted two other applications after 2008. The district court agreed with Respondent and granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously, such that mandamus relief was necessary, because Respondent did not show that, post-2008, the Division was granting applications for individuals who, like Respondent, failed to satisfy probation obligations. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Coley" on Justia Law

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their two minor children, and Kersten received primary physical custody of both children. In 2013, the parties’ daughter, I.M., moved to her grandparents’ house in Reno, where she currently resides. In 2014, Michael sought primary physical custody of I.M. The district court awarded primary physical custody of I.M. to her grandparents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the grandparents custody of I.M. because the grandparents were neither parties to nor intervenors in the custody suit, the court failed to notify the Micones that it was considering the grandparents as a custodial option, and the court did not make the requisite findings to overcome the parental preference. View "Micone v. Micone" on Justia Law

Jorgenson & Koka, LLP (J&K) filed this professional negligence action against the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) and real parties in interest PWREO Eastern and St. Rose LLC (collectively, PWREO) and the City of Henderson. J&K, which leased a portion of a shopping center owned by PWREO, alleging that water entered its premises on two separate occasions and that NDOT failed to prevent the flooding. PWREO filed a cross-claim against NDOT and the City. NDOT moved to dismiss the amended complaint and the cross-claim for failure to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258. The district court denied the motions. This petition for writ relief followed. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that NDOT is not a design professional as envisioned by the legislature in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.2565(1)(a), and therefore, the requirements of section 11.258 are inapplicable to NDOT since the action would not statutorily qualify as “an action involving nonresidential construction.” View "Nev. Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related felonies. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant filed a postconviction habeas proceeding but was denied relief. Defendant then filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the ineffective assistance of the attorney who represented him in the first postconviction proceeding excused the procedural bars to claims raised in his second petition. The district court denied the petition as both untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied the petition as procedurally barred because, although Defendant filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconviction-counsel claims became available, those claims lacked merit, and therefore, Defendant had not demonstrated good cause for an untimely petition or good cause and prejudice for a second petition. View "Rippo v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to Alford, to voluntary manslaughter and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial bodily harm. After entry of Appellant’s guilty plea, but before sentencing, the State obtained an affidavit relevant to Appellant’s case. The State did not disclose the affidavit to Appellant but used the affidavit at Appellant’s sentencing hearing to impeach Appellant’s girlfriend after she provided a favorable oral statement to the court on Appellant’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) because the affidavit was not favorable to Appellant, there was no Brady violation; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose the affidavit in accordance with the State’s open-file discovery policy, but the misconduct did not warrant a new sentencing hearing; and (3) the district court erred by not issuing a written order granting a media outlet’s request to record Appellant’s sentencing hearing and by not making the requisite particularized findings on the record, but the errors were harmless. View "Quisano v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a timely post-probate will contest but failed to timely issue a citation to Respondent, the executor of the estate, in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 137.090. Appellant filed a petition to enlarge time for issuing citations. The probate commissioner recommended that the petition be granted, determining that Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.25 granted the court discretion to extend the time limit for issuing citations. The district court dismissed the will contest, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits. The court did not address whether Rule 2.25 applied in this matter. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order, holding (1) a failure to timely issue citations to the estate’s personal representative and the will’s devisees constitutes grounds for dismissal of a will contest; (2) Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits; but (3) the district court erred in failing to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule 2.25 when requesting an enlargement of time to issue the citations. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Black" on Justia Law

MB America, Inc. (MBA) and Alaska Pacific Leasing Company entered into an agreement whereby Alaska Pacific agreed to become a dealer for MBA’s line of products. A dispute later arose between the parties, and MBA sued Alaska Pacific in the district court. Alaska Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that MBA had prematurely filed its complaint because it had not complied with a prelitigation mediation provision in the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alaska Pacific. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prelitigation provision in the parties’ contract was a condition precedent to litigation; (2) MBA did not initiate mediation as required under the agreement; and (3) therefore, the district court correctly granted Alaska Pacific’s motion for summary judgment and did not err in granting attorney fees to Alaska Pacific. View "MB America, Inc. v. Alaska Pacific Leasing Co." on Justia Law