Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Real parties in interest filed a professional negligence action against several healthcare providers. All defendants settled except for Petitioners. During pretrial proceedings, real parties in interest filed a motion in limine to bar Petitioners from arguing the comparative fault of the settled defendants at trial and including those defendants’ names on jury verdict forms. The district court granted the motion. Petitioners subsequently asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to allow Petitioners to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and to include those defendants’ names on the jury verdict form for the purpose of allocating liability among all defendants. At issue before the Supreme Court was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.045, which makes healthcare provider defendants severally liable in professional negligence actions for economic and noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the provision of several liability found in section 41A.045 entitles a defendant in a healthcare provider professional negligence action to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants and to include the settled defendants’ names on applicable jury verdict forms where the jury could conclude that the settled defendants’ negligence caused some or all of the plaintiff’s injury. View "Piroozi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of violating Carson City Municipal Code (CCMC) 3.04.050. CCMC 3.04.050(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any…member of the sheriff’s office…in the discharge of his official duties.” Petitioner appealed, arguing that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it restricts constitutional speech. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overboard because is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words and is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks sufficient guidelines and gives the sheriff too much discretion in its enforcement. Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order reversing Petitioner’s conviction in part on the grounds that CCMC 8.04.050(1) is unconstitutional on its face and to determine whether Petitioner may properly be charged under the remainder of CCMC 8.04.050. View "Scott v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant in a criminal complaint with a category C felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337(2)(b) but did not allege a prior conviction as required by statute. The justice court concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proof for the category C felony and discharged Defendant. The State moved for leave to file an information by affidavit and included a proposed information charging Defendant with a category D felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337(2)(a). The motion was filed sixty-three days after the justice court discharged Defendant. The district court granted the State’s motion, concluding that the State’s delay in filing the motion did not prejudice Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice by the State’s delay in filing the motion to file an information by affidavit; and (2) the district court did not err by allowing the State to file the information by affidavit based on a finding that the justice court committed egregious error that resulted in Defendant’s discharge. View "Moultrie v. State" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation, the State had located and seized approximately $125,000 from bank accounts kept by Bryan Fergason at Bank of America. The State filed a complaint against the seized money pleading a single cause of action in forfeiture and alleging that the seized money represented proceeds attributable to the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmance of Fergason’s criminal proceedings, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of showing an absence of genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the funds seized from Fergason’s bank accounts were subject to forfeiture as proceeds attributable to the commission of a felony, and therefore, the burden of production did not shift to Fergason. Remanded. View "Fergason v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, burglary, and robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging newly discovered evidence and asserting nine claims. Appellant supported his petition with declarations that, if true, may establish a gateway claim of actual innocence. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition without allowing discovery or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly discounted the declarations offered in support of Appellant’s petition, which presented specific factual allegations of Appellant’s innocence that were not belied by the record and were sufficient to merit discovery and an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s gateway actual innocence claim. View "Berry v. State" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.160 states that homicide is justified in response to a reasonable apprehension of the commission of a felony or in the actual resistance of an attempted felony, but the statute does not specify the type of felony. Defendant was charged with battery with the use of a deadly weapon and attempted assault with the use of a deadly weapon for lighting the victim on fire during an altercation at a gas station. At trial, Defendant claimed that his actions were a justifiable battery because he reasonably believed the victim was committing felony coercion against him at the time of the incident. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court gave a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of Nevada law and that his conviction for attempted assault was legally impossible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the use of deadly force in response to a felony is justified only when the person poses a threat of serious bodily injury, and the amount of force used must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances; and (2) attempted assault under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.471(1)(a)(2) is not legally impossible. View "Newell v. State" on Justia Law

During Vivian Harrison’s divorce proceeding to Kirk Harrison, Kirk hired psychiatrist Norton Roitman to conduct a psychiatric analysis of Vivian. Without meeting with or examining Vivian, Dr. Roitman submitted to the court a written report diagnosing Vivian with a personality disorder. Vivian subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Roitman, alleging that his statements constituted, inter alia, medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Roitman’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Dr. Roitman was absolutely immune from liability for each of Vivian’s causes of action because he was a witness preparing an expert report in connection with the matter in controversy at the time he made the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the allegations contained in Vivian’s complaint were true, Dr. Roitman's defense of absolute immunity precluded her claim. View "Harrison v. Roitman" on Justia Law

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest (collectively, Seaver) filed a complaint against Petitioners (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet Imaging, Inc., alleging claims arising out of agreements between the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet’s purchase of the Helfsteins’ companies. The Helfsteisn settled with Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Helfsteins. Seaver later filed a notice of rescission, alleging that the Helfsteisn fraudulently induced them to settle. Meanwhile, the district court resolved the claims between Seaver and Uninet. Seaver later filed a Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal, seeking to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteisn filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the Rule 60(b) motion was procedurally improper. The district court denied the motion. The Helfsteins then filed this original writ petition asking the Supreme Court to consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that even if Rule 60(b) applied in this case, the motion was time-barred. View "Helfstein v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law