Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case were a homeowners’ association (HOA) and a foreclosure sale buyer. On summary judgment, the district court set aside a trustee’s deed following the HOA’s assessment lien foreclosure sale, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(2) limited the HOA lien to nine months of common expense assessments, and the HOA acted unfairly and oppressively in insisting on more than that amount to cancel the sale; (2) the bid price was grossly inadequate as a matter of law; and (3) the buyer did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.31166’s enactment, in an appropriate case, did not eliminate a court’s authority to grant equitable relief from a defective HOA lien foreclosure sale; but (2) the district court in this case erred in limiting the HOA lien amount to nine months of common expense assessments and in resolving on summary judgment the issues of fact regarding the parties’ conduct, the foreclosure sale buyer’s status, the HOA lien amount, and the competing equities. Remanded. View "Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.3705(1) allows the State Engineer to subject newly approved water applications to an incremental use process. The statute was enacted in 2007. In 1989, Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) filed various water permit applications with the State Engineer. Many entities, including the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (CPB), opposed SNWA’s applications. Ultimately, in 2012, the State Engineer denied some of SNWA’s applications and granted others. The State Engineer subjected SNWA’s approved applications to three stages of incremental development and monitoring. CPB and others petitioned the district court for review. The district court rejected CPB’s argument that the State Engineer gave section 533.3705(1) an improper retroactive effect but reversed and remanded the State Engineer’s ruling on other grounds. CPB subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ barring the State Engineer from applying section 533.3705(1) to SNWA’s applications. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the State Engineer applied section 533.3705(1) prospectively to applications approved in 2012, and therefore, the State Engineer did not apply section 533.3705(1) retroactively in this case. View "Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant, a payday loan company, provided loans to the named plaintiffs. The named plaintiffs and other borrowers did not repay their loans, prompting Appellant to file several thousand individual collection actions. Appellant secured thousands of default judgments against the named plaintiffs. It was later discovered that the process server hired by Appellant falsified affidavits of service. The named plaintiffs sued Appellant, alleging that Appellant improperly obtained its default judgments against them and other similarly situated borrowers without their knowledge. Appellant moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in its loan agreements. The district court denied Appellant’s motions, holding that Appellant waived its right to arbitrate by bringing collection actions in justice court and obtaining default judgments based on falsified affidavits of service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Appellant waived its right to an arbitral forum where the named plaintiffs’ claims all concerned the validity of the default judgments Appellant obtained against them in justice court. View "Principal Investments v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116(4), if two or more homeowners’ associations (HOAs) have liens for assessments created at any time on the same property, those liens have “equal priority.” The property at issue in this dispute was part of two HOAs - Appellant and a nonparty. The nonparty foreclosed on the property, and Respondent purchased it. Appellant subsequently recorded a lien against the property for unpaid association dues pre-dating the foreclosure sale. When the lien went unpaid, Appellant set a foreclosure sale date. Respondent sought to preliminarily enjoin the foreclosure sale, arguing that section 116.3116(4) gives equal priority to multiple HOA liens, and therefore, the nonparty’s foreclosure sale extinguished Appellant’s lien. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under section 116.3116(4), the nonparty’s foreclosure sale extinguished Appellant’s lien, but Appellant remained entitled to its proper share of the sale proceeds. View "Southern Highlands Cmty. Ass’n v. San Florentine Ave. Trust" on Justia Law

The City of Fernley filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief arguing that the Local Government Tax Distribution Account under Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.660 violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the prohibition on special or local legislation under Nev. Const. art IV, 20. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly found the Local Government Tax Distribution Account to be general legislation because the system is a “general law that applies neutrally to local government entities and is based on classifications that are rationally related to achieving the Legislature’s legitimate government objective of promoting general-purpose governments that have public services.” View "City of Fernley v. State, Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

The State filed an amended abuse and neglect petition alleging that Mother’s two minor children needed the State’s protection. Mother’s case plan included a provision that she must randomly submit to drug testing. The district court ordered, instead, that an agent of the Department of Children and Family Services could require Mother to take a drug test if the agent reasonably believed that Mother was under the influence of a controlled substance. Mother filed a motion to amend her case plan, arguing that the drug-testing requirement infringed on her constitutional rights. The district court denied Mother’s motion. Mother subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the portion of the district court’s order establishing the drug-testing requirement in her case plan. The Supreme court granted the petition, holding that because the district court did not make any findings to support the drug-testing requirement in the case plan, there were no explicit factual findings to show why this action step in Mother’s case plan was justified, and a writ of mandamus was warranted. View "Manuela H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondents Dawn Stockman, an animal control officer for Clark County Animal Control, and Clark County obtained a warrant to search Appellant Judy Palmieri’s residence by relying in part on a tip from an informant who, Palmieri later alleged, provided a false identity when she filed a complaint against Palmieri. A search of Palmieri’s residence revealed several violations of the Clark County Code’s provisions for the health and welfare of animals. Palmieri later sued Respondents, asserting a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, a Monell claim, and several state law causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court appropriately granted Stockman summary judgment on Palmieri’s 1983 claim based on a finding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stockman was entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore, the district court appropriately granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. View "Palmieri v. Clark County" on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes, was sentenced to serve fourteen consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of ninety-two years in prison. In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The district court granted Defendant’s petition and ordered a new sentencing hearing, determining (1) Graham prohibited aggregate sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and (2) Graham also provided good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar of Defendant’s untimely and successive petition. Although the Supreme Court agreed that Graham precludes aggregate sentences that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that the decision in Graham provides good cause and actual prejudice for Defendant’s untimely and successive petition, the Court nonetheless vacated the district court’s order, holding that A.B. 267 remedies Defendant’s unconstitutional sentence. View "State v. Boston" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes for the death of a member of a motorcycle gang after a brawl between two motorcycle gangs. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to answer two questions from the jury during deliberations; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to bifurcate the gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase; and (3) the cumulative effect of these and other errors deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law